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ABSTRACT

Despite decades of scientific research and increased civil and governmental calls for
reform, the United States continues to spiral toward climate catastrophe. Apocalyptic rhetoric
helps us understand how even the most pressing environmental and societal threats are perceived
differently according to audiences’ rhetorical and ideological frameworks. Drawing on the work
of Barry Brummett and Kenneth Burke, I argue that the premillennial sub-genre of apocalyptic
rhetoric constitutes a rhetorical frame through which many secular climate reformers and
evangelical Christians make sense of the environmental and societal impacts of climate change.
In chapters that analyze secular and Christian climate reform discourse and apocalyptic
evangelical discourse produced during the COVID-19 pandemic, I demonstrate through
rhetorical analysis that apocalyptic rhetoric is a persistent frame through which citizens make
sense of not only climate change but other perceived threats. I suggest that by attending to the
influence of apocalyptic rhetoric on the production and reception of climate change and climate
reform discourse, climate reform rhetors may be positioned to produce environmental discourse
that is more likely to engage (or at least not alienate) a wider variety of U.S. audiences,
especially evangelical Christians. Drawing upon the findings of environmental rhetoric and
communication scholars, I outline a series of rhetorical strategies that may be used to more
productively engage not just climate resistant audiences but a variety of audiences whose
attitudes toward a particular societal problem are characterized by intense ideological resistance.
Despite the potential for such strategies to create possibilities for rhetorical engagement, I
suggest that the influence of premillennialism on U.S. climate action leads us to reconsider the
role of deliberative democratic discourse as a means of resolving such large-scale, pressing

problems in the public sphere. I conclude this project by reflecting on the implications of
apocalyptic rhetoric for climate reform discourse within the U.S. more generally, as well as the
structural inequities that continue to fuel such resistance among evangelical Christian audiences.

AN OVERHEATED DEBATE: THE INFLUENCE OF PREMILLENNIAL APOCALYPTIC
RHETORIC ON CLIMATE REFORM DISCOURSE IN THE UNITED STATES

by
David Gall-Maynard

B.A., The Ohio State University, 2008
M.A., Minnesota State University, 2010
M.A., University of Findlay, 2017

Dissertation
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Composition and Cultural Rhetoric.

Syracuse University
May 2022

Copyright © David Charles Gall-Maynard 2022
All Rights Reserved

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The research and writing of this dissertation was made possible by the generous support of my
core dissertation committee, Professors Lois Agnew, Eileen Schell, and Patrick Berry.

As my Dissertation Chair, I have greatly benefited from Lois’ unique combination of intellectual
curiosity and scholarly rigor. There were several moments in the creation of this dissertation
when I felt like I had lost the thread of my central argument, and one conversation with Lois was
all I needed to get back on track. In addition to providing invaluable insight and advice on the
project, I could also sense Lois’ enthusiasm for the intellectual journey this project reflects. In
moments of doubt, knowing that Lois believed in the project was often all I needed to push
forward. I will always be grateful to Lois for modeling the kind of teacher, scholar, and
administrator that I aspire to be.

Likewise, I am very grateful to Eileen Schell, my Second Reader, for so eagerly agreeing to be a
part of this project and continuing to provide invaluable feedback and support even as the scope
of the project evolved over the past two and half years. It is so easy to develop tunnel vision as a
researcher, especially when attempting to take on such complex topics as apocalyptic rhetoric,
climate change, and evangelical identity. Yet Eileen’s thought-provoking suggestions helped me
to continuously question the assumptions that inspired this project and have helped to make this
project more complex and compelling as a result.

v

Next, I would like to express my deep appreciation for Patrick Berry, my Third Reader, whose
endless encouragement and incredibly attentive readings of my materials helped me to remain
excited about this research even as the process of writing the dissertation took much longer than I
had expected. As an advisor and teacher, Patrick embodies so many of the values that I strive to
cultivate in myself: patience, contemplativeness, excitement to be a part of another’s intellectual
journey, and an ever-present passion for producing stylistically excellent, engaging writing.
Considered collectively, Lois, Eileen, and Patrick have not only helped to make this dissertation
possible, but they have helped me to better understand what kind of teacher, scholar, and
administrator I would like to be. For all of this, I am endlessly thankful.

In addition to Lois, Eileen, and Patrick, who made up my core committee, I would also like to
thank my Outside Readers, Brice Nordquist and Collin Brooke, for generously agreeing to be a
part of this project and my Defense. Through their helpful insights and suggestions, Brice and
Collin have helped me to think more carefully about how this research may contribute to the
field of rhetorical studies moving forward. Lastly, I would like to thank Richard Buttny of the
Department of Communication and Rhetorical Studies at Syracuse University for so
enthusiastically agreeing to be my Defense Chair. Having not officially met at the time, Richard
agreed to be my Chair based on his interest in the subject matter and his desire to contribute to a
graduate student’s intellectual growth and career. I can only hope to embody such generosity and
engagement in my own duties as a teacher and administrator.

In addition to my committee, I want to thank my wife, Maggie, for her endless patience and
support throughout this entire process. I cannot count the number of nights when I went to my

vi

office because I had to do “one more thing” with my dissertation before I could unwind, and I
ended up either reading or typing the evening away. For all of these nights—and for listening to
my endless rants about apocalyptic rhetoric—I cannot thank you enough. I am beyond lucky to
have you in my life, and I love you more than I can express, now and forever.

Lastly, I would like to dedicate this dissertation to my mom, Elizabeth Maynard, and to my now
twenty-month-old daughter, Aspasia.

My mother passed away suddenly in December 2017 and never got to discuss my dissertation
with me. Nor will she see me graduate and become the first PhD in the family. However, so
much of this project embodies my mother’s relentless questioning of comfortable assumptions, a
trait that I am proud to say I inherited from her and one that is especially suited to the study of
rhetoric. Even though my mother is gone, her spirit—especially her stubbornness—permeates
this project, as it does so much of my orientation toward the world. I will be forever grateful to
my mother for supporting and inspiring me to enrich my understanding of the world and
humanity’s place within it.

Finally, I dedicate this dissertation to my daughter, Aspasia Gall-Maynard. Born during a
worldwide pandemic, isolated from family and friends, you nevertheless thrived. And even as I
would get bogged down in the details and daily stress of completing this project, the sound of
your voice, your laughter, the sight of your smiling face, or your hand presenting me with a
crayon to color with you was all I needed to remember why I am doing any of this in the first
place. Aspasia, you are the greatest inspiration I have ever had, and I will love you forever.

vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ……………………………………………………………………………………... i
TITLE PAGE …………………………………………………………………………………… iii
COPYRIGHT NOTICE ………………………………………………………………………… iv
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ……………………………………………………………………... v
TABLE OF CONTENTS ……………………………………………………………………... viii
CHAPTER ONE: Introduction ………………………………………………………………….. 1
CHAPTER TWO: Methodology: ……………………………………………………………… 27
CHAPTER THREE: Evaluating Premillennial Apocalyptic Rhetoric in Secular Climate Reform
Discourse ……………………………………………………………………………………….. 70
CHAPTER FOUR: Lukewarm Millennialism in a Warming World: Evaluating the Influence of
Premillennial Apocalyptic Frames of Acceptance on Evangelical Attitudes Toward Climate
Reform Discourse ………………………………………………………..………………….... 125
CHAPTER FIVE: Rhetorical Strategies for Engaging Resistant Audiences on Climate Change
Even as We Acknowledge the Limitations of Democratic Discourse ………………………... 169
CHAPTER SIX: Conclusion: Where Do We Go from Here? Reflecting on the Implications of
Apocalyptic Rhetoric for the Study and Production of Climate Reform Discourse ………….. 218
WORKS CITED ……………………………………………………………………………… 233
VITA ………………………………………………………………………………………….. 254

viii

1
CHAPTER ONE
Introduction1

Introduction
Between September 20 and 27, 2019, upwards of seven and a half million people (Taylor
et al.; 350.org Team) gathered across the world to demand climate reform, with more than
500,000 striking in the U.S. alone (350.org Team). Emerging out of the youth-led Fridays for
Future protests begun by teenage Swedish climate activist Greta Thunberg (Feller), the Global
Climate Strike consisted of “students, parents, trade unions, businesses, health workers,
scientists, celebrities, people of all backgrounds, ages, regions and faiths” participating in “6,100
events . . . held in 185 countries, with the support of 73 Trade Unions, 820 civil society
organizations, 3,000 companies and 8,500 websites” (350.org Team). Backed by “[o]ver 2000
scientists from over 40 countries” (“Scientists”), climate activists not only took to the streets in
what has been reported to be “the largest climate mobilization in history” (Rosane) but voiced
their arguments before world leaders at the United Nations Youth Climate Summit and Climate
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The research and writing of this dissertation occurred between September 2019 and March 2022. Needless to say,
this two-and-a-half-year period has been a time of rapid and extraordinary change in the United States and the
world. No little amount of this change relates to the primary focus of this project—the influence of apocalyptic
rhetoric on the presentation and reception of climate change and climate reform discourse in the U.S. Because of the
constantly shifting nature of climate change discourse, the tangled landscape of policy debates, climate actions, and
even public figures, rhetors, and audiences considered in this project may look much different for readers after the
fact. However, while many of the examples discussed in this project may not be current for present day readers, it is
my hope that the deeper considerations and questions presented are as relevant today as they were when this
dissertation was written.
As this project demonstrates, apocalyptic rhetoric is far from a peripheral mode of discourse, one reserved only for
the kinds of cliched end-of-the-world scenarios one might encounter in a Hollywood blockbuster. As Barry
Brummett observes in Contemporary Apocalyptic Rhetoric, apocalyptic rhetoric provides audiences with
“fundamental, bedrock ways of thinking and talking about the world” (52), especially when those audiences are
encountering moments of societal confusion and distress. While the setting and cast of characters may change, the
influence of apocalyptic rhetoric on not just climate change discourse, but a range of pressing societal problems is
likely to endure as long as apocalyptic frames help rhetors and audiences to make sense of those moments when
received systems and ways of thinking no longer seem to explain the challenges and threats (real and imagined) that
confront them.
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Action Summit, an overlap that was intended by strikers (Feller). Speaking before the UN
General Assembly in New York City, Thunberg confronted the assembled nations with the pain
and outrage felt by those suffering under the weight of climate inaction: “People are suffering.
People are dying. Entire ecosystems are collapsing. We are in the beginning of a mass extinction.
And all you can talk about is money and fairy tales of eternal economic growth. How dare you!”
(“World” 96). Like Rachel Carson before her, whose September 27, 1962 publication of Silent
Spring is credited as a major catalyst in the formation of the environmental movement (Montrie
8), Thunberg’s words evoke what M. Jimmie Killingsworth and Jacqueline S. Palmer might, in
“The Discourse of ‘Environmentalist Hysteria,’” call a collective “cry of pain” (14) at the greed
of lawmakers, companies, and citizens who would sacrifice the futures of many for the material
prosperity of few. In the face of creeping climate catastrophe, Thunberg appeals to audiences’
frustration and anxiety regarding climate change and channels these feelings into calls for
meaningful environmental reform.
The Global Climate Strike and Thunberg’s discourse, in particular, illustrate the power of
what rhetoricians have termed “apocalyptic rhetoric” to mobilize the attitudes and behaviors of
audiences in response to distressing circumstances (Brummett 10). Far from fostering a state of
helplessness in the face of what U.S. climate reformer Mia Werger calls the “End of the World”
(Werger), Thunberg’s science and equity-driven jeremiads regarding the “existential emergency”
of climate change (Thunberg, “Wherever” 86) have united hundreds of thousands of citizens
within the U.S. and millions across the world in an effort to revolutionize environmental policy
in order to avoid the increased weather extremes, melting ice sheets, elevated sea levels,
decimated coral reefs, increased food insecurity and poverty (Masson-Delmotte et al. 7-9), and
the innumerable other effects of unmitigated climate change that threaten the world. While critics
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such as Julian Simon have ridiculed such projections of environmental disaster as little more than
irrational, guilt-ridden byproducts of economic prosperity (Simon 22-23), rhetorical and literary
theorist Kenneth Burke has demonstrated that the symbolic systems through which individuals
and communities interpret the world, even those systems grounded in projections of worldshattering catastrophe, are far from passive and cannot, therefore, be so easily dismissed. In
Attitudes Toward History, Burke explains how, “[i]n the face of anguish, injustice, disease, and
death one adopts policies. One constructs [their] notion of the universe or history, and shapes
attitudes in keeping” (3). These symbolic systems work together to constitute what Burke terms
“frames of acceptance” (5), or narrative frameworks that equip one to interpret and respond to
the challenges of everyday life, as well as those threats that feel overwhelming. Such frames help
to make the world and its turmoil coherent. As a form of what Burke, in “Terministic Screens,”
describes as “symbolic action,” the symbols and narratives that characterize much of climate
reform within the U.S. act upon audiences by encouraging a particular regime of attitudes and
behaviors in response to the threat of climate change (47). As a frame of acceptance that exerts a
profound influence over how many U.S. citizens think about climate change, Thunberg’s
environmental apocalyptic discourse has helped to shape the national discussion on climate
reform. At the same time, Thunberg’s environmental apocalyptic rhetoric exists in contention
with yet other frames that threaten to quash the movement she has helped to build.
Despite the extensive climate reform efforts of Thunberg and the protestors of the Global
Climate Strike, the complex and comprehensive reforms needed to curb carbon emissions in the
U.S. have been repeatedly thwarted by conservative lawmakers and voters. This challenge is
poignantly illustrated by the U.S. failure to fulfill its promise to the global community under the
Paris Agreement. On September 2, 2016 and in keeping with Article Two of the Paris
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Agreement, in which signing nations agreed to limit “the increase in the global average
temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and [to pursue] efforts to limit the
temperature increase to 1.5°C” (United Nations, “Paris Agreement” 3), the U.S. adopted a goal
of 26-28% greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction from 2005 levels by 2025” (United States
of America). Approximately four years later, the Rhodium Group estimates that total GHG
emissions in the U.S. for 2019 represent a mere 12.3% decline since 2005 levels (Houser and
Pitt), meaning that the U.S. is less than halfway to meeting even the low end of its pledged
reduction. In order to meet its agreed-upon target, the U.S. would need to cut more GHG
emissions in the next six years than it has in the last fifteen. That the U.S. will make these
dramatic reforms any time soon appears increasingly unlikely considering the seemingly endless
series of setbacks that have greeted climate reform policy in the U.S.
In November 2019, former President Trump formally announced the withdrawal of the
U.S. from the Paris Agreement effective November 2020 (Pompeo). This move was taken in
fulfillment of Trump’s 2016 campaign promise to, as stated in a May 26, 2016 speech, “cancel
the Paris Climate Agreement and stop . . . all payments of the United States tax dollars to UN
global warming programs” (“Mr. Donald J. Trump” 00:23:33-00:23:50). Though the U.S.
eventually rejoined the Paris Agreement on February 19, 2021, under Democratic President
Biden (Blinken), U.S. climate reform has continued to be stymied by the inability of the Biden
administration to generate consensus within the Democratic party on the climate agenda
contained within the Build Back Better Plan (Brownstein), to say nothing of the continued
resistance Democrats have received from conservative citizens and lawmakers. This is all in spite
of the fact that the U.S. has the dubious honor of being the largest total GHG emitter after China
and the largest in the world per capita (UN Environment Programme xvi). While the massive
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mobilization of the Global Climate Strike and the influence of Thunberg’s apocalyptic warnings
have helped make climate change a more pronounced issue in the consciousness of U.S.
lawmakers and citizens, the ongoing failure to enact the reforms necessary to limit global
warming to 1.5°C suggests that the attitude of urgency embodied within much climate reform
discourse is not sufficiently shared by the rest of the nation, a disconnect that is especially
evident in the stark divides between Republicans and Democrats on environmental policy.
Like the United Nations and Thunberg, Democrat and New York Representative OcasioCortez has sought to mobilize U.S. citizens and lawmakers in the fight against climate change
but has been largely thwarted by conservative forces that position such environmental reform as
a direct threat to the U.S. economy and freedoms. House Resolution 109, more commonly
known as the Green New Deal, outlines a plan to limit global warming to 1.5°C “through a 10year national mobilization” (United States 6) that will involve a complete overhaul of U.S.
infrastructure in order to achieve “100 percent of the power demand in the United States through
clean, renewable, and zero-emission energy sources” (7). Like the Paris Agreement, House
Resolution 109 is not just concerned with mitigating the physical effects of climate change but
seeks to ameliorate its threat to societal equity and links unchecked climate change with
“systemic racial, regional, social, environmental, and economic injustices” because it exacerbates
the inequalities already faced by the world’s most vulnerable populations (4). Also like the Paris
Agreement, the Green New Deal has not succeeded in rallying sufficient support among U.S.
citizens and lawmakers in order to achieve its vision of climate reform. As of this writing, the
Green New Deal has failed to advance in the Republican-controlled Senate (“Roll Call Vote”),
with Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell variously describing the resolution as a
“destructive, socialist daydream” (“Green New Deal” 00:10:41-00:10:45), a source of “self-
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inflicted economic ruin that would take a sledgehammer to America’s middle class” (00:10:5500:11:03), and a “far left science fiction novel” (00:06:40-00:06:42) that would cost the U.S.
ninety three trillion dollars over the course of ten years (00:06:53-00:07:02) and dictate to
citizens what homes, cars, and healthcare they are allowed to have (00:05:34-00:05:41).
Like Thunberg, Democrats have also attempted to generate support for climate reform
through apocalyptic appeals, with Ocasio-Cortez warning that “the world is going to end in
twelve years if we don’t address climate change” (00:35:45-00:35:48) and Senator Chuck
Schumer insisting that “climate change is an . . . existential threat to our country and our planet”
(00:00:10-00:00:16). However, the current failure of the Green New Deal, like the Paris
Agreement, to achieve its desired GHG reductions points to the tremendous hurdles that litter the
path of meaningful climate reform. Many of these hurdles are financially driven, as evidenced in
the Trump administration’s reversal of almost one hundred environmental protections in the
U.S., a move which benefited the fossil fuel industry over the health of U.S. citizens (Popovich
et al.). Yet it would be unwise to reduce the U.S. failure to halt climate emissions to financial
reasons alone. Climate reformers’ inability to generate sufficient consensus to mitigate climate
reform also highlights the power of political and ideological frames to mediate audiences’
interpretations of climate change information and climate reform policy. The failure of the U.S.
to meet its goals under the Paris Agreement illustrates that climate reformers’ appeals are not
sufficient, in themselves, to overcome the political and ideological divisions that have such a
great influence on the trajectory of climate reform efforts within the U.S. Indeed, the persistent
intractability of conservatives on climate reform illustrates the importance of attending to the
political and ideological frames of the audiences whose opinions have a direct bearing on the
future of that reform.

7
Resistance to the Green New Deal is not limited to conservative lawmakers, but is
reflected in the opinions of conservative Republicans, more generally. According to a May 8,
2019 report by the Yale Program on Climate Change Communication (YPCCC), while 96%,
88%, and 64% of liberal Democrats, moderate Democrats, and moderate Republicans
(respectively) support the Green New Deal, only 32% of conservative Republicans do so
(Gustafson et al. 3). The YPCCC’s data suggests that increased awareness of the Green New
Deal is accompanied by increased support among Democrats but has the opposite correlation
among Republicans: “Republicans who have heard ‘a lot’ about the Green New Deal are 81
percentage points less supportive of the proposal than are Republicans who have heard ‘nothing
at all’ (85% vs. 4%, respectively)” (4). In other words, the more Republicans learn about the
Green New Deal, the less likely they are to support the climate reform policies its authors
propose. This correlation might be explained in part by the YPCCC’s accompanying finding that
Republicans “who watch, read, or listen to Fox News more than once per week” are more likely
to be aware of the Green New Deal and that “support for the Green New Deal is lower among
Republicans who watch Fox News more frequently than it is among Republicans who watch it
less often” (5). Only 22% of Republicans who view Fox News multiple times a week support
House Resolution 109 (5). And while it would be a gross oversimplification to blame Fox News
entirely for Republicans’ lack of support for the Green New Deal, this link between Fox News
viewership and reduced support for House Resolution 109 helps to illustrate how the political
and ideological contexts in which climate reform discourse is produced, disseminated, and
received influence the meaning of that discourse for particular audiences.
As two of the most high-profile efforts at U.S. climate reform in recent history, the Paris
Agreement and the Green New Deal would, if fully enacted, revolutionize U.S. infrastructure in
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order to achieve net zero carbon emissions. However, despite their shared mission of promoting
societal equity within the U.S. and across the world, and despite their mutual grounding in the
rigorous scientific data of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (MassonDelmotte et al. vii), these reform efforts will accomplish nothing if they cannot mobilize the
attitudes and behaviors of the broad array of lawmakers and citizens whose support is needed to
implement and sustain even a fraction of the called-for environmental and societal reforms. Just
as the causes and effects of global warming emerge and unfold gradually over the course of
many years, national and global efforts to mitigate climate change must, if they are to be
successful, also endure and not simply fizzle out with the next election cycle as occurred with
Trump’s exit from the U.S.’ Obama-led membership in the Paris Agreement. If climate
reformers are to have any hope of limiting the U.S.’ GHG emissions, it is clear they must frame
such reforms in ways that appeal to as many citizens as possible. In order to do this, however,
climate reformers must acknowledge that the values and goals of the climate reform movement
are neither natural nor inevitable but represent the ideological frames of the reformers
themselves, frames that exist in contestation with those of conservative audiences. By evaluating
climate change discourse within the ideological contexts of its production and reception, we may
better understand the source of its controversy and, in doing so, open up strategies for more
productively engaging wider swaths of U.S. citizens in the cause of climate reform.

Climate Reform’s Reliance on Scientific Appeals
In what must feel like a tragic irony to many climate reformers, one obstacle to climate
reform’s goal of enlisting the attitudes of U.S. citizens in the pursuit of net zero emissions is its
tendency to rely so heavily on scientific appeals. Scholars of environmental rhetoric and
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communication have demonstrated that appeals to science as a self-evident basis for climate
reform are not sufficient to persuade U.S. citizens to accept the burden of that reform. In
Communicating Climate Change, Susanna Priest associates such strictly evidence-based
approaches to climate change discourse with the “‘deficit model’” of science communication, or
“[t]he idea that providing an abundance of scientific facts will necessarily alter people’s opinions
in a direction more consistent with the opinions of the scientific community[,] . . . the belief that
public opinion (and public relations) problems can be solved with improved dissemination of
scientific information alone” (7). One of the key disadvantages of the deficit model is that it
overlooks how citizens’ understanding of any given issue, no matter how technical or specialized
the area of knowledge that encompasses it, is always mediated by the “beliefs and values” of
those citizens (7). One of the great ironies of scientific communication on matters of pressing
societal import like climate change is that it is often the urgency of the problem that compels
rhetors to “double-down” on scientific evidence as a basis for their claims and support for
proposed pathways forward. However, it is precisely this privileging of science that
disadvantages such arguments by limiting their potential range of persuasion to those audiences
whose frames of acceptance are already favorable to such science-based appeals. In what
amounts to an elaborate case of “preaching to the choir,” appeals to science as the primary basis
for climate reform often lack the rhetorical consideration needed to convert the unconverted.
As a climate activist who has become the face of climate reform for many U.S. citizens,
Greta Thunberg vividly illustrates both the rhetorical affordances and drawbacks of using
scientific appeals to mobilize audiences to mitigate global warming. The extent of citizens’
participation in the Global Climate Strike and the sheer persistence of Thunberg’s climate reform
message throughout the U.S. public sphere suggest that Thunberg’s scientific appeals resonate
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with many U.S. audiences. In her September 23, 2019 speech to the assembled protestors of the
Global Climate Strike in New York City, for instance, Thunberg positions the strike, itself, as an
outgrowth of the scientific consensus surrounding climate change, stating that “[w]e are united
behind the science, and we will do everything in our power to stop this crisis from getting worse”
(“Greta Thunberg” 00:02:57-00:03:07), a statement that is followed by a loud round of applause
(00:03:07-00:03:11). As a recurring feature of Thunberg’s environmental discourse, this aligning
of the Global Climate Strike and, by extension, the movement for climate reform as a “boots-onthe-ground” expression of the scientific consensus surrounding climate change appeals to and
reinforces a frame of acceptance in which reformers accept science as a self-evident authority for
environmental legislative reform. Furthermore, beyond appealing to the scientific consensus as a
defining and unifying system of belief for climate reformers, Thunberg forwards adherence to
the science as a premier metric by which reformers may evaluate the credibility of lawmakers
and the legitimacy of their positions.
Citing the presence of world leaders at the upcoming UN Climate Action Summit,
Thunberg observes that these leaders “have a chance to prove that they, too, are united behind
the science. They have a chance to take leadership to prove they actually hear us” (00:05:3200:05:45). In this statement, Thunberg suggests that the best way for world leaders to
demonstrate their support of climate reform is to accept and act upon the findings of climate
scientists. Significantly, this statement serves to reinforce adherence to the scientific consensus
as a defining feature of belonging within the climate reform movement while also positioning
any lawmaker who does not sufficiently accept and act on that consensus as an enemy of the
movement. That this opposition extends beyond lawmakers to include citizens who are resistant
to the scientific consensus and, by extension, climate reform is suggested by Thunberg’s
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concluding warning that “if you belong to that small group of people who feel threatened by us,
then we have some very bad news for you [applause] because this is only the beginning
[applause]. Change is coming whether they like it or not” [applause] (00:08:09-00:08:44). As
Philip Eubanks observes in The Troubled Rhetoric and Communication of Climate Change,
appeals to science and evidence-based reasoning can be incredibly effective rhetorical strategies,
but their effectiveness is largely restricted to audiences who “are, if not the already persuaded,
[then] the already persuadable” (124). To be sure, such appeals to those who are already
effectively converted to the cause of climate reform and the authority of the scientific consensus
do not seem so ineffective when we consider the enormous success that Thunberg and the Global
Climate Strike have had in generating interest in and discussion about the issue of climate
change. However, when we consider that the goal of climate reform is not “patting itself on the
back” or even necessarily generating public debate but enacting the Paris Agreement’s climate
mitigation protocols, we must begin to question whether the movement’s privileging of scientific
appeals is sufficient to bring about the change it seeks.
Far from being the premier metric of meaningful climate reform, scientific authority is
one of many different forms of appeal that may be persuasive to U.S. citizens, a form of appeal
that has evolved within and serves to reinforce a particular ideological orientation toward the
world and its problems. Eubanks links this tendency for climate reform to privilege scientific
over other forms of appeal to the persistence of Enlightenment thinking within the western public
sphere. According to Eubanks, “Consensus arguments, in particular, are not framed in a way that
is likely to appeal to a broad audience. Indeed, spokespeople for the consensus tend to ignore the
importance of framing altogether. They tend to make the Enlightenment-inspired error of
believing that if you present credible facts in a logical way, audiences can be counted on to draw
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the right conclusions” (126). Likewise, in Science and the Enlightenment, Thomas Hankins
explains that “the Enlightenment was . . . a way of thinking, a critical approach that was
supposed to open the way for constructive thought and action. Anyone who believed that man
had the power to correct past errors through the use of his reason could find value in the
Enlightenment” (2). In the face of a problem in society or in nature, Enlightenment thinking
holds that human beings are able to solve that problem through the sustained application of
human reason. Sharon Crowley further states in Methodical Memory, that the “burgeoning of
scientific knowledge” that characterized the Enlightenment as a moment in history “created a
sort of faith that the human will to know, as this was manifested in scientific investigation, could
finally succeed in solving most earthly difficulties” (6). As a powerful and persistent ideological
frame of acceptance among many western citizens, scientific thinking allows rhetors and
audiences to experience a remarkable feeling of control over the world around them by
positioning the world’s problems as puzzles to be solved through the sustained application of
human reason and ingenuity.
Thunberg’s climate reform discourse illustrates how this Enlightenment reliance on
science and evidence-based reasoning as the definitive means of resolving problems continues to
influence many citizens’ understanding of and response to the societal dilemmas we encounter
today. If the problem is climate change, and the source of climate change is excess carbon
emissions, then the logical solution is, according to Thunberg and other science-grounded
climate reformers, to eliminate carbon emissions, a plan of action that is heavily documented
through the scientific research of the IPCC and laid out in detail in the Paris Agreement and the
Green New Deal. Yet, despite the enduring persuasiveness of such scientific thinking for many
citizens, the U.S.’ ongoing inability to generate consensus regarding anthropogenic climate
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change is a poignant reminder that scientific thinking alone is likely not sufficient to mobilize the
attitudes and actions of citizens in response to climate change. The science cannot save us; only
science-guided human action can, and that action will not occur unless a sufficient number of
citizens are motivated to undertake it. As such, while climate change is, indeed, a measurable
physical phenomenon, how we interpret and respond to climate change is not exclusively a
question of science but is also one of rhetoric.
In keeping with Burke’s partial definition of rhetoric as “the use of language as a
symbolic means of inducing cooperation in beings that by nature respond to symbols” (Rhetoric
43), the discourse through which climate change is presented and responded to is not merely an
ornamental or secondary dimension of climate change, but serves to define the meaning of
climate change for citizens. Far from being a problem that “has already been solved” (Thunberg,
“Disarming,” 00:08:27-00:08:29), climate change poses a significant rhetorical challenge to
climate reformers. How does one frame a global issue in ways that are persuasive to local
knowledges when some of those knowledges are resistant to many of the fundamental
assumptions on which climate reform is based?
One small step toward answering this question is to acknowledge that despite the
presence of scientific thinking as a dominant frame of acceptance in the U.S., appeals to the
scientific frame are not equally persuasive for all U.S. citizens. Far from being a universal frame
of reference for U.S. citizens, science operates as what Crowley has termed a “hegemony”
(Toward a Civil Discourse 65), a “set of signifiers and practices that achieves a powerful, nearexclusive hold on a community’s beliefs and actions” (63). Crowley goes on to explain that as
science-as-hegemony has come to dominate much of Western thinking, other, less scientific
knowledge systems have come to exert less influence over civic affairs (66). Instead of being
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what Thunberg represents as a natural mode of thinking and being in the world, science and the
attitudes it authorizes represent a particular approach to the world that exists in contestation with
other modes of thinking and being. If the goal of Thunberg and other U.S.-directed climate
reformers is to mobilize a vast majority of U.S. citizens in the fight against climate change, it
follows that this goal would be better served by crafting persuasive strategies that encompass
even those citizens whose frames of thought and action are meaningfully influenced by other,
non-scientific hegemonies.

Evangelical Christians and the Premillennial Apocalyptic Frame
As evidenced by such events as Trump’s initial withdrawal the U.S. from the Paris
Agreement and the failure of the Green New Deal to generate sufficient support within what was
until relatively recently a Republican-controlled Senate, conservative U.S. citizens have proven
to be a significant obstacle to the goals of the climate reform movement. However, there is a
subset of the Republican base that exerts an especially marked influence on U.S. policy,
environmental or otherwise: evangelical Christians. The Pew Research Center reports that 81%
of “white born-again or evangelical Christians” voted for Trump in the 2016 election (Martínez
and Smith). With white evangelicals constituting 26% of the overall 2016 electorate (Martínez
and Smith), that means that Trump-favoring, white evangelicals made up approximately 21% of
voting citizens. Representing just over one-fifth of 2016 voters, this community played a
significant role in undoing years of climate reform by voting into office a President who would
rapidly pull the U.S. out of the Paris Agreement. Far from being unique to the 2016 election, the
Pew Research Center reports between 81% and 85% of “White evangelical Protestants” voted
for Trump in the 2020 election, with the greater number reflecting those evangelical “voters who
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attend religious services frequently” and the lesser those who “attend less frequently” (Nortey).
In addition to exerting a direct influence on U.S. involvement in the Paris Agreement through
their support of Trump, evangelical Christians also paved the way for McConnell and the
Senate’s rejection of the Green New Deal, with 75% of white born-again/evangelical Christians
voting Republican in the 2018 Midterm Election (CNN). This data suggests that evangelical
Protestants will continue to influence the direction of U.S. climate reform efforts through their
privileging of Republican candidates who are unable or unwilling to enact the cooperative,
international, large scale, and rapid climate reform called for by the United Nations, U.S.
Democrats, the scientific consensus, and climate reformers such as Thunberg.
Evangelical Christians represent a community of stakeholders whose belief system has a
direct bearing on their voting habits and, by extension, the state of environmental reform. This is
illustrated by the results of a March 21, 2020 Pew Research Center Report, in which it was found
that 89% of white evangelical Protestants believe that the “Bible should have . . . influence on
U.S. laws,” with 58% of respondents stating that scripture should influence legislation “[a] great
deal” (Gecewicz et al. 16). Even more worrying for liberal lawmakers and citizens who would
see questions of U.S. policy resolved through the use of evidence-based reason, when asked “[i]f
the Bible and will of people conflict, which should have more influence on U.S. laws?” 68% of
white evangelical Christians say that the “Bible should have more influence” (16). The Pew
Research Center’s findings suggest that when it comes to a decision between scriptural authority
and the authority of human reason, many evangelical Christians believe that the surest political
path is the one paved with scripture. In light of the influence of faith-based logics on
evangelicals’ civic engagement, it follows that climate reformers’ efforts to generate consensus
would be more successful if they could construct climate reform narratives that more
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productively engage evangelical frames of acceptance. And while it is unclear if such consensus
is in fact possible given the profound ideological and political divides that characterize not just
climate reform discourse but so many of the public debates occurring in the U.S. today, attending
to the power of ideological frames and apocalyptic thinking, especially, to influence audiences’
reception of climate change discourse may help to illuminate tentative paths forward on this
pressing issue.
Apocalyptic scholars have demonstrated that one especially compelling ideological frame
for evangelical Christians is “premillennial dispensationalism” (Wojcik 34), in which it is
believed that the world, far from being the only home human beings have, is only a preliminary
(and fallen) state of existence that foreshadows Christ’s imminent return and the destruction and
recreation of the universe itself (Jeremiah 394). Far from being a mere vestige of ancient belief
in a modern world, Daniel Wojcik observes that premillennialism is “the most influential form of
religious apocalypticism in the United States today” (34) and has a profound influence on how
many evangelical Christians think about and respond to the world around them by representing
“humanity and the world as unrecuperably evil” (35). For evangelical Christians operating within
the premillennial frame, “the imminent return of Christ is the only means of rectifying the
world’s problems” (35), not human efforts at reform. Furthermore, in the face of the possibility
that the rapture may occur at any moment (LaHaye and Jenkins 139), an event in which true
believing Christians will be taken up to meet Christ “in the clouds” (120) and leave sinners (and
environmental devastation) behind, the greatest responsibility for evangelical believers is to
prepare their souls and the souls of their neighbors for Christ’s return (Wojcik 56-57). Believing
that human beings are currently living in the “dispensation known as the church age,” the last of
several divinely-ordained periods of history, evangelical adherents to premillennial
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dispensationalism believe that “the rapture, the Tribulation, the second coming of Christ, and the
establishment of the millennial kingdom” are imminent realities (Chapman 4). For this audience,
the arc of history is a linear movement toward union with Christ, in which all of the pain and
problems of this world are understood to be temporary and all of its pleasures merely preludes to
divine rapture.
Several apocalyptic scholars have drawn a correlation between increased apocalyptic
belief and decreased motivation to improve the environment or take an active role in combating
environmental emergencies like climate change. For instance, in “End-Times Theology, the
Shadow of the Future, and Public Resistance to Addressing Global Climate Change,” David
Barker and David Bearce “analyze data from the 2007 Cooperative Congressional Election
Studies (CCES)” in order to test their hypothesis that “[c]itizens who believe in Christian endtimes theology are less likely to see global warming as a policy problem that requires immediate
government action” (270). The results of Barker and Bearce’s study suggest that Christians who
adhere to this apocalyptic frame are more likely to resist government attempts at climate reform
and are more likely to remain skeptical toward global warming as an actually existing
phenomenon. Likewise, Eric Zencey suggests in “Apocalypse and Ecology” that such
“apocalyptic thinking” promotes “paralysis” in the face of environmental issues (55). Applied to
the United States’ current impasse on climate change, Barker and Bearce’s and Zencey’s
research does not foster optimism that secular climate reformers will be able to mobilize
influential evangelical stakeholders by using scientific data to warn them, as Thunberg does, of
the imminent and catastrophic consequences of unchecked global warming.
Not all apocalyptic scholars have drawn the same conclusions as Barker, Bearce, and
Zencey, however. For example, in The Gospel of Climate Skepticism Robin Veldman suggests
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that this “end-time apathy hypothesis,” the belief that climate change is the predetermined sign
of the end-times and, therefore, cannot be stopped, may actually reflect the beliefs of a minority
of evangelical Christians and not characterize evangelicals’ relationship to environmental reform
more generally (84). However, Veldman is also careful to observe that evangelical Christians
and environmentalists interpret environmental events like climate change in radically different
ways (65). For instance, some evangelicals might interpret environmental degradation as a
consequence of original sin manifesting in the “pollution” of the material world, rather than what
secular-minded environmentalists see as a series of human choices and natural events that can be
easily reversed through science-guided action if we only had the initiative to do so (63). This
split between secular and evangelical interpretations of environmental degradation points to the
ways in which climate reformers’ appeals to human reason and agency as a means of solving the
world’s problems may not be as persuasive to evangelical audiences who believe that God, not
humanity, is in control of everything that happens. Furthermore, while apocalyptic scholars may
disagree on precisely what premillennialism encourages evangelical Protestants to do in response
to societal challenges like climate change, their research suggests that premillennial belief,
nonetheless, constitutes a frame of acceptance that lies at the heart of evangelical Christians’
orientation toward the human and natural world. As such, premillennial apocalyptic represents a
potentially rich analytical frame for engaging and making sense of how influential evangelical
citizens interpret and respond to the public discourse surrounding climate change.
In light of the ideological divides that separate secular climate reformers and many
evangelicals, and in consideration of the inefficacy of evidence-based appeals to persuade
audiences whose meaning-making systems are grounded in non-empirical experience, it follows
that any attempt to achieve a consensus among U.S. citizens regarding not just climate change,
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but any shared problem, must be willing to step outside its reliance on scientific discourse. In the
case of climate reform, such an attempt must identify all “possible means of persuasion,” and
determine what forms of appeal might be most persuasive for evangelical audiences (Aristotle 6).
This is not to suggest, however, that the burden of persuading evangelical Christians to adopt the
attitudes and behaviors needed to prevent climate change is on the shoulders of secular climate
reformers, alone. Evangelical climate scientists such as Katharine Hayhoe (Hayhoe and Farley
xiii-xvii) and organizations such as the Young Evangelicals for Climate Action (YECA)
(Goebel, “Paris”) already produce climate reform discourse that is informed by evangelical
values and designed to engage this influential audience. Still, the unfortunate reality is that even
with such faith-inspired treatments of climate change, both the Green New Deal and the Build
Back Better Plan are stalled at the time of this writing, and there is no clear catalyst for meeting
the necessary emission reductions under the Paris Agreement to avoid the most catastrophic
effects of global warming. Far from being the fault of secular climate reformers, the present
environmental impasse presents an opportunity for reformers and rhetorical scholars to reflect on
the assumptions that undergird scientific appeals within the public sphere in response to pressing
societal problems. Far from constituting a universal source of persuasion, appeals to the
scientific consensus surrounding climate change are not equally persuasive for all U.S. citizens,
especially evangelical audiences whose understanding of environmental and societal distress are,
to some extent, mediated by the premillennial apocalyptic frame.

Chapter Outline
In this introductory chapter, I provided a brief overview of the climate reform discourse
that is currently being used to persuade U.S. citizens to adopt the extensive and rapid reforms
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needed to mitigate climate change. Despite its sustained use of scientific appeals and its
representation of climate change as an imminent and apocalyptic threat to U.S. citizens and the
world, this climate reform discourse has not succeeded in mobilizing the support needed to
achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement by enacting the policy reforms of the Green New Deal
or Build Back Better Plan. While the primary obstacle to these climate reforms is the resistance
of conservative citizens, the evangelical community poses an especially significant challenge by
consistently voting in lawmakers who are hostile to such reform. In order to have a better chance
of generating the national consensus needed to enact meaningful environmental reform, climate
reformers may benefit from attending to the beliefs and values that influence evangelicals’
attitudes and behaviors regarding pressing societal issues like climate change. Scholars of
apocalyptic discourse have demonstrated that the premillennial apocalyptic frame exerts a
profound influence on how evangelicals make sense of the distress and problems they encounter
in the world. I conclude this chapter by suggesting that efforts to enact meaningful climate
reform would likely be more successful if climate reformers adopted a more rhetorical approach
to climate reform discourse by seeking to understand and more strategically engage the
apocalyptic frames of influential evangelical audiences. Regardless of the likelihood of such
adoption actually occurring, the study of the influence of apocalyptic rhetoric on evangelicals’
and other citizens’ reception of climate reform discourse illuminates the importance of
considering such apocalyptic frames in the production and dissemination of public discourse on
not just climate change but a range of pressing societal problems that require some form of
consensus to be addressed.
In Chapter Two, I introduce readers to the methodology that will undergird this
dissertation. Toward that end, I provide an overview of Krista Ratcliffe’s methodology of

21
“rhetorical listening” (1) and “eavesdropping” as developed in Rhetorical Listening:
Identification, Gender, Whiteness (101). I present rhetorical listening and eavesdropping as a
means of ethically engaging with U.S.-directed climate reform and evangelical Christian
discourse even as I evaluate the ways in which these discourses are influenced by scientific and
apocalyptic ideological frames. I proceed to explain my decision to focus on U.S.-directed
climate reformers that have been influenced by Greta Thunberg and who largely share her
preference for evidence-based appeals to the climate consensus. As touched upon in Chapter
One, I am evaluating how scientific thinking and appeals to human reason works to structure
climate appeals within U.S.-directed climate reform. Therefore, I will be narrowing my focus to
evaluate in depth those climate reform efforts, such as the Global Climate Strike and the Green
New Deal, that seek to persuade U.S. audiences by invoking the scientific authority of the United
Nations and IPCC. In addition to explaining the rationale behind my selection of climate reform
examples, I will elaborate on my selection of primary texts to represent the influence of
apocalyptic thinking on evangelical Christians. I will explain my choice of the term
“evangelical” to describe this religiously and politically conservative segment of the Christian
community, as well as why I chose not to use one of the several other terms often used to
describe this group, such as “Fundamentalist Christians” (Crowley, Toward a Civil Discourse 3),
“Conservative Christians” (Greeley and Hout 1), and the “Christian Right” (Taylor 61-62). I will
also introduce Kenneth Burke’s theories of literature and the rhetoric of symbols as a means of
recognizing the ways in which apocalyptic appeals create meaning for individuals and
communities in response to daily problems. In so doing, I will provide a methodological and
theoretical basis for my varied selection of primary texts to represent both evangelical and
climate reformer belief and practice. As Burke suggests in “The Philosophy of Literary Form,”
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poetic narratives, or any symbol system that we have internalized and use to make sense of
phenomena, operates “as a ritualistic way of arming us to confront perplexities and risks. It
would protect us” (61). Echoing Burke, Brummett observes that “apocalyptic [rhetoric] may
serve many as prophylactic, preemptive, and preventative equipment for living, maintaining a
steady tension of opposition against looming disorder” (43). By evaluating primary texts that
represent climate reformer and evangelical Christian responses to climate change, I will
illuminate some of the constraints and affordances each frame offers concerning the U.S.
response to climate change.
In Chapter Three, I evaluate the influence of premillennial apocalyptic rhetoric on secular
climate reform discourse within the U.S. I begin by conducting a brief review of the literature
that has been produced by rhetoric and communication scholars regarding the use of apocalyptic
rhetoric within secular environmental discourse in the United States. Drawing upon Barry
Brummett’s theory of secular apocalyptic rhetoric, I then provide a detailed analysis of
Thunberg’s efforts to engage U.S. citizens and lawmakers on climate change. To illuminate the
larger cultural logics of the climate reform movement within the U.S., I also examine examples
of climate reform discourse created as part of the Global Climate Strike, as well as the policy
reform text of the Green New Deal. I evaluate the influence of apocalyptic rhetoric on these
secular climate reform rhetors and texts by assessing their discourse for four key features of
premillennial apocalyptic rhetoric: (1) how reformers encourage audiences to think about climate
change as a looming threat, (2) the critical attitudes reformers encourage audiences to adopt
toward currently existing institutions as the primary cause of the current climate emergency, (3)
calls for a new millennial order, (4) the use of sacred or “grounding texts” to imbue statements
with rhetorical authority (Brummett 99). During this analysis, I pay special attention to the role
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that appeals to scientific texts and intergovernmental entities such as the United Nations play in
generating authority for climate reform arguments within the U.S. Through this analysis, we
come to understand the important role that apocalyptic rhetoric plays in mediating citizens’
understanding of pressing societal problems like climate change within the U.S., as well the
importance of attending to the political and ideological frames of one’s audiences as one
articulates courses of action in the public sphere.
In Chapter Four, I analyze the recent premillennial discourse of such apocalyptic
evangelical rhetors as David Jeremiah, Jimmy Evans, Ron Rhodes, and Todd Hampson for how
this discourse may influence audiences’ attitudes toward the climate reform efforts considered in
Chapter Three, as well as those of evangelical climate reform rhetor Katharine Hayhoe. By
analyzing the discourse of these public premillennial evangelical figures, as well as the discourse
produced by their audiences through social media forums like YouTube, I demonstrate that
premillennial evangelical rhetors and audiences’ persistent distrust of intergovernmental
organizations like the United Nations poses a significant challenge to climate reform initiatives.
Furthermore, I demonstrate that premillennialist evangelicals’ distrust of secular institutions and
humanity in general and their ability to resolve problems in the world without divine means
poses a meaningful ideological challenge to the secular climate reform efforts discussed in
Chapter Three, all of which position human intelligence, problem solving, and collaboration as
the premier metrics of success in the fight against climate change. And while evangelical climate
reform rhetors like Katharine Hayhoe may help to present climate change science and climate
reform appeals to evangelicals in ways that more productively resonate with evangelical beliefs
and values, an analysis of select textual representations of Hayhoe’s evangelical climate reform
discourse suggests that Hayhoe’s narratives of climate reform moderation do not seem likely to
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facilitate the rapid and systems-wide reforms that the climate reformers of Chapter Three and the
global scientific consensus project are needed. Lastly, I suggest that it is not clear if Hayhoe’s
model of climate reform moderation is sufficient to overcome similar appeals within
premillennial evangelical rhetoric. While such appeals to environmental moderation may
encourage some evangelicals to embrace some aspects of climate reform, it is likely that any
such reform efforts will be lukewarm.
In Chapter Five, I consider the implications of my study of premillennial apocalyptic
rhetoric for citizens’ understanding of climate change, as well as the future of climate reform
discourse more generally. In light of the deep ideological oppositions that characterize public
discourse in the United States on not just climate change but any pressing societal problem, what
is the likelihood that U.S. citizens and lawmakers may achieve sufficient consensus on climate
change to move forward with meaningful, rapid, and large-scale policy reforms? More
importantly, what are some rhetorical strategies that may assist climate reform rhetors in the
project of generating such consensus among an ideologically divergent populace, many of whom
are not likely to be motivated by appeals to the scientific consensus surrounding climate change?
By extending the insights of such rhetoric and communication scholars as Susanna Priest, Philip
Eubanks, Leah Ceccarelli, Sharon Crowley, Krista Ratcliffe, Bethany Mannon, and Megan Von
Bergen and drawing upon the climate reform discourse of Katharine Hayhoe and the
organization Young Evangelicals for Climate Action (YECA) as working examples, I present
four rhetorical strategies by which climate reform rhetors may produce discourse that more
productively engages members of the evangelical community as well as other climate-resistant
audiences. By creating climate reform narratives that empower, resonate with audiences’
worldviews, foster trust, and that are grounded in the personal experience of rhetor and audience,
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climate rhetors may help to make climate reform discourse more persuasive for resistant
audiences. However, while paying attention to the influence of ideological frames on citizens’
attitudes toward climate change discourse may help climate reform rhetors to produce discourse
that is more engaging and persuasive to resistant audiences, the violent nature of such ideological
divisions begs us to question the notion of democratic consensus itself. Therefore, even as I
outline strategies for producing climate reform discourse that may engage intractable audiences,
I also consider the limitations of the democratic model of public discourse to resolve the
ideological divisions that characterize U.S. citizens’ attitudes toward pressing problems like
climate change. In light of the very real possibility that the U.S. may not be able to achieve a
consensus that results in sustained, meaningful climate policy, I conclude this chapter by briefly
highlighting examples of climate actions that have occurred in local and transnational contexts.
Even as U.S. climate policy continues to stall, such examples help to illustrate the varied tactics
and strategies that citizens innovate in communities within the United States and across the globe
to help combat environmental problems like climate change.
In Chapter Six, I revisit the claims, theories, and research methods that I have developed
and applied throughout this project. I reflect on the implications of apocalyptic rhetoric for the
study and production of climate reform discourse within the United States, more generally. I
suggest that one of the challenges to achieving consensus on climate change and climate reform
is that rhetors and audiences often believe that they possess what amounts to a transcendent
understanding of climate change and what must be done to address it. Such transcendent thinking
can lead rhetors and audiences to automatically dismiss perspectives on climate change that do
not align with one’s own. I suggest that by considering pressing societal problems like climate
change more rhetorically, rhetorical scholars and climate reform rhetors may better understand

26
the values and beliefs that motivate climate reform resistant audiences’ attitudes and behaviors
toward climate change and may position themselves to engage such audiences more
productively. At the same time, I also acknowledge that the evangelical communities that I study
in this project are not motivated by religious belief alone—apocalyptic or otherwise. As I
conclude this dissertation, I reflect upon the structural inequities of racism and sexism that can
motivate white evangelical Christians’ understanding of and response to climate change and
climate reform rhetors, as well as those communities who are most impacted by the impacts of
global warming. Likewise, I also address the moral responsibility that the United States and other
developed Western nations have to not only mitigate climate change but to repair the violence
global warming has inflicted on the most vulnerable communities within the U.S. and the world.
Lastly, I offer examples of how future research on the influence of apocalyptic rhetoric on
climate reform within the United States may take the theoretical and research frameworks I
develop in this project and extend them beyond broad public and policy discourse to better
understand the influence of apocalyptic thinking on individuals and communities’ responses to
climate change in local and transnational contexts. Furthermore, I suggest that future research
may also benefit from exploring the influence of premillennial apocalyptic rhetoric on
evangelicals’ continued support of conservative leaders and policies as they impact not only the
future of climate change and climate reform but how citizens and lawmakers respond to a wide
range of other pressing societal questions moving forward.
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CHAPTER TWO
Methodology

Introduction
In order to better appreciate the impact of apocalyptic thinking on U.S. citizens’
production and reception of climate change appeals, we must first begin to understand how the
apocalyptic frame mediates knowledge production in the everyday lives of those citizens. Such
an endeavor raises important methodological and theoretical questions for rhetorical scholars.
For one, what criteria do we use to determine if a given communication qualifies as apocalyptic
discourse? Furthermore, once we have determined that a given text is engaging in apocalyptic
appeals, how do we then use that text to extrapolate, if not a principle, then at least a working
assumption about the influence of apocalyptic thinking on the attitudes and even behaviors of the
community the text ostensibly represents? How do we then use this understanding to make sense
of and even predict the influence of apocalyptic rhetoric on citizens’ attitudes and behaviors
moving forward? Perhaps most challenging, how are we to respond to the problem of
representation, itself? As Krista Ratcliffe and Kenneth Burke have made abundantly clear, any
attempt to represent a community or ideology through textual analysis necessarily provides a
selective perspective on that community by dislocating a given text from its lived reality as
social discourse, as an utterance produced by a particular person or community at a certain time
in response to particular circumstances (Ratcliffe 78; Burke, “Terministic Screens” 45). As such,
a certain degree of distortion is inevitable not only in this project, but in any attempt to
extrapolate a community’s general attitudes from a selection of texts produced by its members.
Furthermore, even as we acknowledge that rhetorical research is not a pristine window into the
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thoughts and behaviors of one’s fellow citizens, rhetorical researchers must likewise recognize
the great responsibility we have regarding how we choose to represent the individuals and
communities we study.
As I reflect upon this inability to capture a lived reality that, in the words of Plato’s
Timaeus, is “always becoming and never is,” I am reminded of Nan Johnson’s statement in the
CCCC’s first Octalog. Locating herself between an historical positivist and a poststructuralist
approach to historical research, Johnson states the following: “I proceed on the assumption that
historical research and writing are archeological and rhetorical activities. As an historian, I am
responsible both to the claims of historical evidence and to the burden of proclaiming my
enterprise as an attempt to tell ‘true stories’” (Octalog 9-10). Johnson goes on to clarify that by
“‘true story,’” she is referring to the power of a given historical account to, “as an act of
rhetoric,” impress “formal shape on the probable, or on relative truth, while simultaneously
seeking acceptance as a logical explanation of reality” (18). Even as we acknowledge that any
analytical account of a community’s textual production, past or present, can only ever
approximate the discursive processes of knowledge formation within that community, we must
also recognize that, according to Johnson, “historians and readers alike tend to believe and
subsequently proceed as if some stories were truer than others,” a “contradiction that . . . makes
this business of accounting for the past a baffling responsibility” (18). Riding the line between
relativism and positivism, Johnson offers what I believe to be a pragmatic and productive
approach to the work of not just history but any attempt to represent an individual or community
based on the texts they have produced. While we may acknowledge that a researcher’s decisions
influence the knowledge produced, this does not mean that anything goes. To the contrary, the
researcher is obliged to present their readers with rhetorical narratives that perform ethical work
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by shaping their understanding of the events and communities involved, understanding that will
form a foundation for future thought and action. In the following chapter, I will outline my
methodological basis for weaving a story that provides rhetorical scholars with tentative but, I
trust, helpful insights into the power of apocalyptic thinking to shape citizens’ responses to
pressing societal problems like climate change.

Listening to Apocalyptic Rhetoric
In this project, I seek to better understand the use of apocalyptic appeals in climate
change discourse and how such appeals engage, productively and/or unproductively, the
apocalyptic frames of U.S. citizens and evangelical Christians. Given the urgency of climate
change as a threat to U.S. citizens and the world, as well as the inability of U.S. citizens and
lawmakers to generate sufficient consensus to halt carbon emissions, this study of the
apocalyptic logics that undergird climate change discourse within the U.S. promises to provide
rhetorical scholars and other interested readers with a more complex understanding of climate
change discourse within the United States. However, even as I assert the value of this project, I
must acknowledge that as an author who identifies neither as a climate reformer or an
evangelical, I am attempting to produce knowledge about communities to which I do not belong.
This is a fraught enterprise, to be sure, and it carries the persistent risk that, despite my good
intentions, I may distort the beliefs and rhetorical practices of the very communities I seek to
understand and help readers understand. In light of this potential for distortion, it is necessary to
approach climate reform and evangelical Christian apocalyptic discourse with caution, in full
knowledge of my status as an interloper whose hope is, echoing Johnson’s views on
historiography, to produce approximate knowledge of the influence of apocalyptic thinking on
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the climate change debate within the U.S. in order to illuminate the importance of fostering
shared fields of deliberation between seemingly opposed stakeholders regarding this pressing
societal issue.
Helping to guide my approach is Krista Ratcliffe’s concept of “rhetorical listening” (17).
According to Ratcliffe, “rhetorical listening is defined generally as a trope for interpretive
invention and more particularly as a code of cross-cultural conduct. As a trope of interpretive
intervention, rhetorical listening signifies a stance of openness that a person may choose to
assume in relation to any person, text, or culture” (17). While much of Ratcliffe’s research
focuses on how rhetoric and writing researchers and teachers may apply rhetorical listening as
they engage with issues of race, whiteness, gender, and power, rhetorical listening constitutes a
powerful methodology for more sensitively and ethically engaging the discourse of any
community to which one does not belong. For the purposes of this project, rhetorical listening is
an effective methodological tactic for selecting and engaging the discourse of climate reform and
evangelical Christian stakeholders in that it allows me to evaluate the use of apocalyptic appeals
in texts that are representative of these groups’ beliefs, while simultaneously acknowledging the
inherent limitations of any such textual representation. Texts provide a window into the attitudes
of the communities that produce them, but these windows are never fully transparent.
One of Ratcliffe’s core concerns relates to the potential for textual analysis to produce a
distorted portrait of a community through overgeneralization. In order to “avoid the trap of unfair
generalizations and stereotyping” that can occur when a researcher attempts to use one text or
individual’s discourse to represent an entire community, Ratcliffe offers a methodological
subspecies of rhetorical listening: “listening metonymically” (98). According to Ratcliffe, “the
trope of listening metonymically assumes that a text or a person does not share substance with all
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other members of its/his/her cultural group but, rather, is associated with them. In other words,
this trope invites listeners to assume that one member of a group (say, one woman) does not
speak for all other members (say, all women) . . . ” (99). Applied to the study of apocalyptic
discourse undertaken in this project, Ratcliffe’s observation highlights how any selection of
representative climate reform and evangelical Christian figures and texts can never offer a
complete representation of these complex communities.
One might suggest, with good reason, that by choosing to focus primarily on U.S.directed examples of the climate reform movement—examples that include Greta Thunberg’s
speeches to U.S. citizens and lawmakers, the communications of U.S. Global Climate Strikers,
and such U.S. climate reform policy efforts as the Green New Deal—I have reduced the
complexity of this global movement to a limited set of signifying rhetors and texts. While I will
demonstrate that, at least for U.S. audiences, Thunberg is one of the most visible representatives
of climate reform and, as such, is well-positioned to productively influence the climate change
debate within the U.S., we must remember that Thunberg does not constitute the global climate
movement, just as apocalyptic appeals represent but one dimension of climate reform discourse.
Likewise, my decision to focus on such influential apocalyptic rhetors as Hal Lindsey, Jimmy
Evans, David Jeremiah, Ron Rhodes, Todd Hampson, and Tim LaHaye and Jerry Jenkins as
representatives of evangelical Christians’ views regarding the end of the world necessarily offers
readers a limited perspective on the influence of apocalyptic thinking on evangelical Christian
attitudes and behaviors toward pressing societal problems like climate change. By listening to
these discourses metonymically, I treat them as illustrations of the influence of apocalyptic
thinking on some but not necessarily all members of the climate reform and evangelical Christian
communities.
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Ratcliffe’s methodology of listening metonymically raises an important question
regarding the practice of textual analysis. If we accept that a given text or individual utterance
can never entirely stand in for the community it is associated with, then how are rhetorical
scholars to foster understanding of a community’s attitudes and practices through the analysis of
its members’ textual production? In the absence of an exhaustive and, therefore, impossible
analysis of an entire community’s textual production, what meaningful knowledge can we hope
to derive from this admittedly limited analysis of rhetors and texts? Fortunately, Ratcliffe offers
a partial answer to this question through her discussion of “cultural logics” (10). According to
Ratcliffe, textual production does not occur within a vacuum, and “rhetorical listening turns the
meaning of the text into something larger than itself, certainly larger than the intent of the
speaker/writer, in that rhetorical listening locates a text as part of larger cultural logics” (46).
Even though it cannot be assumed that all members of a given community share the same set of
attitudes toward a given topic, one can analyze even a limited set of representative texts in order
to develop a tentative understanding of the “belief system or way of reasoning that is shared
within a culture” (10). Informed by this notion of cultural logics, we can analyze a given textual
production for both the argument that it asserts and how that argument overlaps with and/or
differs from “the cultural logics that ground such claims” (33). This concept of cultural logics is
helpful as a methodology for analyzing climate reform and evangelical Christian discourse.
Whereas the claims of Thunberg and other U.S.-directed climate reformers, as well as those of
evangelical Christian apocalyptic rhetors, do not overlap completely with the rest of their
respective communities, these discourses can still be interpreted in order to shed some light on
the influence of apocalyptic thinking on community members’ attitudes toward climate change.
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And in the face of such a catastrophe and in consideration of the often politically and
ideologically divided nature of this issue, some understanding is a good place to start.

Applying Burkean Analysis to Apocalyptic Texts
While often grounded in the examples and language of literary theory, Burke provides us
with a powerful rhetorical tool for assessing how a given text works to persuade its audiences to
adopt a particular set of attitudes and behaviors in response to real world problems. For example,
Burke suggests that the act of poetic composition “is undertaken as equipment for living, as a
ritualistic way of arming us to confront perplexities and risks. It would protect us” (“Philosophy
of Literary Form” 61). The production of poetic discourse is, for Burke, not something that is
detached from or even opposed to real world action but is both preparation for and itself a form
of such action, action that occurs through the rhetorical shaping of one’s own and others’
attitudes and behaviors toward problems encountered in the world. Literary texts represent an
author’s attempt to create and provide to audiences symbolic equipment by which to interpret
and respond to actual situations. This model of textual analysis helps us to understand the
persuasive power of an individual and community’s textual production. By examining the
symbolic world produced within a text, we gain insight into how that type of text seeks to
influence audiences’ understanding of and response to particular experiences and problems.
Significantly, this analytical approach is not limited to the study of poetry but is helpful in the
analysis of a wide variety of texts. As Burke suggests, “every document bequeathed us by history
must be treated as a strategy for encompassing a situation,” whether it is a political document
like “the American Constitution” (109), a creative work such as “The Grapes of Wrath” (81-82),
or, more relevant to this project, a public call for climate reform. By applying Burke’s model of
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textual analysis to climate reform and evangelical Christian texts, we gain insight into how the
use of apocalyptic symbols works to authorize certain responses to current problems, namely
anthropogenic climate change.
The assertion that textual production, far from being dislocated from the sphere of social
and political action, is itself a form of action is not limited to the “Philosophy of Literary Form”
but constitutes a recurring feature of Burke’s thought. In his essay on “Terministic Screens,” for
instance, Burke outlines his “dramatistic view of language,” in which all discursive productions
are held to engage in “‘symbolic action’” (45). Distancing himself from the positivist
understanding of language dominant within scientific discourse, Burke emphasizes “the
necessarily suasive nature of even the most unemotional scientific nomenclatures” (45). For
Burke, the very act of selecting words to convey one’s thought is rhetorical in that this act of
selection shapes the knowledge that is produced through the exchange. In a statement that bears a
remarkable similarity to the research methodology outlined by Johnson in the first Octalog,
Burke observes that “[e]ven if any given terminology is a reflection of reality, by its very nature
as a terminology it must be a selection of reality; and to this extent it must function also as a
deflection of reality” (45). The symbols one uses to explain an event are inherently persuasive
and, therefore, rhetorical in that one’s choice and arrangement of those symbols serves to
construct a particular interpretation of the event for one’s audience and seeks to influence how
the audience feels toward the event being described. As such, all texts, whether the scientific
findings of the IPCC or LaHaye and Jenkin’s account of the approaching end times, offer
audiences a symbolic representation of the world in response to a perceived situation or problem
and ask audiences to internalize that representation and use it as a basis for thinking and
responding. In “Literature as Equipment for Living,” Burke likewise suggests that “[p]roverbs
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[and, by extension, all literary works] are strategies for dealing with situations. In so far as
situations are typical and recurrent in a given social structure, people develop names for them
and strategies for handling them. Another name for strategies might be attitudes” (296).
According to Burke, not just literary texts but all textual productions constitute social artifacts
that act upon human beings in rhetorical ways, persuading them over time to adopt particular
attitudes and, by extension, practices in response to social phenomena.
By suggesting that any given text attempts to persuade its audience to inhabit a set of
attitudes and then use those attitudes as a basis to respond to perceived conflicts, Burke
articulates a flexible and powerful tool for assessing the persuasive designs of apocalyptic
environmental texts. As a genre of public discourse, apocalyptic rhetoric may be defined as
rhetorical equipment for interpreting and responding to those moments of tragedy and disaster
that seem to threaten our sense of normalcy and our feelings of control over our lives and the
world. As Barry Brummett has suggested, “apocalyptic may serve many as prophylactic,
preemptive, and preventative equipment for living, maintaining a steady tension of opposition
against looming disorder” (43). Apocalyptic texts perform rhetorical work by opening and
closing particular ways of understanding and responding to perceived upheaval and disorder. Of
course, not all apocalyptic texts embody apocalyptic thinking in the same way or seek to foster
the same attitudes and practices in all audiences. Applied to the study of apocalyptic rhetoric,
Burke’s contextual approach to textual analysis compliments Ratcliffe’s methodology of
rhetorical listening by calling upon scholars to not just investigate the apocalyptic appeals that
occur within a given climate reform or evangelical Christian text but to consider how those
apocalyptic appeals participate in the larger cultural logics of climate reform and evangelical
Christian discourse.
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Having introduced Ratcliffe’s methodology of rhetorical listening and having outlined
Burke’s theory of rhetorical textual analysis, we still face the methodological challenge raised by
Ratcliffe that no individual text or figure associated with a community can be taken as a
metaphorical substitution for the community itself. When we consider the complex and varied
use of apocalyptic appeals within climate reform and evangelical Christian discourse, as well as
the heterogeneous nature of the communities themselves, we must wonder how an analysis of
one of Thunberg’s speeches or a prophetic work by an evangelical apocalyptic rhetor like David
Jeremiah could possibly be read as representative of climate reformers and evangelical Christians
more generally. In the remaining sections of this chapter, I will attempt to address this concern
by first explaining why Thunberg and then bestselling evangelical Christian apocalyptic rhetors
such as Evans, Jeremiah, Rhodes, Hampson, Lindsey, Jeremiah, and LaHaye and Jenkins may be
taken as meaningfully representative of the use of apocalyptic appeals within their respective
communities. I will explain how such public figures have had or continue to have a noteworthy
influence on the apocalyptic attitudes their respective audiences adopt toward societal problems
like climate change. In the process of accounting for my decision to focus on these rhetors and
their texts, I will also outline the cultural logics with which these texts and rhetors are associated
but not wholly identified and, in doing so, will further explain and enact both Ratcliffe’s
methodology of rhetorical listening and Burke’s theory of rhetorical textual analysis.

Rationale for Selecting Greta Thunberg as Representative of Climate Reform
Having spoken before U.S. lawmakers and citizens, alike, in both formal legislative and
popular entertainment contexts, Thunberg has become a principal representative of the climate
reform movement for U.S. audiences. This is not to suggest, however, that Thunberg is the sole
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representative of the movement. Even as she addressed assembled Global Climate strikers in
New York City in 2019, Thunberg was only one climate reformer out of the “over 7.6 million . . .
students, parents, trade unions, businesses, health workers, scientists, celebrities, people of all
backgrounds, ages, regions and faiths” who assembled “in all corners of the globe” to express
their frustration toward ever increasing global warming (The 350.org Team). The heterogeneous
nature of the climate reform movement is further illustrated by the elaborate list of “Allies”
provided by 350.org, the organization that hosts the Global Climate Strike website, a central
organizational hub for the Global Climate Strike itself. Consisting of a plethora of nongovernmental environmental organizations and companies from across the world, 350.org’s list
of allies does not, at the time of this writing, feature Fridays for Future (“Allies”), the climate
reform organization that began first with Thunberg’s school strikes outside of Sweden’s
Parliament and then grew to include other student strikers (Fridays for Future). Yet, as we delve
deeper into the history and organization of the Global Climate Strike, we learn that it was the
Thunberg-inspired Fridays for Future movement that served as the original inspiration for the
strike (Fridays for Future). Despite the fact that much of the Global Climate Strike is organized
by 350.org and its associated environmental organizations, Thunberg’s influence on the global
event continues to be felt, not only through her role as a featured speaker at the strike itself
(“Greta Thunberg”), but in the fact that it was the Thunberg-led Fridays for Future that issued the
call for the 2020 Global Climate Strike, a call that 350.org advertised (350.org, “Fridays for
Future”). While it is important to not conflate Thunberg with the global climate movement writ
large, her associations with that movement continue to be highly visible both within the
discourse produced by the movement itself and the legislative and popular discourse regarding
climate change in the United States.
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Even as we acknowledge that Thunberg is not identical with the global climate
movement, she nonetheless serves to represent that movement for many of its members and the
outside world. And even though there is little indication that Thunberg has or will ever have the
desire to develop appeals that engage evangelical audiences, in particular, it is by exploring the
possibilities and limitations of climate reform discourse for engaging such resistant audiences
that we may foster a more complex understanding of climate change discourse within the U.S.
and what kinds of environmental appeals are likely to mobilize different audiences for (or
against) much needed climate actions. Still, the question remains, “Why is Thunberg well
positioned to engage evangelical Christian audiences, specifically, through her apocalyptic
environmental appeals?” In answering this question, we may look at another dimension of
Ratcliffe’s methodology of rhetorical listening: “eavesdropping” (104). Eavesdropping is,
according to Ratcliffe, a method of research engagement that involves “choosing to stand outside
. . . in an uncomfortable spot . . . on the border of knowing and not knowing . . . granting others
the inside position . . . listening to learn” (104-05). Eavesdropping constitutes “a rhetorical tactic
of purposely positioning oneself on the edge of one’s own knowing so as to overhear and learn
from others . . . ” (105). By seeking to understand the influence of apocalyptic climate change
discourse on evangelical Christian audiences, I am, in essence, attempting to understand and
represent discourse that is, as a product of the social movements of climate reform and
evangelical belief and practice, inextricable from the social conditions of its own production and
reception. As one who was raised in a theologically conservative household and a writing teacher
who has designed and taught coursework within environmental rhetoric, my analysis of these
community discourses is inevitably influenced by the experiences and identifications I bring to
the subject. However, as one who does not actively identify with either the evangelical Christian
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community or the community of climate reformers explored in this project, I approach the
discourses from an analytical location outside the communities that have produced them. I must,
therefore, acknowledge my limited understanding of evangelical and climate reform discourse
even as I attempt to eavesdrop on these discourses. I must also acknowledge the risks that the
practice of eavesdropping carries with it, namely the danger of inscribing overly reductive
definitions of these communities.
Thankfully, the practice of rhetorical listening helps to resist this danger of overly
reductive or even stereotypical interpretation and representation. “A rhetoric of listening,”
Ratcliffe suggests, “interrupts the emphasis of Western logic to perpetrate either-or reasoning,
for instance, to recognize commonalities or to recognize differences” (95). By acknowledging
the danger that I, an outsider to climate reform and evangelical Christian discourse, may too
easily reduce these discourses to an overly simplistic climate reformer versus evangelical binary,
I can respond by eavesdropping with “an accompanying ethic of care,” in which I strive to
remain open to both their commonalities and differences (105). Toward this end, it is not only
important to foster an understanding of the beliefs and values that characterize evangelical
experience and identity but to acknowledge that, far from being universally opposed to climate
reform, there are many evangelical Christians who are, themselves, a part of the climate reform
movement and, as such, offer special insight into the rhetorical and ideological contexts that
influence evangelicals’ reception of climate change appeals.
Prior to introducing the climate appeals of climate scientist and evangelical Katharine
Hayhoe, as well as those of the Young Evangelicals for Climate Action (YECA), it would be
helpful to better understand the beliefs and values of the evangelicals they are appealing to. This
is no simple task. As a community of believers that resists easy categorization, it is difficult to
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arrive at a stable definition of evangelical belief and practice. In the study The Truth About
Conservative Christians, for instance, Andrew Greeley and Michael Hout state that there is so
little consensus over what the term “‘evangelical’” means and how it relates to the associated
term “‘fundamentalist’” that they chose to lump all such believers together “under the rubric of
‘Conservative Christians’” (2). In Toward a Civil Discourse, Sharon Crowley uses the term
“fundamentalist” to designate those evangelical Protestants who are adamantly opposed to
mainstream culture and Christianity as corruptions of biblical truth (103). Crowley’s observation
is supported by Randall Balmer who, in Blessed Assurance, echoes George M. Marsden’s
observation “that the difference between an evangelical and a fundamentalist is that a
fundamentalist is an evangelical who is mad about something” (112). Indeed, it is largely this
image of the angry evangelical crusading to inscribe biblical values onto U.S. political and
popular culture that has led many to conflate Christian fundamentalism with what Mark Lewis
Taylor in Religion, Politics, and the Christian Right terms “‘the Christian Right’” (x). This is in
spite of the fact that many fundamentalists and, by extension, evangelicals resist the materialism
and worldliness that marks such “messianic and aggressive nationalism” (x). Such differences in
definition are not limited to scholars of evangelical Christianity but are reflected in the
statements of belief of major evangelical organizations such as the National Association of
Evangelicals (NAE) and the Southern Baptist Association (SBA), the latter being “the largest
evangelical denomination” of all (Lewis 10). As a case-in-point, while the NAE’s “Statement of
Faith” primarily limits its scope to the core evangelical values of scriptural authority, belief in
the trinity, the practice of evangelism, and belief in the divinity of and salvation through Jesus
Christ, the SBC statement “Baptist Faith & Message 2000” goes beyond such doctrines to assert
an opposition to same sex marriage and abortion and incorporates calls “to bring industry,

41
government, and society as a whole under the sway of the principles of righteousness, truth, and
brotherly love.” Despite existing under the shared umbrella of evangelical Christianity, the NAE
and SBC often articulate differing attitudes toward the world around them, as well as the proper
role of evangelicals within it, thereby illustrating the ways in which evangelical Christians can
differ in belief and practice.
While the preceding examples help to illustrate the difficulty of defining evangelical
identity in any kind of uniform way, there are certain beliefs that are characteristic of evangelical
thought and practice, regardless of institutional affiliation or political purpose. In The Rights
Turn in Conservative Christian Politics, Andrew R. Lewis identifies the five shared features of
evangelical identity: “(1) a high view of the authority and trustworthiness of the Bible; (2) a
belief in God’s real, historical work of salvation; (3) a belief that salvation comes only through
the atoning work of Christ; (4) a commitment to the importance of evangelism and missions; and
(5) a commitment to living a spiritually transformed life” (10). While the form taken may vary
according to the particular contexts of a given denomination, church, or situation, these values
serve to unite evangelicals across lines of doctrinal and institutional difference. Rather than
seeking to adhere to any particular dogma, evangelicalism is, according to Christianity Today
writer Bruce Hindmarsh, “centrally concerned with what it means to discover a personally
meaningful relationship with Christ through conversion.” As such, “[e]vangelicals are concerned
to bring people to Christ more than to convert anyone to the category of evangelicalism”
(Hindmarsh). This emphasis upon cultivating a personal relationship with Jesus and leading
others to such a relationship helps to explain the tendency among evangelicals to not view
evangelical Christianity as a religion at all, but as an often-misunderstood term denoting direct
communion with the divine truth of salvation through Christ. As stated in the “Evangelical
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Manifesto: A Declaration of Evangelical Public Commitment,” “the term Evangelical, and the
desire to be biblical, both predate and outlast the Protestant project in its historical form. . . .
Other labels come and go, but the Evangelical principle that seeks to be faithful to the Good
News of Jesus and to the Scriptures will always endure” (Evangelical Manifesto Steering
Committee 10-11). Far from being a product of history, culture, or society, evangelicalism is, for
many evangelicals, a God-given spiritual path that transcends the base materialism of the
mundane world.
In light of the complexities of belief and practice that mark evangelical identity, it is not
surprising that figures such as Hayhoe and organizations like YECA have attempted to explain
the problems and solutions of climate change in ways that are accessible and acceptable to
evangelical audiences. In an article written for the New York Times, titled “I’m a Climate
Scientist Who Believes in God. Hear Me Out,” Hayhoe offers readers insight into the complex
social influences that fuel the “the alliance between conservative theology and conservative
politics” that is often associated with evangelical Christians, an alliance that is evident in
evangelicals’ continued support of Trump, support that resulted in the country’s temporary
withdrawal from the Paris Agreement. According to Hayhoe, this politicization of the Christian
faith “has been deliberately engineered and fostered over decades of increasingly divisive
politics on issues of race, abortion and now climate change, to the point where the best predictor
of whether we agree with the science is simply where we fall on the political spectrum.” As a
climate scientist who articulates climate change in terms that evangelical Christians may identify
with, Hayhoe provides secular climate reformers with models for more expansive rhetorical
engagement. For instance, in recognition of the power of political ideology to mediate
evangelicals’ reception of climate change appeals, Hayhoe will often begin discussions about
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climate change by appealing to the values she shares with her evangelical audience, such as “the
well-being of our community,” “our children,” or even “our faith.” While such values as caring
for one’s community and being concerned with the safety of one’s children are not exclusive to
evangelicals, they provide a resource of rhetorical appeal that may help Hayhoe and, by
extension, other climate reform rhetors to establish a shared foundation of values on which to
foster more productive, mutually engaging climate change discourse. As an evangelical Christian
and climate scientist, Hayhoe illustrates how evangelical climate scientists and scholars have
initiated meaningful discussions about climate change within their communities, discussions that
are aided by a familiarity with evangelical belief. Such discussions are not limited to Christian
scientists and scholars but can be seen in the reform efforts of evangelical organizations such as
YECA.
In a move that directly contradicts the tendency of many evangelical Protestants to
support Trump’s policies (Martínez and Smith), YECA publicly challenged the U.S. withdrawal
from the Paris Agreement (Goebel, “Paris”). Like Hayhoe, YECA National Organizer and
Spokesperson Kyle Meyaard-Schaap grounds his climate change appeals in the values shared by
evangelical Christians, asserting in a response to the withdrawal that Christians have a dual
responsibility to “protect God’s creation” and their “neighbors’ good” (qtd. in Goebel, “Paris”).
For Meyaard-Schaap, Christians’ environmental responsibility is not just a matter of belief, but is
also one of practice, asserting that “[i]t is immoral and irresponsible for the United States to
abandon our commitment and withdraw from an agreement signed by virtually every nation of
the world” (qtd. in Goebel, “Paris”). In addition to having a moral responsibility to take care of
the environment, Meyaard-Schaap suggests that evangelicals have a responsibility to take care of
other human beings, regardless of nationality. Meyaard-Schaap’s statement points to how,

44
according to communications scholar Susanna Priest, “[m]any religious groups, including groups
within American Christianity, embrace the concept of human stewardship over the land—which
in turn implies a responsibility for environmental protection” (54). Meyaard-Schaap’s response
to Trump’s withdrawal illustrates how appeals to environmental stewardship and Christian
morality may help engage more evangelical Christians on the issue of climate change and may
even persuade them to champion climate reform measures like those contained within the Paris
Agreement. Interestingly, Meyaard-Schaap’s response also addresses the tendency of
conservatives, many of whom are Trump-leaning evangelicals, to think of climate reform as a
threat to U.S. global dominance. By suggesting that “[t]he U.S.should be a leader in the effort to
protect God’s creation” (qtd. Goebel, “Paris”), Meyaard-Schaap appeals to evangelicals’ sense of
nationalism by placing evangelical Christians at the forefront of the battle to protect the world
God created. If one is a true Christian and a real patriot, then one would see the United States
take on the mantle of environmental stewardship and shepherd the rest of the world toward zero
emissions. Taken together, the YECA and Hayhoe provide insight into forms of climate change
appeals that may be especially persuasive to evangelical Christian audiences.
As I evaluate evangelical Christian discourse concerning climate change, I will employ
rhetorical listening by actively resisting the tendency to explain evangelical resistance to climate
reform in overly simplistic, either-or terms. By listening to the ways in which Hayhoe and
YECA produce texts that attempt to bridge the rhetorical and ideological gaps between secular
climate change and evangelical discourse, I will identify forms of appeal that may be persuasive
to evangelical Christian stakeholders whose understanding of climate change may be mediated
by apocalyptic symbols that are not identical to the secular apocalyptic appeals used by
influential secular climate change rhetors such as Thunberg and within climate reform efforts
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such as the Green New Deal and the Global Climate Strike. In doing so, I will explore rhetorical
strategies that U.S.-directed secular climate reformers may adopt to more effectively engage the
approximately 21% of the U.S. whose votes for Trump (Martínez and Smith) facilitated the U.S.
withdrawal from the Paris Agreement in 2020 (Pompeo) and who largely continued to support
Trump even after this withdrawal had occurred, with between 81% and 85% of white
evangelicals voting for Trump in the 2020 election (Nortey). And even though the United States
would go on to rejoin the Paris Agreement on February 19, 2021 under Democratic President
Biden (Blinken), the reality that a majority of white evangelical Protestants supported a
candidate whose environmental policies had such a profoundly negative impact on climate
reform in the U.S. highlights the power of this voting base to influence the future of climate
reform policy.
Though it is important to acknowledge and learn as much as we can from such
evangelical Christian rhetors as Hayhoe and such organizations as YECA who have crafted
helpful strategies for persuading this community, the severity of global warming’s consequences
and the urgent need for an immediate, expansive overhaul of U.S. infrastructure suggests that the
cause of climate reform would benefit from engaging evangelical audiences as much as possible.
Due to her access to political, legal, and public spheres, Greta Thunberg is especially poised to
promote attitudes toward climate change in the public sphere that are conducive to its mitigation.
As a climate reform rhetor whose discourse is consistently being impressed upon U.S. citizens,
evangelical Christians included, the reality is that Thunberg has become the default climate
reform representative for many of these audiences. As such, how Thunberg represents the
climate reform movement is likely to have an impact on how these audiences think about climate
reform more generally. Again, it is unlikely that Thunberg does or will possess the desire to
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make such a rhetorical move by modifying her appeals to more productively engage evangelical
audiences whose understanding of climate change and other such societal threats are mediated by
religious apocalyptic thinking. Thunberg has gone so far as to state that she does not “want to
meet with people who don't accept the science” (Chappell and Chang). Rather than tailor her
climate reform communication to appeal to specific groups (or ideologies), Thunberg strives to
spread her “message across to everyone. And whoever listens listens” (Chappell and Chang).
Yet, despite Thunberg’s disinterest in producing climate reform appeals that explicitly engage
particular ideological frames, the failure of climate reform within the U.S. to achieve many of the
goals Thunberg has called for, goals that reflect the carbon mitigation efforts of both the U.N.
and many U.S. Democrats, illustrates the profound importance of framing climate reform appeals
in ways that resonate with and mobilize the attitudes of U.S. citizens, even those whose
ideological frames are resistant to the appeals of climate reform. Throughout this project I argue
that Thunberg and the secular incarnations of the climate reform movement she has inspired
would benefit from being more mindful of the impact of apocalyptic rhetoric on both the
production and reception of climate change discourse. This is especially important for addressing
evangelical Christian audiences, many of whom interpret existential crises such as global
warming differently than their secular or more mainstream counterparts, as will be demonstrated
in the remaining sections of this chapter.

Listening to the Cultural Logics of Secular Climate Reform
In order to illustrate how Ratcliffe’s methodology of rhetorical listening may help us to
make sense of apocalyptic appeals within contemporary climate change discourse, we may look
to Thunberg’s recurring appeal to younger audiences’ anomie regarding lawmakers and older
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generations’ collective and systemic failure to mitigate global warming. Such appeals to
audiences’ frustration with the status quo are a core feature of apocalyptic rhetoric. Indeed, the
genre of apocalyptic discourse may be interpreted as, in its essence, a “rhetorical response” to a
given audience’s “feeling of anomie or disorientation, a feeling of bewilderment, a sense that
one’s received systems of explanation have failed” (Brummett 15). Whether addressing the U.S.
Congress (“Wherever I Go”), protestors at the Global Climate Strike in New York City (“Greta
Thunberg” 00:02:53-00:03:55), or the European Union and other world leaders (Neubauer et al.),
Thunberg has consistently appealed to audiences’ shared sense that current systems are broken
and incapable of addressing the complexities and urgency of climate reform and that these
systems need to be replaced with ones that privilege international cooperation, global equity, and
environmental sustainability over the motives of national profit, convenience, and personal gain.
By analyzing Thunberg’s communications as a form of apocalyptic rhetoric, we gain an
enhanced understanding of how Thunberg’s climate change discourse takes audience’s
dissatisfaction with current systems and channels it into the cause of climate reform, thereby
authorizing a set of attitudes and behaviors that, if taken to their logical conclusion, would
revolutionize virtually every aspect of U.S. society. In the face of destruction, Thunberg’s
discourse offers audiences the pleasure of seeing current systems symbolically annihilated and
replaced. However, while we might argue that Thunberg’s appeals, like much apocalyptic
discourse, operate as a form of catharsis, it would be a mistake to therefore conclude that the
revolutionary portrait they paint for audiences is merely figurative. No, the apocalyptic
destruction of the status quo Thunberg calls for, a destructive act designed to save the world
from an even worse fate, does rhetorical work by asking audiences to enter Thunberg’s reformist
vision and then interpret and respond to the world from that perspective.
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Despite the prevalence of Thunberg’s climate reform discourse, Ratcliffe’s call to listen
metonymically reminds us that Thunberg is not the sole representative of climate reform, but one
of many sometimes-conflicting voices. That multiple interpretations of climate reform exist
within the cultural logic of this movement becomes evident when we contrast Thunberg’s speech
to the U.S. Congress with Representative Ocasio-Cortez’s Resolution Recognizing the Duty of
the Federal Government to Create a Green New Deal. While admitting that “a sustainable
transformed world will include lots of new benefits,” Thunberg clarifies that climate reform “is
not primarily an opportunity to create new green jobs, new businesses or green economic growth.
This is above all an emergency, and not just an emergency. This is the biggest crisis humanity
has ever faced” (“Wherever I Go” 87). Read in isolation, Thunberg’s distinction between a
climate reform model that privileges economic well-being and one that does whatever is
necessary, even if economically unfeasible, to halt global warming might be read as but another
critique of lawmakers and older generations’ privileging of economic prosperity over the safety
of future generations. However, when we situate Thunberg’s statement within the cultural logic
of the Green New Deal and its association of U.S. climate reform with the creation of “highquality union jobs” (United States 12), we come to realize that Thunberg is not just critiquing
outright opponents of climate reform but is even challenging those climate reform proponents
who, like Ocasio-Cortez, do not go far enough.
By evaluating Thunberg’s apocalyptic appeals within the larger cultural logics of climate
reform, we begin to appreciate how Thunberg, while clearly associated with the cause of climate
reform, does not speak for all of its advocates. The importance of developing this more nuanced
understanding of Thunberg’s relationship with the climate reform movement becomes evident
when we consider that support for U.S.-centered climate reform efforts such as the Green New
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Deal tends to be distributed along partisan lines that pit Democrats against Republicans, with
only 32% of “Conservative Republicans” reporting that they support the Green New Deal
(Gustafson et al.). By recognizing that Thunberg not only distances herself from Democrats’
partisan responses to climate change but also criticizes Democrats for helping to make climate
reform a political issue, we may begin to remove the sutures of identification that would seek to
conflate Thunberg with Democrats’ political agenda. By exposing such gaps between Thunberg
and other U.S. climate reform efforts, we open spaces for opposing political perspectives to enter
Thunberg’s apocalyptic climate reform frame. Simply put, Thunberg’s implied refutation of
Democrats’ politicization of climate reform presents Republicans with the opportunity to
consider Thunberg’s arguments on their own merit, rather than dismissing them as complicit in a
Democratic political agenda. What conservative Republicans might think about this dissonance
is uncertain, and it is unlikely that simply disentangling Thunberg’s message from that of
Democrats is sufficient to undo the politicization of climate change in the U.S. or overcome the
monetary interests that appear to have driven so much of Trump and, by extension, the
Republican party’s efforts to undo climate reform and other environmental policies (Popovich et
al.). However, by acknowledging the gaps between Thunberg and Democrats’ climate reform
vision, we foster opportunities for Republicans to engage climate reform as something more than
a Democratic platform. While aspirational in nature, such acknowledgements of the differences
in thinking within U.S.-directed climate reform create opportunities for a wider array of
audiences with different ideological identifications to engage with climate reform discourse
moving forward.
Whereas scholars have a tendency to evaluate textual productions as either representative
or not representative of a given community’s identity, “[a] rhetoric of listening proceeds via a
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cultural logic that recognizes simultaneous commonalities and differences” (Ratcliffe 95).
Ratcliffe goes on to suggest that “[s]uch simultaneous recognitions are important because they
afford a place for productively engaging differences, especially those differences that might
otherwise be relegated to the status of ‘excess’” (95). Ratcliffe highlights how the critic’s
overemphasis on finding commonality between the textual productions within a given cultural
logic can create a false sense of identification between those texts and the community members
who produce them. This is not to suggest that because a community’s members produce texts
that are not wholly in sync, the community has no shared identify, but to highlight how members
of a community are never completely homogenous in their attitudes and behaviors toward a
given topic. Breaking with the conventions of “either-or reasoning” (95), Ratcliffe’s
methodology of rhetorical listening and, in this case, listening for excess, allows us to recognize
that Representative Ocasio-Cortez and Thunberg coexist within a shared cultural logic of climate
reform even as they differ in their articulation of its immediate goals. This observation does not
collapse the differences between the Green New Deal authors and Thunberg but allows us to
evaluate their responses to the apocalyptic threat of climate change as associated but not identical
with each other.
Listening metonymically to Thunberg does not only reveal gaps, however: it can also
help us to appreciate the ways in which Thunberg’s apocalyptic appeals reverberate in the
discourses produced by her audience members, many of whom are also active in the climate
reform movement. Indeed, it is only by exposing these reverberations that we gain insight into
how Thunberg’s apocalyptic messaging provides an apocalyptic logic that, in turn, reflects and
even shapes the larger cultural logic of climate reform in the U.S. As a case-in-point, we may
turn to the collection of multimodal digital texts that 350.org has published on its organizational
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website for the Global Climate Strike, in which “Young Climate Strikers Tell Their Stories.”
When we evaluate the textual productions of U.S. stakeholders within the 350.org organization,
one of the primary environmental organizations that has helped to organize the Global Climate
Strike, we come to see that Thunberg’s apocalyptic logic is not exclusive to her but is reflected in
U.S. climate reform discourse more generally.
Take, for example, U.S. stakeholder Mia Werger’s response to climate reform titled
“Growing Up at the End of the World,” an audiovisual text ripe with apocalyptic appeals. In this
text, Werger combines hand-drawn images with narration to communicate her frustration with
the environmental status quo and offers a set of attitudes that may foster a more sustainable
future. As we evaluate Werger’s text, we can identify several parallels with the apocalyptic
appeals offered by Thunberg. For instance, the teenage Werger observes that for her entire life,
she has lived with the “shadow” of climate catastrophe hovering over her (00:00:13), a status quo
that has taken a dramatic toll on her emotional wellbeing. Werger goes on to observe that in
addition to “the external dangers of climate change, such as “[r]ising tides, melting permafrost,
[and] polluted air” (00:00:55-00:01:05), global warming is also inflicting “harm” on “our minds
and hearts” (00:01:12-00:01:15). This emotional tally includes “[c]hildren breaking down from
trying to carry the weight of the world on their shoulders” (00:01:19-00:01:23), experiencing
“guilt” regarding the environmental consequences of even the most routine behaviors (00:01:2400:01:30), and even the “trauma” of food industry practices (00:01:31-01:01:36). By drawing her
audience’s focus to the psychological harm that the knowledge of global warming can have on
young people, Werger engages in an apocalyptic appeal to audience’s anomie that overlaps with
appeals made by Thunberg throughout her public discourse.
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In her September 23, 2019 speech to the UN General Assembly, for instance, Thunberg
criticizes the assembled audience of lawmakers and, by extension, the older generations of
citizens who allowed global warming to get to this point, confronting them with the
consequences of their generational irresponsibility: “People are suffering. People are dying.
Entire ecosystems are collapsing. We are in the beginning of a mass extinction. And all you can
talk about is money and fairy tales of eternal economic growth. How dare you!” (“World” 96).
Like Werger, Thunberg expresses outrage and pain at the realization that past and present
environmental practices are effectively robbing present and future generations of a habitable
planet. Also like Werger, Thunberg articulates her frustration with the status quo through the
narrative of childhood innocence shattered: “You have taken away my dreams and my childhood
with your empty words” (96). Thunberg’s distress is echoed in Werger’s text as well, with
Werger going so far as to question whether “the human race even deserves to survive”
(00:02:26-00:02:33). Just as Werger and Thunberg both articulate their fear and anger regarding
looming environmental catastrophe, they present audiences with a similar strategy of response.
In the face of the negative impacts of environmental practice on not only the natural
world but the psyches of its human inhabitants, Werger concludes her text by outlining a course
of action through which we may abolish the status quo and usher in a more environmentally
sustainable future. Shifting from the personal pronouns of self-reflection and confession, Werger
employs the communal “us” and asks her audience to, above all else, be more “honest” about its
impact upon and responsibility toward the environment (00:03:01-00:04:25). Werger concludes
her video essay by observing that it was only by embracing and not rejecting her “grief over the
state of the world” that she was able to discover “a sense of meaning that” she “had never known
before” and which provides the inspiration needed to help “reinvent our relationship with the
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world” (00:04:51-00:05:09). Like Thunberg, Werger appeals to her audience’s frustration and
despair toward a society that would privilege the pursuit of comfort and material wealth over its
children’s future and the health of the planet.
Both Thunberg and Werger present audiences with a natural world that is spinning out of
control and a society that is dooming its youth to life in a figurative and, in some cases, literal
wasteland. Also like Thunberg, Werger attempts to take these negative feelings and channel
them into more sustainable environmental attitudes and practices. For Werger, like Thunberg, the
frank acknowledgement of our helplessness before climate catastrophe is liberating in that it
reminds us of our need to protect the only home we have. As such, Werger’s text, like
Thunberg’s speeches, serves as both a simulacrum of and a line of escape from looming
destruction. Significantly, this escape comes in the form of human action, guided by science. By
evaluating Thunberg and Werger’s environmental apocalyptic appeals in tandem, we gain insight
into the cultural logics of the secular climate reform movement in the U.S., and we better
understand that Thunberg’s appeals are not limited to Thunberg alone but are to some degree
representative of this movement more generally. In Chapter Three, I will continue to evaluate
Thunberg’s U.S.-directed discourse in the context of the cultural logics of U.S.-directed climate
reform and thereby provide a portrait of how Thunberg’s apocalyptic discourse represents and
reinforces that of the movement more generally.

Rationale for My Selection of Representative Evangelical Christian Apocalyptic Discourse
In addition to explaining why it is productive to take Thunberg as representative of but
not entirely identical to the cultural logics of the climate reform movement, I must also provide
some insight into why such evangelical Christian apocalyptic rhetors as Hal Lindsey, Jimmy
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Evans, David Jeremiah, Ron Rhodes, Todd Hampson, and Tim LaHaye and Jerry Jenkins are
sufficiently representative of apocalyptic belief within the evangelical community. While these
authors will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Four, a brief discussion of the influence and
popularity of such premillennial rhetors as Lindsey, LaHaye, and Jeremiah and, especially in the
case of Lindsey, the role they have played in shaping the genre of premillennial apocalyptic
discourse within the U.S. will help to illustrate the influence that many of these apocalyptic
rhetors continue to have on evangelical Christians and non-Christians alike.
While Chapter Four will focus primarily on the more recent premillennial evangelical
discourse of Jeremiah, Evans, Hampson, Rhodes, and LaHaye and Jenkins, the influence of Hal
Lindsey’s foundational premillennial discourse is felt throughout much these rhetors’ work and
provides a fitting place to start. The influence of Lindsey’s seminal work of premillennial
Christian prophecy, The Late Great Planet Earth, co-written with C.C. Carlson, has been
especially strong and is cited by the New York Times as the single bestselling book of the 1970s
(Walters 27). In “Varieties of Religious Publishing,” Martin Marty encapsulates The Late Great
Planet Earth’s influence by deeming it a “Flag Book” (55). Just as “a flag exists in part for the
purpose of rallying the troops,” The Late Great Planet Earth formed the locus of a “quasiecumenical” push among premillennial Christians (55), thereby spreading Lindsey’s brand of
evangelical Christian apocalyptism throughout the U.S. Commenting on the influence of Hal
Lindsey and The Late Great Planet Earth on the landscape of Christian premillennialism in the
1970s, Erin Smith observes that “[t]o read and talk about” The Late Great Planet Earth and other
popular contemporary Christian publications “was a way of publicly claiming a particular
religious identity and membership in a privileged community of believers” (228). As the book
that effectively brought apocalyptic prophecy into the Christian and secular mainstream
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(Brummett 124), The Late Great Planet Earth and, by extension, Lindsey provided evangelical
Christian rhetors and audiences with a biblical apocalyptic frame that continues to influence their
attitudes and behaviors toward world events to this day.
Arguably one of the most persistent and profound of these influences is Lindsey and
Carlson’s argument that it is only with the complete reestablishment of Israel as an autonomous,
thriving nation state that the necessary end time events will be sparked to “culminate with the
personal, visible return of the Messiah, Jesus Christ” (52). Significantly, the return of Christ and
the final cessation of worldly suffering is, according to Lindsey with Carlson, contingent upon
Israel’s “repossession of ancient Jerusalem” (54) and the reconstruction of “the ancient Temple
of worship on its old site” (56). As Mark Lewis Taylor observes in Religion, Politics, and the
Christian Right, evangelical Christians continue to exert a strong influence on U.S. foreign
policy as regards Israel (59). “‘Christian Zionist’ movements in the U.S. have,” according to
Taylor, “grown to record numbers, powered by their belief that Israel’s full return and settlement
of the biblical lands is a necessary precondition for Jesus’ return, the second coming” (59). And
while evangelical Christian and Trump confidant Reverend Johnnie Moore has suggested to the
BBC that the impact of Lindsey’s apocalyptic thinking on evangelical Christians’ political views
toward Israel “is exaggerated” (Amos), religious studies scholar Diana Butler Bass asserts that
former President Trump’s decision to “officially recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel”
(Trump) is, “[f]or many conservative evangelicals, . . . not about peace plans or Palestinians or
two state solutions. It is about prophecy. About the Bible. And, most certainly, it is about the
end-times” (Bass). The apocalyptic dimensions of evangelicals’ support of Israel is further
illustrated by the results of a LifeWay Research study, in which 52% of the evangelicals
surveyed reported that they support the nation state of Israel because it “is important for fulfilling
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biblical prophecy” (17). And when we combine this emphasis on Israel’s prophetic role with the
Pew Research Center’s 2010 finding that “[f]ully 58% of white evangelical Christians say Jesus
Christ will definitely or probably return to earth” within “the next 40 years” (15), we come to
realize that far from diminishing in influence in the decades since its 1970 publication, The Late
Great Planet Earth and Lindsey’s apocalyptic logic continues to be felt in U.S. citizens’
responses to public debates today, with evangelical Christians’ attitudes toward Israel being but
one example.
Evangelical Christian apocalyptists like Lindsey, while not necessarily representing the
religious and political views of all evangelicals, nonetheless provide rhetorical scholars with
helpful insights into the attitudes that characterize premillennial dispensationalism and how those
attitudes may influence not all, but some evangelical Christian understandings of pressing
societal problems like climate change. In “The Second Persona,” speech scholar Edwin Black
suggests that in addition to “the implied author of a discourse,” there is also an “implied auditor”
(111) or “the sort of audience that would be appropriate” to a given textual production (112).
Black goes on to suggest that this search for the implied audience of a given discourse is “a
useful methodological assumption” for rhetorical analysis in that it allows “the critic to link this
implied auditor to an ideology” (112). In other words, by evaluating the symbols of a given
textual production, the rhetorical critic can provide insight into the ideological orientation of the
rhetor, as well as that of the audience the text is intended to persuade or, at the very least, the
ideology that the rhetor is inviting the audience to enter. While one cannot completely
extrapolate an actual audience’s beliefs from a particular text, one can infer “a general attitude”
among the implied audience that the rhetor is attempting to engage (113). “The critic can see in
the auditor implied by a discourse a model of what the rhetor would have his real auditor

57
become” (113). In a statement that parallels Burke’s call to analyze textual productions as
equipment for interpreting and responding to daily conflicts, Black observes that textual
productions, especially those created for overtly ideological ends like those “of the Radical
Right,” offer their audiences “enticements not simply to believe something, but to be something.
We are solicited by the discourse to fulfill its blandishments with our very selves” (119). In
Chapter Four, I evaluate the apocalyptic discourse of influential evangelical Christian rhetors
operating within a genre of religious and public discourse that Lindsey has helped to popularize
and shape. In light of the widespread and continuing proliferation of Lindsey’s premillennial
frame, understanding the particular brand of apocalyptic rhetoric premillennial Christian rhetoric
endorses for evangelicals provides a helpful frame of reference in which to make sense of this
community’s reception of climate reform appeals, as well as what kinds of attitudes such
premillennialism authorizes for its audiences more generally.
Like Lindsey, LaHaye and Jenkins have also had a meaningful impact on premillennial
apocalyptic thinking within the evangelical Christian community in the U.S. with arguably the
greatest impact stemming from their Left Behind series of apocalyptic novels. It is difficult to
overestimate the influence of the Left Behind series on evangelicals and popular culture. With
sales exceeding 80 million copies and with seven books of the initial twelve-part series becoming
number one bestsellers on Publisher’s Weekly, New York Times, and USA Today bestseller lists,
the Left Behind novels have helped to bring a uniquely evangelical brand of apocalypse into
mainstream consciousness (Byle), spreading beyond the shelves of Christian bookstores and
occupying those of Wal-Mart, Sam’s (Crosby), Costco, and other mainstream chains (Memmott).
Published in 2005, the original novel, simply titled Left Behind: A Novel of the Earth’s Last
Days, would spur, in addition to its eleven sequels, a spin-off series of apocalyptic novels for
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kids, audiobooks (Van Biema et al), multiple films, and a videogame (Stern). The widespread
success of the Left Behind series would lead influential evangelical Christian Jerry Falwell to
state that, “[i]n terms of its impact on Christianity, . . . it’s probably greater than that of any other
book in modern times, outside the Bible” (as cited in Van Biema et al). The success and
popularity of the Left Behind series helped to bring Tim LaHaye and premillennial
dispensationalism into the minds of millions of U.S. citizens, Christian and non-Christian, alike.
Yet the Left Behind series was only the crown jewel of a career that had begun decades earlier.
In addition to the Left Behind series, Tim LaHaye published more than sixty nonfiction
books before his death in July 2016, several of which deal with biblical prophecy about the end
times (Byle). In tandem with his wife, Beverly LaHaye, Tim LaHaye was named one of “the 25
most influential evangelicals in America” by TIME Magazine in 2005 (Van Biema et al).
Beverly LaHaye is well known herself for her political activism on behalf of evangelical
Christian values, having founded the organization Concerned Woman for America in 1979 in an
effort to combat “abortion, gay rights and sex education” and defend “the traditional family,
prayer in schools and the teaching of creationism” (White). Tim LaHaye, too, would seek to
defend his values in the political public sphere by creating “his own political action group,
Californians for Biblical Morality” (White). Through LaHaye’s influence, Jerry Falwell also
“launched the Moral Majority in 1979” with Tim LaHaye serving on its original board (White).
Tim and Beverly LaHaye would also go on to become “national co-chairmen of Rep. Jack
Kemp’s presidential campaign” in 1987, though Tim LaHaye would leave the campaign “after
some Kemp supporters expressed anger that he had called Catholicism a ‘false religion’ in some
of his writings and blamed the crucifixion of Jesus Christ on the Jews” (White). Just as it is
difficult to overestimate the influence of the Left Behind series on Christian and mainstream
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understanding of the end times, it is difficult to overestimate Tim LaHaye’s influence on
evangelical Christianity in the United States, an influence that is felt throughout much of the
premillennial evangelical discourse studied in Chapter Four.
One of the most recent evangelical Christian apocalyptic rhetor whose texts I will be
evaluating in this dissertation is David Jeremiah. In many respects, Jeremiah is a spiritual
successor to Tim LaHaye, with Jeremiah going so far as to identify LaHaye as one of the “four
prophetic scholars who have” had the greatest impact on his life (vi). In addition to being a
figurative successor to LaHaye’s prophetic mission, Jeremiah is also a literal successor to
LaHaye, having replaced LaHaye as senior pastor of Shadow Mountain Community Church
(Weber, “Died”), the thirty eighth largest church in the United States with over 8,000 attendees
each week at the time of this writing (Outreach 100, “Largest Churches”). Beyond ministering to
this congregation and publishing premillennial apocalyptic texts like The Book of Signs,
Jeremiah is also the founder of Turning Point for God, a global multimedia ministry
(DavidJeremiah.org). Through his public engagements, Jeremiah circulates a brand of
evangelical Christian premillennialism that bears strong parallels with that of Lindsey and, even
more so, LaHaye. That this apocalyptism is, in fact, being engaged by a plethora of U.S. citizens
is suggested by the popularity of Jeremiah’s sermons on social networking platforms like
YouTube. Recently, one of Jeremiah’s videos, titled “Is the Coronavirus in Bible Prophecy?:
Facing Uncertain Times with David Jeremiah,” reached, as of this writing, 2,843,966 views. Like
Lindsey and LaHaye, Jeremiah has taken the seemingly esoteric discourse of bible prophecy and
presented it as a cultural logic through which not only evangelical Christians but the larger
public of U.S. citizens may begin to make sense of their anxiety and frustration toward current
events. Guided by Ratcliffe’s methodology of rhetorical listening and its emphasis upon situating
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rhetors and texts within their cultural logics, as well as Burke’s assertion that textual productions
offer audiences attitudinal equipment for interpreting and responding to perceived problems, in
Chapter Four I evaluate how Jeremiah, as well as other recent premillennial evangelical rhetors
such as Jimmy Evans, Ron Rhodes, and Tod Hampson, authorizes a premillennial framework
through which evangelical Christian audiences may make sense of and even respond to pressing
societal problems like climate change.

Listening to the Cultural Logics of Evangelical Christian Apocalyptic Discourse While
Applying Burke’s Dramatistic Theory
Having outlined the reasoning behind my selection of representative evangelical
premillennial apocalyptic rhetors, it would be helpful to also address the question of how
completely the premillennial apocalyptic frame these rhetors articulate corresponds with that of
the evangelical Christian community they seek to engage. While such rhetors as Lindsey,
LaHaye, and Jeremiah have clearly succeeded at circulating their apocalyptic visions among a
great number of U.S. citizens and evangelicals, we must evaluate the daily discourse of
evangelical audiences today in order to understand how that apocalyptic frame mediates or
corresponds with citizens’ attitudes toward the difficulties they encounter in their lives. This is a
challenging task, to be sure, but there do exist opportunities for cross-referencing the apocalyptic
narratives of such rhetors as Lindsey, LaHaye, Jeremiah, Evans, Rhodes, and Hampson with
those used by evangelical Christians within the U.S. One such opportunity is user comments and
chats on the social media and other web forums in which many of these apocalyptic messages are
presented and responded to. As a case in point, we might look to the public comments on
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Jeremiah’s sermon, “Is the Coronavirus in Bible Prophecy?: Facing Uncertain Times with David
Jeremiah,” on YouTube.
Interestingly, while the subject of the video is possible intersections between COVID-19
and biblical apocalyptic prophecy, user responses highlight how, far from encouraging audiences
to adopt a passive role in the face of inevitable destruction, the premillennial apocalyptic frame
asks audiences to enter an active role by trusting in their salvation through Jesus Christ. For
instance, username Jere Bergen states the following: “Death rate of Corona is wht? 5 % ish? The
real virus is sin it has a death rate of 100 % and jesus is our only cure folks.” On the surface, this
comment may not appear to express an especially apocalyptic sentiment and may seem to simply
acknowledge and encourage readers to acknowledge that Jesus is the only refuge in a chaotic
world. However, when we evaluate this comment in relation to Burke’s dramatistic theory, as
well as research on apocalyptic rhetoric, we find that this very act of suggesting that Jesus is the
only true solution to COVID-19 and, by extension, the rest of the world’s problems (which are
caused by sin) represents a profoundly apocalyptic vision of the world that does rhetorical work
by encouraging particular attitudes toward societal upheaval while discouraging others.
In Attitudes Toward History, Burke outlines what he terms “‘frames of acceptance’” (5).
Similar to Ratcliffe’s theory of cultural logics, Burke’s frames of acceptance describe “the more
or less organized system of meanings by which a thinking man gauges the historical situation
and adopts a role with relation to it” (5). While Attitudes Toward History is ostensibly a
theoretical treatment of the work of the historian, its assertions, like so many of Burke’s theories,
apply to the ways in which human beings use symbol systems to make sense of phenomena more
generally. These frames constitute the core of our identity and exert a profound influence on how
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we interpret and respond to the events we perceive in the world, especially when those events are
felt to challenge or threaten us in some way. According to Burke,
In the face of anguish, injustice, disease, and death one adopts policies. One constructs
his notion of the universe or history, and shapes attitudes in keeping. Be he poet or
scientist, one defines the ‘human situation’ as amply as his imagination permits; then,
with this ample definition in mind, he singles out certain functions or relationships as
either friendly or unfriendly. (3-4)
Because one’s frames of acceptance exert such a profound influence on one’s attitudes toward
the world, Burke suggests that one’s relationship to them cannot be dismissed as merely passive.
“Since they name both friendly and unfriendly forces, they fix attitudes that prepare for combat.
They draw the lines of battle—and they appear ‘passive’ only to one whose frame would
persuade him to draw the line of battle differently” (20). This statement points to the profoundly
rhetorical nature of Burke’s theory of history which, like that of literature, emphasizes the
ultimately persuasive nature of the symbol systems through which one makes sense of, not just
the historical events one encounters secondhand through research, but the history that is being
made every moment of our lives. In essence, Burke’s frames of acceptance mediate the meaning
and knowledge that we produce in response to everything we have and ever will encounter and
can, therefore, be used by rhetorical critics to if not predict, then project how citizens may
respond to similar events in the future.
By identifying the frame of acceptance that is evident within a given rhetor’s textual
production, we gain insight into what symbols may be persuasive to that rhetor as audience. Of
course, this is not to suggest that a rhetor or the community they are associated with can be
completely understood through the analysis of one or more of their textual productions. As we
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have discussed in relation to Ratcliffe’s methodological “tactic” of listening metonymically,
rhetorical scholars may “assume that a text or a person is associated with—but not necessarily
representative of—an entire cultural group” (78). While recognizing that Jere Bergen’s response
to Jeremiah’s sermon does not necessarily represent either Jere Bergen or evangelical Christians’
attitudes toward societal catastrophe entirely, we can use Ratcliffe’s methodology of
eavesdropping as a promising strategy for attempting to listen to and understand Jere Bergen
and, by extension, other audience-rhetors’ attitudes toward societal distress. In addition to being
“a tactical ethic” (107) through which a rhetorical scholar may attempt to listen to the discourses
of communities they do not belong to, Ratcliffe describes how eavesdropping can help a rhetor
better understand the cultural logics of their prospective audiences (106). Most relevant for our
purposes, Ratcliffe goes on to describe how eavesdropping can help rhetors more productively
think about opposing political frames: “[w]hen I am viewing a TV ad for a political candidate I
dislike, perhaps I should heed why its addressed audience finds it so compelling. In each
instance, eavesdropping enhances critical thinking, helping me better assess the situation” (10607). By evaluating Jere Bergen’s response to Jeremiah’s overtly apocalyptic discourse, we gain a
tentative insight into how apocalyptic frames of acceptance may influence evangelical
Christians’ attitudes toward apocalyptic scenarios more generally.
Prior to conducting a sample analysis of apocalyptic appeals in Jere Bergen’s text, it will
be helpful to further narrow down the particular forms such apocalyptic appeals can take. While
generally concerned with the figurative and literal end of the world as we known it, the genre of
apocalyptic discourse can vary in how that end is conceived and how audiences are encouraged
to respond to it. Apocalyptic scholars often approach the study of apocalyptic rhetoric through
the theoretical framework of Burke’s dramatistic theory, and it would be helpful to further
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outline this theory prior to explaining its application within the work of apocalyptic rhetorical
scholars such as Stephen O’Leary. According to Burke, the narratives operating within the tragic
frame encourage audiences to acknowledge their “personal limits” (Attitudes 37) through their
identification with characters who are punished for their vanity (39). From the beginning, the
tragic frame has been wrapped up in the feeling that humanity is subject to forces outside of its
control. The ancient Greek tragic frame of acceptance, for instance, “admonished one to ‘resign’
himself to a sense of his limitations. They feared good fortune, as the first sign of punishment
from the gods” (39). Whether it is the “superhuman” power of divine agencies or the “inhuman”
forces of the natural world, the tragic frame positions human beings as subject to the ofteninscrutable necessity of forces that are beyond our control in order to encourage audiences to
humble themselves (42). Importantly, while the tragic frame as genre greets audiences with the
image of the excoriated ego, this does not mean that the tragic frame induces passivity. To the
contrary, “[o]ut of such frames we derive our vocabularies for the charting of human motives.
And implicit in our theory of motives is a program of action, since we form ourselves and judge
others (collaborating with them or against them) in accordance with our attitudes” (92). As an
orienting device, the tragic frame of acceptance influences how citizens understand the world’s
problems and, significantly, how they think about other citizens in relation to those problems.
In contrast with the tragic, Burke presents the comedic frame of acceptance. Whereas the
tragic frame encourages audiences to acknowledge that they are subject to forces beyond their
control, the comedic frame “deals with man in society” and is, therefore, “essentially humane”
(42) in that it portrays “people not as vicious, but as mistaken” (41). Where the tragic frame
serves to remind audiences of their inborn sin and fallen nature, comedy is much more willing to
forgive humanity its imperfections. This is not to suggest that the comic frame does not confront
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audiences with their flawed natures, but that it does so with a less sinister inflection. “Like
tragedy, comedy warns against the dangers of pride,” for instance, “but its emphasis shifts from
crime to stupidity” (41). While tragedy teaches audiences “humility” through the evisceration of
its characters, comedy helps audiences to understand “that all people are exposed to situations in
which they must act as fools, that every insight contains its own special kind of blindness” (41).
According to Burke, “the comic frame should enable people to be observers of themselves, while
acting. Its ultimate would not be passiveness, but maximum consciousness. One would
‘transcend’ himself by noting his own foibles” (171). Burke’s tragic and comic frames of
acceptance offer a helpful classificatory scheme for us to evaluate the attitudes authorized by
evangelical Christian apocalyptic rhetoric.
Scholars of apocalyptic rhetoric such as O’Leary have employed Burke’s theories of the
tragic and comic frames of acceptance in order to articulate the two main varieties of apocalyptic
discourse (O’Leary 83). O’Leary sums up the comic and tragic apocalyptic frames as follows:
The comic reading of the Apocalypse addresses the topoi of time and evil by either
postponing the End, or making its enactment a consequence of human choice and activity
in the world, and conceiving of evil (to a limited extent) as something to be overcome by
recognition, reform, and education. The tragic reading, in contrast, structures time by
placing the End somewhere in the immediate future, and views this End as predestined
and catastrophic; evil is depicted in demonic terms, and can only be overcome by divine
intervention rather than human action. In the tragic interpretation, the predictive function
of the apocalyptic myth is dominant; in the comic interpretation, the hortatory and
allegorical functions are emphasized. (85-86)
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Just as Burke represents the comic frame as a process through which characters and, by
extension, audiences come to be aware of their own flaws and, in doing so, become more tolerant
of the flaws they perceive in others, the comic apocalyptic frame positions evil as something that
humanity can mitigate through better thinking and action, as illustrated by Werger and
Thunberg’s arguments regarding climate change. In contrast, the tragic apocalyptic frame
positions evil as a force that human beings cannot hope to overcome and must, therefore, be
stopped through the divine annihilation of its conditions of existence, i.e., the fallen world. In
Chapters Three and Four, I provide a detailed explanation of the characteristics of premillennial
apocalyptic rhetoric, specifically, as they have influenced secular climate reform discourse
within the United States, as well as evangelical attitudes toward pressing societal problems like
climate change. However, for the moment, O’Leary’s explanation of the tragic and comic frames
of apocalyptic acceptance provides us with the theoretical equipment we need to productively
eavesdrop on Jere Bergen’s response to Jeremiah’s sermon.
By suggesting that “[t]he real virus is sin” and that “it has a death rate of 100 %,” Jere
Bergen offers what amounts to a tragic frame for interpreting the COVID-19 pandemic. By
contrasting the physical death of the body with the spiritual death of sin, Jere Bergen implicitly
argues that the threat of COVID-19 and, by extension, other terrors of this world pale in
comparison to the danger of losing one’s soul to the forces of evil. When we evaluate Jere
Bergen’s call for audiences to turn their gaze from the ills of this world and to look upon the face
of Jesus in the context of Jeremiah’s own apocalyptic discourse, we come to see that this
dismissal of the threat of COVID-19 enacts the premillennial apocalyptic tendency to view the
sufferings of this world as tragic signposts directing us toward a deeper relationship with God.
“The truth is that, although many biblical prophecies predict disasters,” Jeremiah argues that
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“their underlying purpose is merciful and benevolent. . . . These prophecies serve as warnings,
alerting us to traumatic events coming in the future that we can either prepare for or avoid by
following God’s directives and depending on his providence” (235). By suggesting that it is sin,
and not COVID-19, that is the real source of danger in the world, Jere Bergen articulates a frame
of acceptance in which audiences are encouraged to not be passive, but to respond to this
pandemic and, by implication, other threats to human safety by saving their soul, not their body.
Of course, a single YouTube comment is not sufficient to claim that Jere Bergen’s
statement represents the evangelical Christian community more generally or even Jere Bergen’s
more general attitudes and practices. However, what Jere Bergen’s statement does tell us is that
U.S. citizens are accessing Jeremiah’s apocalyptic discourse and using it as a frame of reference
for the production of public discourse. Like Jeremiah, who states that “[t]he total work of Christ
is nothing less than redeeming this entire creation from the effects of sin,” which “will not be
accomplished until God has ushered in the new earth, until Paradise lost becomes Paradise
regained” (403), Jere Bergen encourages audiences to believe that their “only cure” to the
sufferings of this world lies in personal salvation. By responding to a global pandemic by
publicly suggesting that the true problem of the world is sin and that the true cure is salvation,
Jere Bergen enacts a tragic apocalyptic appeal by calling upon audiences to trust in, not scientific
experts, not governmental authorities, not civic institutions, but in the supreme authority of God.
It is here, in this implied dismissal of human agency in the face of worldly problems and the
emphasis upon seeking solutions to said problems, not in the systems of the world, but in eternal
life in the next that we find the attitudes fostered by evangelical Christian apocalyptic discourse.
While only a brief example of how I will analyze the texts of evangelical apocalyptic
rhetors in this project, the preceding paragraphs have sought to contextualize the claims of these
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rhetors within the apocalyptic discourse of their audiences. By comparing Jere Bergen’s response
to the COVID-19 pandemic with Jeremiah’s prophetic reading of such societal catastrophe, we
can see that Jere Bergen’s attitudes toward the pandemic are mediated by the apocalyptic frame
that Jeremiah and, by extension, other influential evangelical Christian apocalyptic rhetors
present. While the goal of my project is to better understand the influence of apocalyptic thinking
on U.S. citizens’ production and reception of climate change discourse, Jere Bergen and other
posters’ use of apocalyptic appeals demonstrates that the apocalyptic frame is, for these
evangelical stakeholders, a shared frame of acceptance through which they make sense of and
publicly discuss their anomie regarding societal upheaval. By contextualizing Jeremiah and other
influential evangelical rhetors’ apocalyptic discourse within the wider cultural logics of their
audience’s own apocalyptic appeals, I hope to demonstrate that such apocalyptic thinking is a
dominant and recurring discursive frame through which evangelical Christian rhetors and their
audiences interpret and respond to societal upheaval more generally and climate change,
specifically.

Conclusion
In this chapter, I have introduced and explained the key terms, methodologies, and
theories that will guide this project. By listening rhetorically to the use of apocalyptic appeals
within climate reform and evangelical Christian discourse, we may extrapolate a more general
understanding of how the apocalyptic frame influences rhetors’ and audiences’ understanding of
pressing societal questions. By analyzing apocalyptic texts using Burke’s model of textual
analysis, we can better understand how apocalyptic rhetors, whether secular climate reformers or
evangelical Christians, use apocalyptic symbols to construct rhetorical worlds of thought and
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action, worlds that audiences are then asked to occupy and act from. In the next chapter, I will
assess the influence of premillennial apocalyptic appeals within the climate reform movement
that has proliferated within the U.S. Drawing primarily from Barry Brummett’s research on
secular and religious apocalyptic rhetoric, I will evaluate the climate reform discourse circulated
by Thunberg, the Global Climate Strike, and the Green New Deal for how it uses apocalyptic
appeals that serve to activate particular attitudes toward the problem of climate change. At the
same time, I will situate this discourse within the cultural logics of the climate reform movement
more generally, both as a global phenomenon and as a movement that targets U.S. citizens whose
environmental practices have a profound (and often profoundly negative) impact on people
across the world. By charting the use of apocalyptic appeals within Thunberg and other U.S.directed climate reform discourse, we gain insight into how apocalyptic rhetoric influences
citizens’ attitudes to societal distress more generally, and we gain a better understanding of how
such apocalyptic appeals may be used more consciously to more productively engage audiences
moving forward.
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CHAPTER THREE
Evaluating Premillennial Apocalyptic Rhetoric in
Secular Climate Reform Discourse

Introduction
Whether it is Greta Thunberg’s warning that in 2030 the world will “set off an
irreversible chain reaction beyond human control . . . that will most likely lead to the end of our
civilization as we know it” (“Can” 57), Global Climate Strike rhetor Mia Werger’s observation
that the threat of catastrophic climate change is like a “shadow” (00:00:13) that burdens the
“minds and hearts” of young people everywhere (00:01:12-00:01:15), or the Green New Deal’s
assertion that unmitigated climate change may result in one trillion dollars of damage to “public
infrastructure and coastal real estate in the United States” (United States 2), climate reform
rhetors often attempt to convince audiences that climate change is an existential threat by vividly
describing the environmental and societal consequences that will result if such warming
continues unchecked. In the face of environmental and societal changes that will devastate much
of the world and which are steadily creeping closer with every molecule of CO 2 released into the
atmosphere, climate rhetors, quite understandably, “want you to panic” (Thunberg, “Our House”
22). Yet it would be an oversimplification to suggest that the persistence of such panic-inducing
descriptions in climate reform discourse is designed to foster the fatalistic “paralysis” that Eric
Zencey warned of in 1988 (55), a warning that environmental communication scholars M.
Jimmie Killingsworth and Jacqueline S. Palmer would echo in their 1995 EcoSpeak (263).
Likewise, it would be a mistake to reduce such environmental apocalyptic rhetoric to the
economically-devastating “[f]alse prophecy” and misleading “doomsday predictions” critiqued
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by Julian Simon, a line of critique that reverberates in former Senate Majority Leader Mitch
McConnell’s dismissal of the Green New Deal as a form of “self-inflicted economic ruin that
would take a sledgehammer to America’s middle class” (“Green New Deal” 00:10:55-00:11:03).
While the dire projections that characterize much climate reform discourse are designed to instill
fear and anxiety in audiences regarding the future, the goal of such appeals is not to foster
acquiescence to climate catastrophe but to mobilize audiences for climate action. For such action
to occur, U.S. audiences must undergo a radical reorientation toward their relationship with the
environment.
As a form of apocalyptic rhetoric, climate reform discourse is apocalyptic not merely
because it utilizes images of a devastatingly transformed planet to convince audiences of the
seriousness of climate change but because it seeks to promote a radical transformation within
those audiences, a transformation in which one’s status quo is annihilated and replaced by an
entirely new order of attitudes and behaviors. The apocalyptic experience embodied by
apocalyptic rhetoric denotes an internal process of destruction and recreation within the
audiences of apocalyptic discourse as much as any external apocalyptic event occurring in the
physical world. It is this pursuit of individual and societal transformation that forms the core of
the secular premillennial apocalyptic rhetoric that makes up much contemporary climate reform
discourse. In his analysis of secular apocalyptic rhetoric within the United States, Barry
Brummett explains that secular premillennial narratives, like their religious counterparts,
“usually identify certain groups or entities as the agents of evil who are causing so much
misfortune, agents who will be destroyed in the imminent apocalypse” (144). In response to the
inability of current institutions and systems to adequately encompass and respond to a looming
disaster, the secular premillennial apocalyptic rhetor “offers political and social prescriptions”

72
that are designed to replace the current system with one that more adequately addresses the
underlying problems that necessitated or brought about the apocalypse in the first place (144).
This act of replacing a corrupt system with one that is aligned with the truth (whatever the truth
may be for the rhetor and audience) does not necessarily circumvent apocalypse, but can enact “a
radical discontinuity with” the status quo, effectively trading one apocalyptic scenario for
another, albeit one that is, from the perspective of the apocalyptic rhetor and audience, the start
of a new “millennium” (144), or “a period of justice, peace, and harmony . . . that will be better
than the current age” (48-49). Examined from the perspective of Brummett’s apocalyptic
rhetorical theory, U.S.-directed climate reform discourse may be understood as a secular
incarnation of apocalyptic rhetoric that seeks not to foster passivity in its audience, but to initiate
a radical personal and societal transformation and thereby usher in a new age of environmental
responsibility. In the face of climate change as an imminent threat that is destabilizing the natural
and human world, climate reformers call for a collective and immediate break with the status quo
in order to usher in a more sustainable and equitable era of humanity.
In this chapter, I begin by examining rhetoric and communication scholarship on
apocalyptic environmental rhetoric to better understand the affordances and limitations of
apocalyptic appeals as a catalyst for increased environmental engagement. Next, we will evaluate
the influence of apocalyptic rhetoric on climate reform discourse in the United States today by
assessing it for four key features of premillennial apocalyptic rhetoric: (1) how reformers
encourage audiences to think about climate change as a looming threat, (2) the critical attitudes
reformers encourage audiences to adopt toward currently existing institutions as the primary
cause of the current climate emergency, (3) calls for a new millennial order, (4) the use of sacred
or “grounding texts” to imbue statements with rhetorical authority (99). By analyzing the use of
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apocalyptic appeals within such climate reform discourse, we may better understand the
rhetorical strategies through which climate reformers attempt to mobilize the attitudes and
behaviors of widespread audiences while also better understanding the symbolic systems that
motivate climate reform as a movement within the United States. Far from being a discursive
aberration or a threat to scientific rational discourse, apocalyptic rhetoric is a fundamental
rhetorical frame through which perceived threats like climate change are made sensible to U.S.
audiences. Because apocalyptic rhetoric is such a pervasive influence on the production and
reception of environmental apocalyptic discourse, it is important for climate reform rhetors and
rhetorical scholars, as well as any audience concerned with the outcome of the climate reform
debate, to adopt a more enhanced apocalyptic rhetorical awareness moving forward.

Secular Environmental Apocalyptic Rhetoric: A Scholarly Overview
While rhetoric and communication scholars acknowledge the influence of apocalyptic
rhetoric on the production and reception of environmental discourse, this influence is not always
considered positive. Scholars frequently assert that while apocalyptic rhetoric can be persuasive
to audiences by adding a degree of urgency to the environmental rhetor’s argument, it risks
fostering a state of helplessness and fatalism, as well as inspiring ridicule and dismissive charges
of hysteria and fearmongering among skeptical and antagonistic audiences. Yet, while the use of
environmental apocalyptic appeals can be rhetorically risky, there is no denying that such
appeals contain great rhetorical force, and rhetoric and communication scholars frequently note
the power of apocalyptic appeals to add immediacy to otherwise abstract environmentalist
statements. In “Millennial Ecology: The Apocalyptic Narrative from Silent Spring to Global
Warming,” M. Jimmie Killingsworth and Jacqueline S. Palmer compare environmentalist
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apocalyptic appeals to “shock tactics to win the hearts and minds of the general public at crucial
historical periods in which the need is perceived to extend and broaden commitments to the
environmental movement” (22). Building upon Killingsworth and Palmer’s findings, Christina
R. Foust and William O’Shannon Murphy observe in “Revealing and Reframing Apocalyptic
Tragedy in Global Warming Discourse” that, as a “rhetorical strategy,” apocalyptic appeals “may
invite widespread attention to environmental issues” where such attention had been previously
lacking (152). In “The Discourse of ‘Environmentalist Hysteria,’” Killingsworth and Palmer
further suggest that “in the view of the environmentalists,” such “a cry of pain can break the
public habit of inattention” to environmental degradation and catalyze reform (3). In “Seeing the
Climate?: The Problematic Status of Visual Evidence in Climate Change Campaigning,” Julie
Doyle acknowledges the power of photographic evidence, especially, to engender feelings of
“shock” and “loss” in audiences regarding the deleterious effects of anthropogenic climate
change on previously pristine natural landscapes (291). And in Communicating Climate Change:
The Path Forward, Susanna Priest observes that reports of cataclysmic climate impacts such as
elevated sea levels can interrupt “the issue-attention cycle” that dominates media coverage by
drawing perpetually distracted audiences’ attention to the issue of climate change and its power
to alter our way of life (141). While approaching environmental communication from a variety
of scholarly perspectives as it circulates through a wide range of social and cultural contexts, this
collage of statements from environmental rhetoric and communication scholars points to the
power of apocalyptic discourse to take the “slow violence” of climate change—a term used by
Rob Nixon to denote those deleterious environmental and societal effects that are often
experienced as temporally and spatially distant by many members of the developed nations most
poised to combat them—and make it a more present reality for audiences (264).
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In addition to grabbing the attention of audiences, rhetoric and communication scholars
have suggested that environmental apocalyptic narratives have the potential to alter audiences’
attitudes and even behaviors toward the environment. Citing such environmental classics as
Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring and Paul Ehrlich’s The Population Bomb, Killingsworth and
Palmer suggest that environmental apocalyptic rhetoric “aims to transform the consciousness that
a problem exists into acceptance of action toward a solution” (“Millennial Ecology” 22).
Likewise, in EcoSpeak: Rhetoric and Environmental Politics in America, Killingsworth and
Palmer emphasize the capacity of Carson’s apocalyptic to “to stir the emotions” of her audience
and out of that initial emotional response elicit “a deep intellectual and ethical concern over an
actual state of affairs,” a rhetorical tactic [that] has great power” for the “rhetor who believes in
the need for immediate action . . . to forestall a human disaster in the future” (67). Foust and
Murphy further acknowledge that even “after the worst effects of global warming have taken
place,” particular forms of apocalyptic discourse may encourage audiences “to rethink their
choices,” admit their mistakes, and try to do better moving forward (160). This scholarship
highlights the potentially transformative nature of environmental apocalyptic rhetoric, a genre of
discourse that does not limit itself to describing an apocalypse that is to come but seeks to
facilitate an equally apocalyptic transformation within the audience, one that destroys and
recreates one’s attitudes toward the environment in order to foster less-damaging behaviors.
In contrast with such classic apocalyptic environmental texts as Carson’s Silent Spring
and Ehrlich’s The Population Bomb, which relied on startling projections of environmental harm
to shock audiences out of environmental complacency, environmental rhetoric and
communication scholars often point to the reform efforts of Al Gore as a model of how such
apocalyptic appeals can be successfully packaged for modern audiences to encourage changed
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behaviors long-term. In “Presence, Analogy, and Earth in the Balance,” John M. Murphy offers
Al Gore’s bestselling Earth in the Balance as an example of how apocalyptic narratives can help
audiences more productively engage the problem of climate change. Murphy especially praises
Gore’s allegorical linking of global warming with the symbolic threat of nuclear war (7).
Through the analogy of nuclear war—the high level of threat such a problem would pose and the
immediate actions it would necessitate to mitigate such risk—Gore “structures a series of
seemingly chaotic environmental problems” in ways that bring otherwise intangible problems
like climate change to visceral life for audiences (11). In response to the use of apocalyptic
appeals in Gore’s An Inconvenient Truth and the “multimedia object theater” known as the
Climate Change Show (Spoel et al. 50), Philippa Spoel and colleagues conclude in “Public
Communication of Climate Change Science” that “the framework of apocalyptic narrative” is a
helpful discursive tool for presenting the technical and scientific data of climate change in an
engaging narrative frame that “includes, but goes beyond, technical rationality” (74). Spoel and
colleagues suggest that “the apocalyptic narrative structure functions as a powerful rhetorical
resource for integrating” the three major forms of rhetorical appeal—ethos, pathos, and logos—
“into politically and ethically as well as technically compelling science stories” (78). In
“(Environmental) Rhetorics of Tempered Apocalypticism in An Inconvenient Truth,” Laura
Johnson also praises Gore’s use of apocalyptic appeals, though Johnson is careful to state that
they are successful because Gore’s apocalyptic discourse “suggests nothing monumental or
violent,” presenting audiences with a “tempered apocalypticism” (40) that succeeds, according to
Johnson, by exerting scientific control over the phenomenon of climate change and rhetorically
inviting audiences to likewise internalize that control as empowered agents in the fight against
global warming (43). While perhaps a more moderate form of apocalyptic than that embodied by
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Carson and Ehrlich, rhetoric and communication scholars suggest that Gore’s projections of
doom nonetheless utilize apocalyptic appeals as a strategy for grabbing audiences’ attention
while also leading them to reevaluate their environmental attitudes and consider more sustainable
practices moving forward.
Even as many rhetoric and communication scholars agree that apocalyptic appeals can
help to bring environmental problems to the forefront of audiences’ attention, such praise tends
to be heavily qualified. Ironically, it is precisely those features that make apocalyptic rhetoric so
powerful that are most heavily critiqued. Such is the case with apocalyptic rhetoric’s capacity to
grab audiences’ attention by vividly describing the environmental and societal consequences of
inaction, rhetorical appeals that seek to foster conviction in audiences but can lead to charges of
hysteria and fear mongering. As Killingsworth and Palmer suggest, when environmentalist
rhetors use fear-based appeals to move audiences toward action they “are likely to be dismissed
as morose naysayers, ‘doom prophets’ who have no faith in the American Dream and no
concrete plan for ‘doing it better’” (EcoSpeak 261). Killingsworth and Palmer further observe
that such apocalyptic appeals can open the environmental rhetor to “the charge of
‘environmentalist hysteria’” (“The Discourse of ‘Environmentalist Hysteria’” 2). This critiqueby-hysteria is often used by anti-environmentalists to dismiss calls for environmental reform and
“maintain the stability of the social order as it is” (2). Such critique is not limited to antienvironmentalists, however, but is leveled by Killingsworth and Palmer themselves against the
use of apocalyptic appeals by such rhetors as Rachel Carson. While challenging the use of the
hysteria trope by anti-environmentalist actors as a strategy for drawing into question the
credibility of environmentalists and calls to environmental action, Killingsworth and Palmer go
on to suggest that the oppositional language that is characteristic of much environmental
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apocalyptic rhetoric can serve to exacerbate the political and ideological divisions that pervade
public discourse on environmental issues rather than bring citizens together to address the
problems themselves.
Even as Killingsworth and Palmer acknowledge and resist anti-environmentalist efforts to
dismiss Carson as an environmental hysteric, they acknowledge that, “[l]ike any political
position, environmentalism seeks to restrict access to certain subject positions just as surely as it
opens access to others” (15), and Carson’s Silent Spring is no exception.
Here, then, is a more disturbing legacy of the discourse of environmentalist hysteria: The
apocalyptic prophets who warn of the ultimate environmental disaster—Carson’s silent
spring, Ehrlich’s population explosion, Schneider’s greenhouse century—if they are
considered politically, seem to stand at the opposite end of the spectrum from risk
specialists who tell us not to worry. . . . Considered psychologically, however, the
reassuring expert who demands silence in the audience and the impassioned
environmentalist who calls for the passing of the ‘Neanderthal’ scientist (an extinct life
form) share a fundamental trait—the desire for the relief of tension that assumes the form
of a death wish. (15)
In this passage, Killingsworth and Palmer suggest that the use of apocalyptic appeals to
characterize environmental threats can actually work against the cause of environmental reform
by intensifying divisions between environmentalist and anti-environmentalist actors rather than
seeking to bridge this gulf and productively engage a wider variety of stakeholders in an
environmental cause. More pointedly, Killingsworth and Palmer question the motives underlying
such appeals: is the environmentalist apocalyptic rhetor interested in producing public discourse
that promotes meaningful environmental reform, or are they merely apocalyptic doomsayers
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hysterically crying out in an anti-environmentalist, neoliberal wilderness with no practical plan
to change things? And while this critique of environmental apocalyptic rhetoric does not dismiss
the power of such rhetoric to grab audiences’ attention and spur environmental action, it does
raise questions about the role of environmental apocalyptic discourse in fostering societal
consensus on pressing environmental problems like climate change.
A second critique leveled by rhetoric and communication scholars against environmental
apocalyptic discourse is that while apocalyptic appeals have the power to draw audiences’
attention to pressing environmental issues, they can also work against the environmental rhetor’s
goals by fostering a state of helplessness in the audience rather than action. Such is the sentiment
expressed by Foust and Murphy when they assert that “[t]he apocalyptic frame, particularly in its
tragic version, is not an effective rhetorical strategy for” promoting climate change mitigation
(164), in part because its representation of climate change as an imminent threat can lead
audiences to feel that global warming is “impervious to human intervention in the current
moment” and can thereby foster feelings of hopelessness that are not conducive to meaningful
climate reform (158). This fatalist reaction can characterize even those climate discourses that
call for the rapid limitation of carbon emissions as even the most urgent carbon reductions will
take centuries to lower carbon concentrations in the atmosphere to pre-industrial levels
(Hersher). Further illustrating the challenges of framing temporally complex environmental
threats like climate change in ways that foster agency for audiences to act, Killingsworth and
Palmer observe that while the rhetorical goal of emphasizing imminent environmental threats
may be “to create an appeal that communicates both a sense of urgency and a plan for action,”
this strategy can easily backfire and “may stimulate a kind of fear and defensiveness that cripples
action rather than promoting it” (EcoSpeak 263). Priest further suggests that even though vivid
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descriptions of looming environmental disaster can interrupt the “issue-attention cycle” of
citizens, “a more sustained compelling force will likely be needed to turn the tide on climate
change action” (142). In the realm of environmental photography, Doyle observes that while
visual representations of climate catastrophe “may generate a feeling or an emotion through the
sense of loss, they do not contribute to understanding the causes of climate change or relate them
to everyday life, that is, on a level where people can actually make a difference. They say little
about the future” (291). While apocalyptic projections may be rhetorically powerful enough to
grab audiences’ attention, they are not sufficient, at least on their own, to harness audiences’
worry and yoke that energy onto a meaningful, sustained, and widespread plan of climate reform.
Even the widespread impact of Gore’s more moderate and science-driven apocalyptic
environmental discourse was not sufficient to curb the greenhouse gas emissions that continue to
be emitted by the United States. And while no one rhetor could possibly be expected to turn the
tide on climate reform, the scholarship on apocalyptic climate reform rhetoric points to the
importance (and difficulty) of fashioning apocalyptic appeals that resonate with the values and
beliefs of a variety of often ideologically opposed audiences and which foster a sense of
environmental agency in citizens’ daily lives.
Yet another challenge facing the environmental apocalyptic rhetor is that the very use of
apocalyptic appeals risks alienating audiences by causing the rhetor to appear irrational and
unscientific. According to Killingsworth and Palmer, while Carson’s Silent Spring and Ehrlich’s
The Population Bomb use apocalyptic imagery to incite fear of the future to inspire meaningful
environmental and societal reforms in the present (“Millennial Ecology” 22), some audiences
misinterpreted (or misrepresented) such depictions of possible future scenarios as predictions of
what would actually happen (32). Killingsworth and Palmer are careful to note that such literalist
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readings are counter to the purpose of environmentalist apocalyptic texts. “These writings are
not,” according to Killingsworth and Palmer, “to be taken literally. Their aim is not to predict the
future but to change it” (41). As previously indicated, such misinterpretations/misrepresentations
are an especially powerful tool for anti-environmentalists for “if the narrative of the future does
not come true, the narrator may be dismissed as a doom prophet with no authority as a scientific
advisor” (40). Due to the often-hyperbolic nature of such apocalyptic narratives and the ease
with which their lack of fulfillment may be used against the environmentalist rhetor,
Killingsworth and Palmer suggest that “the value” of such “environmentalist apocalypses . . . is
not scientific” at all, “but political” (40-41). “The hyperbole,” Killingsworth and Palmer observe,
“with which the impending doom is presented—the image of total ruin and destruction—implies
the need for an ideological shift” (41). As a potential catalyst for policy reform, environmental
apocalyptic rhetors that employ such hyperbole motivate primarily through their “eloquence,”
through their ability to bring a devastated future to visceral life for present day audiences, rather
than through their scientific grounding (41). And while a powerful rhetorical strategy for
grabbing audience’s attention and potentially spurring environmental reform, such projections of
future harm may become fodder for anti-environmentalist interests who would seek to dismiss
the apocalyptic environmental rhetor as irrational and unscientific when those events do not
occur as envisioned.
Killingsworth and Palmer further observe that the activist mission of environmental
apocalyptic rhetoric, as well as its tendency to rely on hyperbolic depictions of future
environmental catastrophe, has led environmental rhetors to be dismissed by ecological
scientists. Killingsworth and Palmer’s “research suggests that environmentalist values have very
little influence on mainstream scientific research and that all such ethical systems are thoroughly
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repressed in late undergraduate and graduate education, during which time the conventions of the
research discourse are learned” (EcoSpeak 99). Whereas environmentalist rhetors are eager to
assert a correlation between human activity and environmental degradation, scientists are,
Killingsworth and Palmer suggest, more cautions regarding causation, a trepidation evident in
the scientific discourse on climate change (138). While Killingsworth and Palmer acknowledge
that “several well-respected scientists believe that global warming is due to the greenhouse effect
stimulated by human alterations of the atmosphere,” they assert that “[t]he dominant outlook in
scientific discourse about the application of greenhouse theory to problems involving the human
relation to nature . . . remains cautions overall” (138). As such, Killingsworth and Palmer draw a
clear ideological and rhetorical line between scientific discourse and “apocalyptic narrative”
(147). “Bringing a possible future alive in the present is the aim of this apocalyptic rhetoric”
Killingsworth and Palmer suggest (67), not offering a definitive portrait of what that future will
look like. Any effort to provide such a view of the future increases the risk that environmentalist
rhetors will be dismissed as unscientific.
Publishing the bulk of their environmental apocalyptic research in the 1990s,
Killingsworth and Palmer are careful to distinguish between environmentalists’ apocalyptic
projections of the future and ecological scientists’ qualified study of environmental phenomena.
The former employs apocalyptic rhetoric to vividly correlate human behavior in the present with
environmental catastrophes in the future, while the latter carefully studies such phenomena
without certainty regarding causation or future effects. This opposition between environmentalist
apocalyptic and scientific discourse is, however, largely ruptured in the climate reform discourse
of today, in which climate reform efforts in civil and governmental contexts are heavily informed
by “the thousands of scientific papers published each year” that, in turn, inform the work of the
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Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (IPCC, “About the IPCC”). The most
current working report as of this writing, “Global Warming of 1.5°C,” “draws on the findings of
more than 6,000 published articles” (Masson-Delmotte et al. vii) that were subject to intensive
peer review prior to being included (viii). And while the IPCC is careful to explain that its
projections are estimates and therefore not immutable predictions of future events, it also lays
out the likelihood that such projections will occur, estimates that are grounded in the findings of
the scientific articles the IPCC has collated. Based on these findings, the IPCC states that
“[h]uman activities are estimated to have caused approximately 1.0°C of global warming above
pre-industrial levels. . . . Global warming is likely to reach 1.5°C between 2030 and 2052 if it
continues to increase at the current rate. (high confidence) . . . ” (4). While Killingsworth and
Palmer frequently separate environmental apocalyptic appeals and scientific estimates and even
suggest that “[t]he development of an environmentalist action agenda is not a sustainable
direction for . . . scientific research” (EcoSpeak 160), the IPCC has bridged scientific research
and climate reform in a way that Killingsworth and Palmer likely could not have predicted. In
several important respects, climate science has fused with environmentalist apocalyptic narrative
in order to persuade citizens and governments of the importance of immediate and global climate
reform. In the face of rapidly accelerating global warming, environmentalist apocalyptic rhetoric
has effectively gone mainstream.

Premillennial Apocalyptic Appeals in Secular Climate Reform Discourse
Climate Change as Imminent Threat
A recurring feature of climate reform discourse is that it represents climate change as a
profound and imminent threat to not only the natural world but human society. This urgency is
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perhaps most apparent in Greta Thunberg’s many addresses to the world’s political and
economic leaders, including those of the United States. In her September 18, 2019 address to
Congress, Thunberg calls upon the U.S. government to “start treating this crisis like the
existential emergency it is” (“Wherever” 86). Climate change is, according to Thunberg, “the
biggest crisis humanity has ever faced” (87). For Thunberg, like many climate reformers, climate
change is not just another issue for U.S. leaders and citizens to deliberate over; it is a gun pointed
at humanity’s head. Only immediate and widespread action will prevent the trigger from being
pulled. Thunberg conveys this urgency through a variety of powerful metaphors. Climate change
is compared to an airline crash: “Would any of you step onto a plane if you knew it had more
than a 50 per cent chance of crashing? More to the point: would you put your children on that
flight?” (89). By “50 per cent chance” (89), Thunberg is referring to climate scientists’ findings
that greenhouse gas emissions must “decline by about 45% from 2010 levels by 2030” just to
have “a 50% probability of limiting warming to 1.5°C” (Masson-Delmotte et al. 12). In other
words, even if we achieve the most ambitious climate reform goals, we may still face the
increased consequences of warming in excess of 1.5°C. In the face of this threat, climate reform
is, for Thunberg, a zero-sum game. As suggested by the most vivid of Thunberg’s metaphors,
delivered to the World Economic Forum in Davos on January 25, 2019, “Our house is on fire. . .
According to the IPCC, we are less than twelve years away from not being able to undo our
mistakes” (“Our” 17). Thunberg’s speeches present audiences with a pressing problem, climate
change, and urge audiences to respond to this problem like the life or death matter it is.
As an apocalyptic rhetor, Thunberg’s appeals most correspond with the premillennial
genre of apocalyptic rhetoric. According to Brummett, premillennialism views the apocalypse as
an imminent event that will disrupt life as we know it (49). Premillennialists argue,” Brummett
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writes, “that unusual and inexplicable problems are indications of the impending apocalypse”
(54). In the face of these problems, the premillennial apocalyptic rhetor attempts to comfort
“those who see themselves as oppressed, persecuted, or in a minority” by giving credence to the
source of the audience’s anguish and pointing toward relief from that suffering (54), relief that,
in the case of climate change, would take the form of the increased carbon consciousness and
dramatically reduced carbon emissions that Thunberg and other climate reformers call for. Even
as the premillennial apocalyptic rhetor will emphasize imminent destruction in order to foster a
sense of urgency in their audience, such discourse also works to affirm audiences’ feelings of
anxiety in the face of such rapid change. Rather than attempting to assuage her audiences’ fears
and frustrations, Thunberg validates the negative feelings of those audiences who suffer under
the weight of climate inaction. In the TedTalk “The Disarming Case to Act Right Now on
Climate Change,” Thunberg recounts her initial reaction to the knowledge that human activity
was causing climate change: “To me, that did not add up. It was too unreal. So when I was 11, I
became ill. I fell into depression, I stopped talking, and I stopped eating. In two months, I lost
about 10 kilos of weight” (00:01:22-00:01:42). In articulating her own anguished awakening to
the climate crisis, Thunberg provides audiences with a narrative that reverberates with their own
experience. Far from being exclusive to Thunberg, such climate anxiety has become a dominate
feature of the emotional landscape within the U.S. In the April 2020 “Climate Change in the
American Mind,” the Yale Program on Climate Change and the George Mason University
Center for Climate Change Communication find that a majority of U.S. citizens “are at least
‘somewhat worried’ about global warming,” with “[a]bout one in four” reporting that they are
“‘very worried’” (Leiserowitz et al. 12), and 45% of respondents stating that they “think people
in the U.S. are being harmed by global warming ‘right now’” (15). By acknowledging her own
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emotional suffering due to climate change, Thunberg vicariously affirms the suffering of those
audiences who feel their worlds slipping away in the face of an approaching catastrophe. As an
embodiment of climate anxiety and the accompanying feeling that current institutions have failed
and must be significantly reformed or even replaced, Thunberg validates that anguish of others
who experience similar suffering. It is through such acknowledgement on the public stage, as
well as the climate reform community that has grown in response, that Thunberg’s premillennial
apocalyptic narratives provide a certain degree of stability despite such looming threats.
While Thunberg’s vivid descriptions of societal and environmental harm may be one of
the most publicized apocalyptic climate narratives, such warnings are not exclusive to Thunberg
but are characteristic of much of the climate reform discourse produced as part of the Global
Climate Strike. This is evident in the variety of multimedia texts that Global Climate Strike
activists created for the public in 2020 during the coronavirus pandemic. As what the Global
Climate Strike describes as “an ongoing hub of youth powered storytelling,” this collection of
narratives from Global Climate Strike participants showcases the power of the secular
premillennial frame to help rhetors and audiences make sense of the complex and devastating
problem of climate change (“Young Climate Strikers Tell Their Stories”). In “Not Your Typical
Textbanking,” Anna Siegel—“a 13-year-old climate activist” and “Maine Chapter Co-Lead with
[the] US Youth Climate Strike”—documents a fictional “conversation between two friends
supporting each other and finding hope through activism in the age of coronavirus.” While
ostensibly concerned with climate reform, Siegel’s text illustrates the ways in which the problem
of climate change has come to serve as an apocalyptic symbol and rallying point for audiences’
more generalized anxieties and frustrations about the current order. Siegel begins by situating her
text within the perceived chaos of our time. The audience is presented with a series of text
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messages that are exchanged between the characters Nico and James. After initiating the
conversation, Nico quickly begins to articulate an anxiety about current affairs, observing that
“everything in our world is so messed up” (00:00:17). While Nico suggests that the coronavirus
is a significant source of this worry, they also reference “the future” as a source of worry,
suggesting a more generalized anxiety about the fate of the world (00:00:21). This is confirmed
by a later statement, in which Nico admits that they are “tired of the way things are” (00:01:42).
By positioning climate change as part-in-parcel with the more generalized upheaval of our times,
Nico and, by extension, Siegel provide a poignant illustration of how widespread feelings of
hopelessness and frustration can provide the soil for premillennial apocalyptic discourse to grow.
As suggested by Brummett, “apocalyptic stems from a sense of unexplained and
inexplicable change or crisis, from a sense that received systems of explanation have failed, and
from a resulting sense of anomie, disorientation, lawlessness, and impending chaos” (23).
Premillennial apocalyptic rhetoric does not stop at acknowledging the failure of current systems
to explain and respond to a pressing crisis but offers audiences an alternative regime of attitudes
for making sense of such failures. As illustrated by the climate reform rhetors discussed in this
project, even for secular premillennial apocalyptic there is a truth lying at the bottom of climate
despair, a truth that will guide the transformation of current systems in the pursuit of a more
carbon conscious world. As a symbolic system by which audiences may make sense of perceived
disorder, “[p]remillennialists argue that unusual and inexplicable problems are indications of the
impending apocalypse” (54). As an apocalyptic symbol, climate change embodies audiences’
more general concerns about society and the future and the belief that the combined state of the
world’s problems is ‘coming to a head’ and can only be resolved through the creation of a new
social order. In reference to the Green New Deal’s attempt to enact precisely such an order by,
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for instance, creating green jobs to bolster the economy and foster a more environmentally
sustainable future (Siegel 00:00:48-00:01:00), James asks “What’s the point of studying and high
school if the planet is wrecked? We need to have a future” (00:01:11). When Nico goes on to
suggest that “what we need is for corona to go away” (00:01:13), James observes that the Green
New Deal’s economic and healthcare reforms are likely to lessen the toll of the coronavirus as
well (00:01:16). Just as climate change functions as a premillennial apocalyptic symbol for
discussing the more general upheaval of our times, climate reform is a language for eliminating
these problems and a blueprint for producing a better society moving forward. Siegel’s linking of
climate reform and higher quality healthcare is especially apt when we consider the potential for
global warming to accelerate the spread of disease on a global scale (El Hamichi et al. 25992600).
Yet, in order for the millennium that James describes to come into being, there must first
be a state of disorder to be replaced, and it is in its descriptions of the negative effects of climate
change that climate reformers produce some of the most startling apocalyptic rhetoric. Such is
the case with Global Climate Strike participant Mia Werger, who created the audiovisual text
“Growing Up at the End of the World” to “spark conversations about the toll of climate change
on the mental and emotional wellbeing of children everywhere . . . ” (Werger). Like Thunberg
and Siegel, Werger emphasizes the harm that climate anxiety has inflicted upon those young
people whose futures are in jeopardy through no fault of their own. Werger acknowledges how
“bizarre” it is to have to live with the “constant threat of climate destruction” (Werger),
comparing it to growing “up with a shadow over [one’s] head” (00:00:12-00:00:14). As a
premillennial apocalyptic rhetor, Werger reassures her audience that they are not suffering alone,
“that the world has turned strange” (Brummett 161), thereby validating feelings of alienation.
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Werger understands “how it feels to wonder if” the “future will be only a series of disasters and
crises, one after another” (00:02:19-00:02:25). Far from attempting to distance herself from these
painful feelings, Werger indicates that such perceptions may even bestow a privileged status
upon those who are climate conscious and even a sense of solidarity among those burdened by
the weight of such consciousness in a society that can often seem indifferent to environmental
woes: “Maybe it’s our role in the world to feel the pain that others will not or cannot feel. We
have grown up with a shadow over our heads” (00:02:40-00:02:49). As a premillennial rhetor,
Werger does not try to reassure audiences that current systems are capable of avoiding the
consequences of climate change but instead models the importance of feeling the full brunt of
climate change as a self-inflicted environmental and societal wound.
In many respects, Werger’s description of the devastating emotional pain that
accompanies climate change awareness evokes a sense of “moral injury,” the feelings of anguish
that result when one realizes one has transgressed one’s most cherished values and beliefs
(Weintrobe 351). In “Moral Injury, the Culture of Uncare and the Climate Bubble,”
psychoanalyst Sally Weintrobe suggests that the kind of climate change “awareness” that Werger
describes, “awareness [that] one has participated in causing damage to the planet, and to people
and animals, can lead to feeling morally injured” (351), an experience Weintrobe compares to
the “trauma that soldiers experience when they realise that the war they find themselves in is an
immoral war and that by taking part they have acted against their conscience” (352). While one
might think that the weight of such pain may be disabling, it is only by acknowledging one’s
complicity in such systems of harm, as painful as such realization can be, that one may begin to
collaborate with others and take meaningful action to resist such harm moving forward (359360). By guiding audiences through the inner turmoil of climate consciousness, Werger vividly

90
illustrates that it is only through acknowledgement of the harm caused by climate change and
humanity’s role in producing it that such pain can be avoided through effective climate action.
Like Thunberg, Werger has opened herself and, by extension, her audience to the full force of
climate anxiety, thereby setting the scene for transformation. Unlike Thunberg, Werger’s choice
to largely eschew scientific appeals and concentrate almost entirely on the devastating emotional
cost of climate change on young people and citizens across the United States offers suffering
audiences with a form of environmental catharsis that scientific appeals alone are ill equipped to
inspire.
While the authors of the Green New Deal may, as government officials, appear to be
distanced from the civil activism of climate reformers like Thunberg, Siegel, and Werger, the
text of the Green New Deal shares many of the same features of premillennial apocalyptic
rhetoric, especially when it comes to representing climate change as an imminent threat. The
Green New Deal is an interesting premillennial text in that it functions as a “grounding text”
through which climate reformers such as Siegel construct rhetorical authority for their arguments
(Brummett 99), and it also constitutes a work of premillennial apocalyptic rhetoric as it attempts
to warn lawmakers and, by extension, U.S. citizens of the impacts of climate change and calls for
immediate reforms that would effectively overhaul U.S. infrastructure. The apocalyptic nature of
the Green New Deal becomes immediately apparent in its opening sections, in which
Representative Ocasio-Cortez and other lawmakers warn that “a changing climate is causing sea
levels to rise and an increase in wildfires, severe storms, droughts, and other extreme weather
events that threaten human life, healthy communities, and critical infrastructures” (United States
2). In addition to producing such environmental disruptions, the Green New Deal emphasizes the
harm climate change will do to the U.S. economy, stating that “global warming at or above 2
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degrees Celsius beyond preindustrialized levels will cause . . . more than $500,000,000,000 in
lost annual economic output in the United States by the year 2100” and also poses “a risk of
damage to $1,000,000,000,000 of public infrastructure and coastal real estate in the United
States” (2). In light of its audience of U.S. lawmakers and citizens, the Green New Deal is
careful to spell out the threat climate change poses to the U.S., in particular.
Like Siegel, who positions climate change as a symbol for the more general problems and
unease facing U.S. citizens, the Green New Deal suggests that the effects of climate change will
not be limited to environmental disruptions or even economic harm but will extend to other
seemingly unrelated conflicts within the U.S. According to the Green New Deal, “climate
change, pollution, and environmental destruction have exacerbated systemic racial, regional,
social, environmental, and economic injustice” and “climate change constitutes a direct threat to
the national security of the United States” (4). By representing climate change as an expansive
crisis that presents a systemic threat to U.S. society, the Green New Deal provides an apt portrait
of the scope of secular premillennial apocalyptic rhetoric as defined by Brummett.
. . . religious apocalyptic is always total in regards to all areas of human experience.
When Christ returns or the Messiah arrives, everything will be changed. Secular
apocalyptic tends to categorize and localize change more. Within the sphere of its
particular concern, change is total. Furthermore, that change radically affects much, if not
all, of the rest of life. But taken in sum, the changes portended by secular apocalyptic are
rarely or never as absolute as are the changes of religious apocalypse. Systemic secular
apocalyptic is therefore more limited in range. (44)
Whereas religious apocalyptic rhetoric describes the apocalypse as an existential threat in the
true sense of the word, an event that will destroy the entire human race or even result in the
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destruction of the world and cosmos, only to recreate it in a new, perfected spiritual realm,
secular apocalyptic rhetoric focuses on how a looming problem will disrupt society in profound
ways while still occurring within the same physical reality. By highlighting the power of climate
change to disrupt virtually all aspects of U.S. society, the Green New Deal falls short of
projecting a cosmic apocalypse but is careful to suggest that climate change will effectively
destroy the day-to-day world that many U.S. citizens take for granted. Yet such apocalyptic
destruction is not limited to the harmful effects of climate change but is also embodied in the
very reform efforts that the Green New Deal authorizes. As demonstrated in the following
section, apocalypse is not only a process of destruction, but denotes the process of recreation that
will follow, the new order that will emerge from the annihilation of the old.

Challenging the Current Order
While Thunberg, the Global Climate Strike, and the Green New Deal’s depictions of the
impacts of climate change highlight the power of apocalyptic rhetoric to inspire urgency in
audiences by emphasizing the mass destruction that approaches them, such overtly apocalyptic
pronouncements are likely the most superficial features of the apocalyptic genre. Drawing on
Burke, Brummett observes that “Considerations of apocalyptic’s characteristics as a rhetorical
genre must go beyond a description of the context as one of feeling disoriented and anomic. In
serving such an audience as equipment for living, apocalyptic has distinctive stylistic and
substantive characteristics” (45). One such characteristic of premillennial apocalyptic rhetoric is
its tendency to challenge the current order of things, the institutions and values that are incapable
of encompassing much less responding to the looming apocalypse and may even be responsible
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for causing it. Such critiques of the current order are a dominant feature of climate reform
discourse and motivate some of climate reformers’ most forceful statements.
Throughout her speeches, Thunberg frequently holds lawmakers and business leaders
accountable for both the role they have played in exacerbating climate change and their
collective failure to swiftly halt greenhouse gas emissions. In a statement that echoes the feelings
of estrangement voiced by Siegel and Werger, Thunberg recounts how she always feels like she
is “surrounded by fairy tales. Business leaders, elected officials all across the political spectrum
spending their time making up and telling bedtime stories that soothe us, that make us go back to
sleep. These are feel-good stories about how we are going to fix everything. How wonderful
everything is going to be when we have ‘solved’ everything” (“Wherever” 87). By critiquing the
current generation of lawmakers and business leaders for their profound underestimate of the
seriousness and complexity of the climate crisis, Thunberg articulates a deeply premillennial
critique of the current order’s assumption that the problem of climate change can be solved
within the matrix of currently existing systems and values. According to Brummett, “The
premillennialist does not see the current order as improving, as progressing toward perfection.
Indeed, it will not have the chance; its imperfections are signs of its impending overthrow” (70).
Because the destruction of the current system is necessary to achieve millennium, or a new order
of things that improves upon the errors of the last, “premillennialism is radical in that it opposes
the values and assumptions of the established order” as it is precisely this established order that
stands in the way of resolving society’s underlying conflicts (71). In the context of climate
change, Thunberg asserts that “[w]e can create transformational action that will safeguard the
living conditions of future generations. Or we can continue with our business as usual and fail”
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(“Our House” 20). Only a new order of thought and practice is sufficient to avoid the full extent
of the climate catastrophe that is rapidly approaching.
One of the key facets of Thunberg’s critiques of the current order is the suggestion that
political, economic, or technological innovations that build upon currently existing systems are
not sufficient in themselves to avert climate change and may even serve to worsen the climate
crisis by delaying our engagement with the only permanent solution: the move to a carbonless
society. Whereas lawmakers and business leaders “pretend that this can be solved with business
as usual and some technical solutions” (“The World” 98), Thunberg argues that “[w]e must
change almost everything in our current societies. The bigger your carbon footprint – the bigger
your moral duty. The bigger your platform – the bigger your responsibility” (“Our House” 22).
As a premillennial rhetor, Thunberg argues that meaningful reform can occur only through the
radical reorganization of society. “Premillennial argument is radical,” Brummett writes, “in the
sense of being opposed to the idea of progress that underlies the scientific and technological
establishment, mainstream liberal Protestant beliefs [in the case of religious apocalyptic
rhetoric], and ‘common sense’ within industrial democracies for the last few centuries” (71).
Because “our current economics are still totally dependent on burning fossil fuels, and thereby
destroying ecosystems in order to create everlasting economic growth” (Thunberg, Foreword 4),
Thunberg questions any such scientific and technological solutions to climate change because
they will most likely serve to reproduce the very same political and economic structures that
created anthropogenic climate change in the first place. Instead, Thunberg calls for a radical
questioning of the role of science and technology in society and the fundamental transformation
of that role by creating a new order. It is only through a transformed environmental
consciousness that future systems will prevent such environmental catastrophes from being
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reproduced moving forward. The fallen logics of a society grounded in capitalist convenience
must be replaced with a regime of thought and practice that prizes climate stability and
environmental sustainability above personal and national wants and desires.
Having rejected the ability to resolve the climate crisis within current systems, Thunberg
calls upon lawmakers and business leaders to resist their desire for an ‘easy fix’ to climate
change and, instead, give themselves over to the complexity of the problem and, by extension,
any real solution. Like Werger, Thunberg suggests that one of the first steps toward meaningful
climate reform is to admit the extent of the problem and to admit one’s powerlessness to resolve
the problem, at least within currently existing systems.
And on climate change, we have to acknowledge that we have failed. All political
movements in their present form have done so. And the media has failed to create broad
public awareness. But Homo sapiens have not yet failed. Yes, we are failing, but there is
still time to turn everything around. We can still fix this. We still have everything in our
hands. But unless we recognize the overall failures of our current systems we most
probably don’t stand a chance. (“Our House” 18)
Thunberg’s call to lawmakers and business leaders to embrace their current failure to address
climate change embodies a feature of apocalyptic rhetoric that Brummett terms the “paradox of
control” (173). Brummett explains that “[i]n regards to apocalyptic rhetoric more generally, we
have seen that it agrees with the audience’s perception that they have no control and that the
world has turned strange, while at the same time reassuring the audience that fundamental
control is present beneath the surface appearance of history” (173). Considered in the context of
climate change, while Thunberg suggests that political and economic leaders are currently
incapable of halting climate change, she is careful to clarify that it is only through acceptance of
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this lack of control over climate change as a physical reality that a new order of attitudes and
practices may be generated that are compatible with meaningful climate change mitigation.
Thunberg thus presents institutional audiences with a paradox of control, in which admission of
one’s lack of control, paradoxically, equips one with the perspective and motivation to take
control, albeit in an altered form.
While such acceptance of climate change is not on par with religious apocalyptic
audiences’ acceptance of a divine plan for the universe, it may be interpreted as having a similar
rhetorical effect on audiences. Thunberg calls upon political and business leaders to “[s]top
pretending that you, your business idea, your political party or plan will solve everything. We
must realize that we don’t have all the solutions yet. Far from it. Unless those solutions mean we
simply stop doing certain things. . . . Creative accounting will not help us. In fact, it’s the very
heart of the problem” (“Wherever” 88). Yet to admit that current institutions are incapable of
avoiding climate catastrophe is to admit that nature is not completely under the audience’s
control. Nature will not submit to the United States and its elites’ dreams of unlimited
consumption but will prove the impossibility of such dreams as it slowly erases humanity from
the earth or makes existence so unbearable that non-existence may feel preferable. As such, the
threat of climate change may carry the rhetorical weight of cosmic apocalypse even as it unveils
itself within secular contexts. While Thunberg encourages her audience to feel “distressed by
change beyond its control,” lawmakers and business leaders are “offered a change back in the
direction of restoring some measure of order” (Brummett 173), even if that order is contingent
upon their admission of powerlessness and their need for a new set of attitudes and practices.
While many U.S.-directed climate reformers agree on the extent of the climate change
threat and will often describe such catastrophe in order to awaken climate consciousness,
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reformers will often diverge regarding the extremity of climate action. This is evident in the
distance between Thunberg’s vision and that of the Green New Deal. Because Thunberg blames
currently existing systems for producing anthropogenic climate change in the first place, she is
critical of the relentlessly partisan responses to climate change that dominate the U.S. political
landscape. Thunberg makes her position on this aspect of the climate change issue clear: “no
matter how political the background to this may be, we must not allow this to continue to be a
partisan political question. The climate and ecological crisis is beyond party politics. And our
main enemy right now is not our political opponents. Our main enemy now is physics. And we
cannot make ‘deals’ with physics” (“Wherever” 93). By “‘deals’ with physics” (93), Thunberg is
likely referencing the Green New Deal, an observation echoed by Forbes contributor Jeff
McMahon (“No One”). Rather than producing a climate reform plan that is interwoven with
Democratic policies that are virtually guaranteed to alienate Republican lawmakers, Thunberg
calls for the immediate and widespread elimination of carbon emissions, regardless of political or
economic fallout. While Democrats and Thunberg may agree on the extent of climate change’s
harm and the importance of responding to climate change immediately, Thunberg critiques the
Green New Deal as another example of business-as-usual and not sufficiently radical enough to
resolve the climate crisis. As a premillennial rhetor, Thunberg suggests that because climate
change is a new order of threat that the human race has never faced before, “the politics and
solutions needed are still nowhere in sight” (“The World” 97). In keeping with premillennial
apocalyptic rhetoric’s rejection of the current order as a source of corrupt (and corrupting)
attitudes and practices, Thunberg indicates that our only hope to not repeat the mistakes of the
past when it comes to climate is to implement climate reform that is driven—not by money or
politics or gradualism—but by a radical desire to eliminate carbon emissions immediately. Given
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the unprecedented nature of the climate threat we must implement equally radical environmental
reforms, a movement that would require a new regime of climate conscious attitudes and
behaviors.
While Thunberg may consider the kinds of system-friendly climate policies called for by
the Green New Deal to be a “surrender” to climate change (“Speech European Parliament”
00:01:53), a statement Thunberg made to the European Parliament regarding Europe’s attempt
“to take Green New Deal policies global” (McMahon, “Green New Deal”), the new order called
for in the Green New Deal has been sufficiently radical to alienate Republican lawmakers and
voters. The Green New Deal calls for “a 10-year national mobilization” (United States 6) that,
among other things, entails “meeting 100 percent of the power demand in the United States
through clean, renewable, and zero-emission energy sources” (7), “removing pollution and
greenhouse gas emissions from manufacturing and industry as much as is technologically
feasible” (8), “providing resources, training, and high-quality education, including higher
education, to all people of the United States, with a focus on frontline and vulnerable
communities” (11-12), and “providing all people of the United States with . . . high-quality
health care” (14). Unsurprisingly, the Green New Deal was rejected by the Senate on March 26,
2019 with all fifty-seven Republican Senators voting against the bill (“Roll Call”). Likewise, a
report by the Yale Program on Climate Change and the George Mason University Center for
Climate Change Communication reveals that while a majority of Republican voters initially
supported the Green New Deal in December 2018, that support had tapered off substantially by
April 2019, with only thirty-two percent of “conservative Republicans” supporting the bill, down
from fifty-seven percent, and sixty-four percent of “liberal/moderate Republicans” supporting it,
down from seventy-five percent (Gustafson et al. 3). These figures testify to the controversial
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nature of the Green New Deal as a piece of legislation that outlines a plan for not just
Democratic lawmakers and citizens but the entire nation.
Thunberg’s suggestion that the Green New Deal does not go far enough despite the fact
that it goes so far that it virtually guaranteed its own rejection by Republicans illustrates the
subjective nature of the apocalyptic experience. Considered from a Republican perspective, the
Green New Deal would likely be categorized as an example of premillennial apocalyptic rhetoric
in that it seeks to replace the current order with one that is, in the words of former Senate
Majority Leader Mitch McConnel, more like “a far-left science fiction novel” (“Green New
Deal” 00:05:52-00:05:55) that could cost more than “the annual GDP of the entire world” in the
first ten years alone (00:06:06-00:06:23). Indeed, judged from the words of McConnell, it would
almost seem that the Green New Deal and, by extension, the Democratic reforms it embodies are
the true apocalypse facing the U.S. and not climate change at all. However, considered from the
perspective of Thunberg, the Green New Deal would likely not be considered an instance of
premillennial apocalyptic rhetoric because it balances climate reform with the pursuit of
Democratic economic and social policies rather than seeking to halt emissions immediately at
any cost. By considering the subjective nature of the premillennial apocalyptic frame as it
pertains to the climate debate, we begin to appreciate how apocalyptic rhetoric functions not as a
static genre that looks the same in every context but one that can only be understood when
studied in real-life discourse. According to Brummett,
Theory of apocalyptic rhetoric needs to go beyond explanation of itself and show how it
can help people to understand the ways in which real discourses are influencing real
people. . . . The critic must also bear in mind that any generic theory is designed to
further the analysis of particular texts, and therefore the ways in which such texts,
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situated in their real contexts, address audiences in those contexts must be the primary
consideration for the critic. (117)
Because different audiences encounter apocalyptic rhetoric in different contexts, it is important
to acknowledge that what one audience perceives as a radical premillennial apocalyptic
overthrow of the status quo, another audience may interpret as merely another example of
business as usual. As Brummett suggests, “The end of the world is very much a matter of
perceptions” (46), and being mindful of the processes by which particular audiences and rhetors
come to understand situations to be catastrophic in the first place provides insight into the
narratives and symbols that are likely motivating their attitudes.

Creating the Millennial Order
So far, I have evaluated how U.S.-directed climate reformers employ apocalyptic appeals
in order to help audiences understand the severity and imminent nature of climate change and
how reformers critique the attitudes and practices of the current order and demand the
instantiation of a new, more carbon conscious society. While both of these appeals are important
features of the premillennial apocalyptic genre, they should not be interpreted as ends-inthemselves, but as a means of achieving the ultimate goal of not just climate reform but any
apocalyptic discourse: a new order or of things in which the errors of the past have been
corrected, a new millennium. According to Brummett, belief in the millennium is prerequisite for
a given discourse to be considered apocalyptic, and it would be
a mistake to call apocalyptic those discourses that do not foresee a millennium. Mere
doomsayers may superficially resemble apocalyptists, but if they do not foresee a
millennium, then the symbolic dynamics of their discourse are completely different from
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the apocalyptic promise. It is one thing to say ‘the world will end’ and another to say ‘the
world will end and you will triumph in the new world that replaces it. (49)
By calling for the almost total disruption of current systems of thought and practice and their
replacement with a new order in which the continued elimination of carbon emissions is a
defining factor, the climate reform movement seeks to produce a new millennial order of
attitudes and behaviors among U.S. citizens and the world.
In contrast with Christian premillennialists who argue that the “impending new world” of
the millennium is the culmination of a divine plan that will finally save true believers from the
sufferings of the fallen world (55), secular premillennialists depict a millennium that is far less
cosmic in scope and call for the creation of a radically new social order through human rather
than divine means. Despite such differences in scale, the millennium performs a similar
figurative and rhetorical function in religious and secular premillennial apocalyptic rhetoric.
“The millennium is,” in its most generic sense, “a period of justice, peace, and harmony. It is,
above all, a period of achieved order, in which whatever pain the audience has experienced is
salved” (48). By pointing audiences to a future in which the ills of the present are addressed and
a new order has been achieved, premillennial apocalyptic rhetors provide them with symbolic
“equipment for living” through the chaotic and frightening present and (Burke, “Philosophy of
Literary Form” 61), in the case of secular apocalyptic movements like climate reform, the
courage to dismantle the current order and make a more carbon conscious millennium a reality.
Whether religious or secular, the millennium is the source of apocalyptic hope that no matter
how bad things get, there will be a better tomorrow, even if, in its secular incarnation, that
tomorrow may not be guaranteed but must be won through yet more labor. By evaluating how
secular U.S.-directed climate reformers construct the millennium for audiences, we gain insight
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into the new realm of attitudes and practices that the climate reform movement is calling upon
U.S. lawmakers and citizens to embrace.
Whereas Thunberg critiques U.S. lawmakers and business leaders for their tendency to
privilege political and economic advantage over achieving a carbon neutral society, her
depictions of the millennium outline the new order she calls upon those lawmakers to embrace.
The defining feature of this new order is that it would replace current measures of national
achievement in terms of gross domestic product with ones that measure success according to
carbon reduction. According to Thunberg, “No other current challenge can match the importance
of establishing a wide, public awareness and understanding of our rapidly disappearing carbon
budget, that should and must become our new global currency and the very heart of our future
and present economics” (“Our House” 21). This passage highlights the dual nature of Thunberg’s
apocalypse. On one level, the apocalypse that U.S. audiences and the rest of the world face is the
catastrophic environmental and societal impacts of climate change. This apocalypse is, in a
sense, absolute. The IPCC reports that human beings have already caused about 1°C of warming,
a number that will probably grow to 1.5°C “between 2030 and 2052 if it continues to increase at
the current rate” (Masson-Delmotte et al. 4). And while the most severe consequences of global
warming are reserved for warming in excess of 1.5°C (5), even limiting warming to 1.5°C will
significantly disrupt the world as we know it (7-11). Yet, in order to avoid the much more
destructive or apocalyptic consequences of warming in excess of 1.5°C, Thunberg offers an
alternative apocalypse, one that we consciously choose to enact and which would, if successful,
bring about a new millennium in which we replace the attitudes and practices that produced
climate change with ones that avoid such problems in the future. This is the millennium of the
carbon neutral society described in the Paris Agreement. While this new order will be more
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easily and rapidly achieved through the support of current lawmakers and business leaders,
Thunberg suggests that it will come into being even without such support. Thunberg warns that
“[t]he world is waking up. And change is coming, whether you like it or not” (“The World” 99).
The millennium that is to come will require the apocalyptic destruction and recreation of the
current order.
As a premillennial rhetor, Thunberg envisions a new economic system that would
represent a radical break with the capitalist and consumerist order that currently exists. In her
foreword to the Climate Resistance Handbook, a resource produced by Daniel Hunter as part of
the Global Climate Strike and 350.org, Thunberg describes the millennium that will come to
replace the current system as the values of the climate reform movement are embraced by more
and more people:
Every time we make a decision we should ask ourselves; how will this decision affect
that curve? We should no longer measure our wealth and success in the graph that shows
economic growth, but in the curve that shows the emissions of greenhouse gases. We
should no longer only ask: ‘Have we got enough money to go through with this?’ but
also: ‘Have we got enough of the carbon budget to spare to go through with this?’ That
should and must become the centre of our new currency. (Thunberg, Foreword 4)
By calling for a new economics that is measured in carbon expenditure and the evasion of
climate catastrophe, Thunberg describes a future that represents a radical break with the current
order. Pointing to the purveyors of capitalism as a secular form of evil, Thunberg identifies
lawmakers and business leaders as the primary reason why climate change exists in the first
place and also the reason for the United States’ refusal to eliminate carbon emissions. “You say
you ‘hear’ us and that you understand the urgency. But no matter how sad and angry I am, I
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don’t want to believe that. Because if you fully understood the situation and still kept on failing
to act, then you would be evil. And I refuse to believe that” (Thunberg, “The World” 97). While
Thunberg falls short of deeming these resistant audiences to be evil, the absence of such an
accusation is linked to Thunberg’s belief that political and economic leaders do not really
understand climate change as a threat and the importance of immediately and completely halting
emissions. Of course, the implication of this statement is that these U.S. audiences, having now
been made aware of the situation by Thunberg and the plurality of scientists that inform the
actions of the United Nations and its internal organizations such as the IPCC and whose findings
Thunberg represents, may be considered evil moving forward if they do not work to achieve the
new order Thunberg calls for. As with the discourse of religious premillennial apocalyptists,
Thunberg’s millennium is a deliverance from evil, even if that evil is the greed and apathy of
societal elites.
Further insight into the kind of millennium called for by the climate reform movement
can be gained by evaluating the discourse produced as part of the Global Climate Strike. Like
Thunberg, Werger outlines a new set of attitudes to usher in a more climate conscious era and,
most importantly, help avoid environmental catastrophe through the effective annihilation of the
current status quo. After outlining the devastating impact of climate anxiety on young people and
critiquing the current order that gave rise to climate change in the first place, Werger asks a
question that is likely on her audiences’ minds: “ . . . what world would I want to see?”
(00:02:54-00:02:56). In answer to this question, Werger outlines a three-fold vision of the new
millennium: “I want us to live lives that are honest about three things: Honest about limits.
Honest about work. Honest about pain” (00:03:01-00:03:14). According to Werger, it is “our
attempts to avoid what scares us [that] have resulted in so much harm to the world” (00:04:37-
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00:04:42). In this statement, Werger suggests that it is precisely our unwillingness to confront
uncomfortable realities, to confront our limitations as human beings who are not masters of the
natural world but dependent upon it, that we have brought ourselves to the brink of an even more
uncomfortable reality: the reality of climate catastrophe. Just as Thunberg called upon the
political and business leaders of the 2019 World Economic Forum to “recognize the overall
failures of our current systems” in order to open the door to another, more climate conscious
order of things (“Our House” 18), Werger suggests that it is only through acknowledging our
lack of control before the natural world that we may take control over ourselves and our own
behavior in order to exist within the natural limits of this world.
By looking forward to an era of transformed environmental attitudes and practice,
Werger further illustrates how the paradox of control is not exclusive to religious apocalyptic
rhetoric but is critical to the climate reform movement’s project to create a new carbon conscious
world. While the paradox of control may encourage audiences to “see that fundamental control is
present beneath the surface appearance of history” (Brummett 173), that control does not have to
be a divine force. It can, in the case of secular apocalyptic rhetoric, be a force that is for all
intents and purposes equally intransigent, such as the force of the world, itself, and the physical
laws that govern it and humanity’s relationship to it. While a premillennial apocalyptic Christian
rhetor might suggest that progressive attempts to perfect the world through attitudes and
practices that are divorced from God will, ironically, serve to accelerate the world’s destruction
(O’Leary 164), Werger, like Thunberg, suggests that the United States and other developed
nations’ refusal to sacrifice their political and economic ambitions before the alter of the natural
world and physics will serve to exacerbate climate change and will lead to the destruction of the
world as we know it. As a common feature of premillennial apocalyptic rhetoric, secular and
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religious, the paradox of control enables rhetors and audiences to accept their powerlessness
before a force that is beyond their control while allowing them to reclaim their power by
embracing a new regime of thought and practice. In the case of climate reform, this new regime
both seeks to produce the millennium and is itself the millennium in action. As Werger suggests,
it is a millennial order grounded in not the rejection of pain but in acceptance of pain as the
world telling us that we are sorely in danger: “ . . . when I leaned into my grief over the state of
the world, I found a sense of meaning that I had never known before” (00:04:51-00:04:57). It is
only through embracing the pain of the present that a new future, a new millennium is possible.
As Werger further observes, “ . . . we can reinvent our relationship with the world. We can make
sure that no more children grow up under a shadow, but in the full light of the sun” (00:05:0600:05:15). By describing the new world that lies at the other side of climate despair, Werger
illustrates the power of moral injury to foster a more affirmative awareness of one’s
interdependence with the world. By embracing one’s responsibility for climate harm, as well as
one’s vulnerability before the mounting climate crisis, one is able “to see strength and beauty in
the interconnected systems that support life and also see the fragility of those systems and the
imperative for us to respect their limits in the way we live our lives” (Weintrobe 359). This new
psychological, emotional, and moral landscape of responsibility and humility is the foundation of
a more climate conscious millennial order.
Of course, not all U.S.-directed climate reformers envision the millennium in precisely
the same way. While one might reasonably suggest that climate reformers share the same
millennial desire for a new social order in which governments, businesses, and citizens make
carbon reduction a primary goal, not all reformers expect this goal to be achieved at the same
scale or in the same amount of time. Global Climate Strike participant Siegel, for instance, does
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not call for the immediate cessation of carbon emissions but points to the Green New Deal as a
meaningful step forward in achieving a more carbon conscious society (Siegel 00:01:30). This
stands in marked contrast with Thunberg who, as previously indicated, is critical of the Green
New Deal for privileging political and economic ambitions over halting carbon emissions. And
while Werger does not reference the Green New Deal explicitly, one might infer from her
argument that the Green New Deal’s reliance on received narratives of economic growth likely
does not constitute quite the profound acceptance of pain and does not chart quite the
revolutionary course Werger envisions. Yet, considered from the perspective of U.S.
Republicans, the Green New Deal’s expansive economic and social reforms (United States 5)
would likely amount to a socialist takeover of the United States and be interpreted as an
existential threat to current political and economic systems, one to be resisted as fiercely as
possible. Just as the Green New Deal may appear lukewarm and progressive to Thunberg while
still being experienced as a form of radical premillennial apocalyptic rhetoric by Republicans, a
millennial vision will be experienced as more or less extreme according to the rhetorical and
ideological frameworks of one’s audience. In much the same that apocalyptic discourse is more
or less premillennial depending on its rhetorical context, millennial narratives become more or
less radical according to an audience’s expectations, and political ideology is an important frame
through which such narratives are made sensible for audiences.

Constructing Authority Through Grounding Texts
One of the most important rhetorical moves apocalyptic rhetors make is how they
construct their authority for audiences. As with any attempt at persuasion, one’s argument is
much more likely to succeed if that argument is imbued with an aura of authority that audiences
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can trust. For apocalyptic rhetors, authority is often constructed through the use of what
Brummett calls “grounding texts” (94). Like so many other aspects of apocalyptic rhetoric, the
type of grounding text may differ between religious and secular apocalyptic discourse, but the
central purpose of the grounding text remains the same: it imbues the apocalyptic rhetor’s
proclamations with an authority that the rhetor could not possibly possess on their own. “For
religious apocalyptic, the grounding text will be one or more of the scriptures of the religion . . .
” (99). Whereas the religious apocalyptic rhetor of the past may have grounded their claims in
the authority of direct communication from God, “today’s apocalyptists ground their claims
about history’s culminating plan in some sort of text or set of principles, always distant from
themselves and their audience in time, space, or ease of understanding. This sacred text is then
interpreted to apply to the present and future; it becomes a grounding text used in support of
claims” (94). Brummett goes on to observe that “[t]he process is structurally identical for secular
discourse” (94), but “the grounding text will be the assertion of a natural law governing the
domain in question or it will be a widely revered secular text” (99). “Ultimately,” Brummett
suggests, “the political and social claims made by apocalyptic rhetoric are secured in the
grounding texts,” whether those texts be religious or secular in nature (99). Both the religious
and secular apocalyptic rhetor ground the authority of their claims in one or more symbols—be
they particular texts, theories, laws, or value systems—that audiences are likely to accept,
thereby harnessing the persuasive power of those symbols and yoking it to the rhetor’s argument.
As for the methods by which an apocalyptic rhetor derives authority from a given
grounding text to persuade audiences within a particular context, Brummett identifies three
primary strategies. First, the rhetor may construct authority through “typology,” in which they
present details from a grounding text to connect that text with current events (105). If the
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apocalyptic rhetor can convince audiences that the grounding text has ‘predicted’ the events that
audiences are experiencing right now, then the rhetor may lead those audiences to believe that
the text has also foreseen events that will happen in the future (105). Brummett goes on to
explain that, as with all uses of grounding texts, “[t]he strategy of typology enables apocalyptic
to make its social and political pronouncements, for the current context is seen as linked to—
indeed, named by—the grounding text” (106). The climate reform movement makes substantial
use of typology to ground its claims in authority that is greater than any single rhetor.
For Thunberg, as with much of the U.S.-directed climate reform movement, there are two
grounding texts that are frequently appealed to in order to justify the rhetor’s claims. These are
the scientific research surrounding climate change as reported by the IPCC and the
intergovernmental plan to halt carbon emissions in both national and global contexts known as
the Paris Agreement. In her September 18, 2019 testimony before the Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Thunberg provides what is likely one of the clearest uses of typology in the history of
climate reform. In lieu of sharing “any prepared remarks” as one might expect a climate reformer
to do when invited to make their case before U.S. lawmakers, Thunberg simply provides
lawmakers with “the IPCC Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5 Degrees Celsius” and asks
them to read it (Committee on Foreign Affairs 10). Along with the report, Thunberg states the
following: “I do not want you to listen to me. I want you to listen to the scientists, and I want you
to unite behind science, and then I want you to take real action” (10). By asking lawmakers to
listen to the findings of climate scientists as reported by the IPCC, Thunberg seems to divest
herself of personal authority in order to ask lawmakers to trust in and act upon the authority of
climate science. However, by presenting the IPCC report as a grounding text, Thunberg has
imbued her calls for political and societal reform with authority that is likely greater than
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anything she—any reformer—could possess on their own: the accumulated authority of decades
of scientific research on climate change.
Such appeals to scientific authority as a justification for climate reform are a recurring
feature of Thunberg’s appeals to U.S. audiences. In her address to the U.S. Congress, Thunberg
asks lawmakers to trust in the “current, best available scientific calculations” (“Wherever” 89).
Thunberg goes on to ask lawmakers “why is it so important to stay below the 1.5°C limit?” (90).
The answer, according to Thunberg, is “[b]ecause that is what the united science calls for, to
avoid destabilizing the climate, so that we stay clear of setting off an irreversible chain reaction
beyond human control. Even at 1°C of warming we are seeing an uncontrollable loss of life and
livelihoods” (90). In the face of climate change, Thunberg offers the findings of climate
scientists as charting a path forward by which we may eliminate carbon emissions and halt
climate change. Grounded in this body of scientific data, Thunberg suggests that her calls to
action transcend politics itself: “These numbers are not my opinions. They aren’t anyone’s
opinions or political views. This is the current best available science. Though a great number of
scientists suggest even these figures are too moderate, these are the ones that have been accepted
by all nations through the IPCC” (91). As with her testimony to the Committee on Foreign
Affairs, Thunberg grounds the authority of her arguments in science to the extent that she
suggests that the reforms that she calls upon lawmakers to enact are not arguments at all in a
political sense. Far from being a deliberative situation, Thunberg suggests that the question of
climate change is not a question to be debated, indeed, is not a question at all, but a matter of
simply acting upon the findings of the IPCC:
Now is the time to speak clearly. . . . You say that nothing in life is black or white. But
that is a lie. A very dangerous lie. Either we prevent a 1.5°C of warming or we don’t.
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Either we avoid setting off that irreversible chain reaction beyond human control – or we
don’t. Either we choose to go on as a civilization or we don’t. That is as black or white as
it gets. There are no grey areas when it comes to survival. (“Our House” 19-20)
The argumentative effect of Thunberg’s use of the IPCC’s report is to suggest that there is no
argument at all surrounding climate change, that it is not an issue so much as a problem that has
already been solved by scientists, and it is only lawmakers’ failure to understand the enormity of
the problem and their unwillingness to act that prevents the U.S. and, by extension, the world
from doing what must be done. As a grounding text, the IPCC’s report imbues Thunberg’s
claims with an authority that, for audiences who are motivated by such scientific data, is almost
sacred in nature.
While appeals to science and the IPCC, specifically, are likely the most dominant use of
grounding texts in Thunberg’s discourse, she also makes heavy use of the Paris Agreement and,
by extension, the intergovernmental body of the United Nations. Indeed, even the preceding
appeals to the IPCC’s scientific authority constitute indirect appeals to the authority of the Paris
Agreement and the United Nations as the IPCC was co-created by the United Nations
Environment Programme in 1988 “to provide governments at all levels with scientific
information that they can use to develop climate policies” (IPCC, “About the IPCC”) and whose
“Fifth Assessment Report . . . informs the negotiations and policy formulation towards the Paris
Agreement” (United Nations, “Background”). As such, Thunberg’s appeals to the scientific
consensus surrounding climate change also constitute appeals to the Paris Agreement and the
United Nations. As with her use of the IPCC’s research, Thunberg uses the strategy of typology
to correlate U.S. lawmakers’ behavior in the present with the Paris Agreement’s calls for climate
reform in national and global contexts. This is evident in Thunberg’s 2019 address to U.S.
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Congress, in which she takes lawmakers to task for turning their back on the Paris Agreement
altogether: “The USA is the biggest carbon polluter in history. It is also the world’s number one
producer of oil. And yet you are also the only nation in the world that has signaled your strong
intention to leave the Paris Agreement. Because, quote, ‘It was a bad deal for the USA’”
(“Wherever” 91-92). In this statement, Thunberg is referencing former President Donald
Trump’s decision to withdraw the U.S. from the Paris Agreement effective November 2020
(Pompeo) in fulfillment of his 2016 campaign promise to “cancel the Paris Climate Agreement
and stop . . . all payments of the United States tax dollars to UN global warming programs”
(“Mr. Donald J. Trump” 00:23:33-00:23:50). As with the IPCC’s report, Thunberg appeals to the
authority of the Paris Agreement and, by extension, the United Nations in an effort to not only
hold U.S. lawmakers accountable for their climate inaction and their effective rejection of the
international consensus regarding climate change but to also chart a path forward for the U.S. to
eliminate its carbon emissions.
As a premillennial apocalyptic rhetor, Thunberg confronts U.S. audiences with the
uncomfortable knowledge of climate change as a pressing physical reality that we cannot
completely control but can only navigate to the best of our ability, and she offers as a blueprint
for such climate action the Paris Agreement and the combined vision of the United Nations. The
assumption underlying Thunberg’s invocation of the Paris Agreement, like the IPCC, is that this
text and the intergovernmental body that produced it are a transcendent source of knowledge for
U.S. citizens, and it is only by putting themselves in harmony with the IPCC and the Paris
Agreement’s edicts that U.S. citizens may avert the much worse apocalypse of global warming in
excess of 1.5°C and embrace the alternative apocalypse of climate reform in pursuit of a carbon
neutral society. By grounding her authority in the combined texts of the IPCC and the Paris
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Agreement, Thunberg suggests that the basis for achieving a millennium of carbon neutrality
does not lie in any claim or information she might provide but in the transcendent wisdom of the
international and scientific consensus regarding climate change that flows through her and to
audiences as through a transparent vessel.
Another strategy by which apocalyptic rhetors construct authority through the use of
grounding texts is that of “transfer” (Brummett 109). Whereas typology is fairly direct in that it
attempts to take details from a particular sacred or grounding text and convince audiences that
those details correspond with one or more current events, transfer can follow a somewhat more
circuitous route. Brummett describes the process of transfer as follows:
In transfer, a paragraph, passage, chapter, or longer discourse will begin by discussing the
grounding text, aligning the rhetor with the text’s ideas, arguments, author, main
characters, and so forth. Then the rhetor will introduce an idea, another author, a fact, or
an example that is very similar to and consistent with the grounding text yet also has a
strategic difference. Then the rhetor will shift to another idea or ‘expert’ that is similar or
linked to the material recently introduced, but further afield still from the grounding text.
This process continues until the rhetor has by degrees transferred the prestige and
rhetorical power of the grounding text to other claims, authorities, texts, and arguments
entirely. The ideas and authorities espoused by the end of the progression contain the
political and social pronouncements desired by the rhetor, and so, by degrees, the rhetor
has linked entirely secular and ideological advice to the grounding text. (109)
Through the strategy of transfer, the apocalyptic rhetor is able to develop associations between a
variety of seemingly unrelated texts and, in doing so, imbue their own claims with that
accumulated textual authority. “To make such a linkage, especially for political purposes,
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requires a ‘slide’ out of the sacred grounding texts and into explicitly secular pronouncements.
Thus transfer is a strategy that fits exactly into what apocalyptic rhetoric tries to do: fetch the
political out of the sacred” (110). Far from being limited to religious apocalyptists, secular
apocalyptic rhetors will often present audiences with a series of associations by which they
transfer the authority of a grounding text into a pronouncement that is not immediately evident in
that text. And while secular apocalyptic rhetors are unlikely to appeal to scriptural authority, they
may invoke the authority of texts that, while not sacred in a religious sense, are highly revered by
their audiences. Such texts serve to generate automatic authority for apocalyptic rhetors due to
the privileged status they maintain for audiences.
Such is the case with the Green New Deal, which attempts to transfer the authority of
such revered texts as the IPCC and the original New Deal in support of more localized claims.
Whereas Thunberg uses typology to make direct connections between grounding texts like the
IPCC’s report and specific decisions facing U.S. lawmakers today, the authors of the Green New
Deal present readers with a much more circuitous path by which such authority is transferred.
While beginning with the IPCC’s projections that “global temperatures must be kept below 1.5
degrees Celsius above preindustrialized levels to avoid the most severe impacts of a changing
climate,” a goal that requires the world to achieve, among other things, “net-zero global
emissions by 2050” and the U.S. to “take a leading role in reducing emissions through economic
transformation,” the Green New Deal takes an apparent detour by lengthily outlining “several
related crises” currently being faced by the U.S. (3). And while the authors of the Green New
Deal suggest that all of the problems described have some connection to climate change, some
seem to be more related than others. On the one hand, the authors of the Green New Deal
describe such climate-related problems as “clean air, clean water” (3), “inadequate resources for
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public sector workers to confront the challenges of climate change,” as well the likelihood that
“climate change, pollution, and environmental destruction have exacerbated systemic racial,
regional, social, environmental, and economic injustices” (4). On the other hand, the Green New
Deal also suggests that “health care, housing, transportation, and education,” as well as “a 4decade trend of wage stagnation, deindustrialization, and antilabor policies” are also “related” to
climate change (3). The rhetorical effect of initially grounding the authority for the Green New
Deal in the scientific data of the IPCC is that this authority is effectively transferred from the
IPCC to the various domestic problems that are identified. In effect, the Green New Deal
suggests that problems like income inequality and anti-union practices are just as related to
climate change as its environmental consequences, meaning that any governmental attempt to
address climate change as an environmental catastrophe must also address other systemic
inequalities within the United States. Through this trail of associations, the Green New Deal
authors effectively transfer the IPCC’s scientific authority to a new order of attitudes and
practices that are not immediately apparent in the original grounding text.
In addition to its use of IPCC research, the Green New Deal also attempts to transfer to
itself the authority of the original “New Deal” that the Green New Deal is named after (5).
Whereas the Green New Deal begins by emphasizing the importance of combatting climate
change to avoid its most deleterious impacts on U.S. society, the authors go on to connect this
project with the goals and contexts of the historic New Deal: “the House of Representatives
recognizes that a new national, social, industrial, and economic mobilization on a scale not seen
since World War II and the New Deal era is a historic opportunity” (5). In this passage, the
authors of the Green New Deal use grounding texts to accomplish two primary rhetorical moves.
First, by referencing the New Deal and, by implication, the Great Depression out of which the
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New Deal emerged, the authors use typology to imply that the climate crisis currently facing the
U.S. is of the same type as that which faced the country decades ago. By drawing a connection
between the devastation of the Great Depression and the ‘related’ threats of climate change, the
Green New Deal authors indicate that the U.S. requires an equally ambitious new plan to save its
citizens from disaster. Second, through transference, the authors effectively take the scientific
authority of the IPCC as a grounding text and associate it with the less scientific but no less
sacred—for Democrats—text of the New Deal. By linking New Deal era economic and political
reform with climate change and, by extension, the IPCC’s climate science, the Green New Deal
imbues its calls for a new social order with combined scientific and political authority.
The third and final strategy for grounding texts that Brummett identifies is the rhetor’s
“language and style” (112). According to Brummett, “The language and style of apocalyptic
rhetoric tend to employ a mysterious vocabulary and to be dogmatic and contentions. As such,
they signal the presence of a system of hidden knowledge, thus justifying the political
pronouncements that are drawn from out of that system” (112). Furthermore, “[i]t is important to
note that vocabulary thus reinforces social and political claims that may run contrary to popular
wisdom. For that reason, we may expect heavier use of more esoteric vocabulary among
premillennialists, who are more often positioned against established or popular values” (113).
Even further, apocalyptic rhetors may make extensive use of “dramatic language” to help
audiences visualize the apocalyptic events depicted by a given sacred or grounding text, thereby
helping to infuse the rhetor’s political and social pronouncements with greater authority (113).
Brummett is careful to observe, however, that the language and style of apocalyptic rhetoric is
not limited to the use of dramatic imagery or “esoteric language,” but may make “[c]areful use of
historical and other kinds of evidence” (115). Like typology and transference, language and style
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make up another strategy that apocalyptic rhetors can use to make their apocalyptic and
millennial claims more persuasive for audiences.
As a discourse that seeks to warn U.S. citizens about the severity of the climate crisis in
order to spur the creation of a new social order in which the elimination of carbon emissions is
the defining factor, the U.S.-directed climate reform movement has certain stylistic features in
common with the premillennial apocalyptic rhetoric that Brummett describes. However, whereas
Brummett explains that religious apocalyptic rhetors will often incorporate obscure and
mysterious ideas and symbols from sacred texts in order to ground their authority in “a system of
hidden knowledge” (112), we have seen through our analysis that U.S.-directed climate
reformers often seek to make the findings of climate scientists as accessible to audiences as
possible. At the same time, while the secular climate reformers we have considered tend to avoid
the use of mysterious textual language as a means of constructing authority, they will often
attempt to persuade audiences by taking the ‘dry’ language of climate science and representing it
through more dramatic imagery.
For a poignant example of dramatic language in climate reform discourse, we may look
to Werger’s account of the emotional toll of climate change awareness, in which she compares
climate anxiety to “growing up with a shadow over [her] head” (00:00:12-00:00:14) and states
that she “can’t really imagine what it would feel like, to look at how beautiful the world is, and
not feel like [she] was grieving for a dying person” (00:00:44-00:00:53). Werger goes on to
invoke images of “[c]hildren breaking down from trying to carry the weight of the world on their
shoulders” (00:01:18-00:01:23), an image that evokes the pain of climate anxiety by comparing
it to a physical weight always pressing one down with devastating consequences. Werger does
not limit her use of imagistic language to descriptions of the emotional pain caused by climate
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change but uses it to describe the feelings of hope and liberation that characterize climate reform:
“ . . . we can reinvent our relationship with the world. We can make sure that no more children
grow up under a shadow, but in the full light of the sun” (00:05:06-00:05:15). While Werger’s
use of dramatic and imagistic language helps to make her argument more persuasive by
conveying the harmful emotional impacts of climate change, her argument is made even more
impactful through her choice of grounding text. Whereas Thunberg and the authors of the Green
New Deal make use of such ‘large scale’ grounding texts as the IPCC’s report, the Paris
Agreement, and the Green New Deal, Werger grounds the authority of her argument in a text that
is likely much more familiar for many audiences: the statements of adults who realize that
climate change is a real danger.
Werger begins her text with the following recollection: “The first time I heard a grown up
explain that the environment was going to be destroyed, I was so little that I was still using a
booster car seat. ‘50 years,’ they said, ‘until it’s too late to save our planet.’ I was scared then,
and I’m scared now. And today, scientists say we have a lot less than 50 years to turn things
around” (00:00:15-00:00:37). By beginning her text with a reference to what adults have told her
about the environment, Werger grounds the authority of her apocalyptic discourse in the
statements of those who seem to be doing so little to address the climate crisis. In what amounts
to a generational critique, Werger encourages the adults in her audience to feel the full weight of
the climate crisis that they have helped to produce and of which they are aware, but about which
they do so little. Like Thunberg, who informed the older generations of lawmakers assembled at
the 2019 UN General Assembly in New York City that “if you fully understood the situation and
still kept on failing to act, then you would be evil. And I refuse to believe that” (“The World”
97), Werger confronts adults with their own climate awareness, suggesting that their own
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knowledge of climate change should be the only catalyst they need to take responsibility for this
crisis and the harm it is inflicting upon young people and the world. And while Werger
references the findings of climate scientists, she does so in the context of adults taking
responsibility for their own climate knowledge and action, thereby making those adults’
awareness the principal grounding text of Werger’s argument. As such, the rhetorical power
present in Werger’s dramatic and imagistic language is found, not in the IPCC or the Paris
Agreement, but in knowledge that exists in the audience itself.
By evaluating the use of grounding texts in secular climate reform discourse, we come to
understand what ideas and symbols climate reformers believe to be persuasive to audiences. Far
from being natural or inevitable, climate reform’s appeals to the authority of the IPCC, the Paris
Agreement, the United Nations, as well as the audience’s knowledge of and concern about
climate change itself, reflect the ideological and rhetorical investments of not only the rhetor but
the implied audience of the text. In “The Second Persona,” Edwin Black observes that “in all
rhetorical discourse, we can find enticements not simply to believe something, but to be
something. We are solicited by the discourse to fulfill its blandishments with our very selves”
(119). Likewise, in “The Writer’s Audience Is Always a Fiction,” Walter J. Ong suggests that
that all writers, “[t]he historian, the scholar or scientist, and the simple letter writer all
fictionalize their audiences, casting them in a made-up role and calling on them to play the role
assigned” (17). And while the scale and success of events such as the Global Climate Strike and
ever growing reports of climate anxiety within the U.S. would seem to suggest that a great many
U.S. citizens are far from reluctant to occupy the audience role that Thunberg, the authors of the
Green New Deal, and Global Climate Strike rhetors have extended to them, we must keep in
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mind that not all audiences necessarily identify with the attitudes such climate reform discourse
embodies.
By evaluating the apocalyptic narratives and symbols that climate reformers employ to
persuade U.S. audiences to care about climate change and to pursue zero carbon emissions, we
are not only able to understand what kinds of audiences this discourse is attempting to produce or
assumes already exist. We are better equipped to identify those appeals that are—or are not—
likely to persuade particular segments of the U.S. population according to their rhetorical and
ideological frameworks, as well as better understand what strategies are more likely to foster
desperately needed climate reforms. As a dominant source of authority within much climate
reform discourse, appeals to the IPCC and the scientific consensus surrounding climate change
are more likely to persuade audiences that already accept scientific authority as a meaningful
basis for local and national decision-making. In Communicating Climate Change, Susanna Priest
associates such evidence-based approaches to climate change discourse with the “‘deficit
model’” of science communication, or “[t]he idea that providing an abundance of scientific facts
will necessarily alter people’s opinions in a direction more consistent with the opinions of the
scientific community[,] . . . the belief that public opinion (and public relations) problems can be
solved with improved dissemination of scientific information alone” (7). One of the key
disadvantages of the deficit model is that it overlooks how citizens’ understanding of any given
issue, no matter how technical or specialized the area of knowledge that encompasses it, is
always mediated by the “beliefs and values” of those citizens (7), and not all citizens’ beliefs and
values are grounded in scientific thinking as the premier source of authority. Likewise, Philip
Eubanks observes in The Troubled Rhetoric and Communication of Climate Change that appeals
to science and evidence-based reasoning can be incredibly effective rhetorical strategies, but
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their effectiveness is largely restricted to audiences who “are, if not the already persuaded, [then]
the already persuadable” (124). By relying so heavily on scientific grounding texts, climate
reformers risk limiting their persuasiveness for those citizens who do not rely on scientific
authorities to make sense of a looming crisis like climate change. Furthermore, for those citizens
who are not persuaded that climate change is, in fact, a crisis, the infrastructure reforms that
climate reformers call for, as well as the various social programs forwarded by the Green New
Deal, may feel more disruptive than anything climate change threatens them with.

Conclusion
Throughout this chapter, I have evaluated the influence of secular premillennial
apocalyptic rhetoric on the climate reform movement today, especially that segment of the
movement that seeks to persuade U.S. lawmakers, business leaders, and citizens to acknowledge
climate change as an existential threat to the nation and the world and to adopt a new order of
attitudes and practices in order to achieve and maintain a carbon neutral society. A review of
rhetoric and communication scholarship on apocalyptic environmental rhetoric suggests that
while apocalyptic appeals can help rhetors to grab audiences’ attention and foster a sense of
urgency regarding environmental reform, those very same apocalyptic appeals can also work
against the rhetor’s argument by leading to accusations of fear-mongering and hysteria and may
actually foster a state of helplessness in their audiences rather than a spirit of action and can even
open up the rhetor to accusations of irrationality when environmental catastrophes do not
transpire as projected. However, whereas scholars of apocalyptic environmental rhetoric have
tended to erect an opposition between apocalyptic environmental discourse and scientific
research, the climate crisis has seen these two poles merge as scientific entities like the IPCC
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have become the primary grounding texts for climate reform rhetors’ apocalyptic
pronouncements. Far from being a fringe discourse, apocalyptic rhetoric has effectively gone
mainstream as climate reform rhetors and their audiences attempt to navigate their increasing
awareness of climate catastrophe, destruction that increases in scale with every moment the U.S.
and the world does not achieve carbon neutrality. By evaluating climate reform discourse as a
form of secular apocalyptic rhetoric as described by Barry Brummett, we better appreciate the
expansive nature of apocalyptic rhetoric as a genre that embodies “fundamental, bedrock ways of
thinking and talking about the world” (52). By asking ourselves what crisis or apocalyptic threat
a given rhetor is responding to, as well as how critical the rhetor is of the current order in
producing or failing to respond to that crisis, we gain insight into the kind of world that rhetor
would like to see come into existence, as well as what facets of the current order the rhetor
would see destroyed.
When we consider the powerful nature of the apocalyptic reasoning explored in this
chapter, we come to realize that “[t]he end of the world” truly is “a matter of perceptions”
(Brummett 46). No matter how convinced one is that the world is effectively going to end, even
if knowledge of that ending is grounded in the most careful, respected, and repeatable scientific
investigations, one cannot assume that others will feel the same way. In fact, Republican
resistance to such measures as the Green New Deal illustrates how even the most scientifically
sound and internationally supported efforts to mitigate climate change, such as the achievement
of a carbon free society, will not be enthusiastically received by all citizens and may even be
interpreted as itself a form of apocalypse due to the radical and rapid changes demanded of U.S.
citizens. By considering the influence of apocalyptic thinking on not just the production but the
reception of climate reform appeals and how that thinking is always grounded in and will vary
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according to the values and beliefs of rhetor and audience, not just climate reformers but any
rhetor who seeks to generate sufficient public consensus to respond to a pressing societal
problem may better appreciate what they are asking their audiences to do. To embrace a new
regime of thought and practice requires that one accept the destruction, if only partial, of the
current order, and it is not surprising that certain audiences would resist such a call to action. In
the case of climate change, reformers seek to avert an environmental apocalypse—or at least
minimize it—by embracing an alternative apocalypse in which the current order will likely be
transformed beyond recognition. By considering how climate reformers represent crisis and how
they present audiences with a new order of thought and practice that will achieve a millennium in
which the carbon producing problems of the previous order are resolved, we better appreciate the
scale and challenges of the rhetorical task that faces the climate reform movement within the
United States. The extent of this challenge becomes even greater when we consider the difficulty
of engaging those audiences yet unconvinced of climate change and its immediate and long-term
impacts. This is especially the case given that climate change affects communities so differently
in terms of temporality and intensity.
In the following chapter, we will examine one such challenge to climate reform, one that
equips its audiences with an alternative apocalyptic frame that may impact U.S. citizens’
understanding of and response to climate change: evangelical Christian premillennialism. Just as
climate reform employs apocalyptic rhetoric to give audiences a framework in which to make
sense of the threat of climate change and chart a new path forward, many evangelicals interpret
pressing societal problems like climate change according to their own apocalyptic frame, albeit
one that is often quite different from that presented by secular climate reformers. Despite such
differences, evangelical premillennialism performs much the same generic function as its secular
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counterpart by providing rhetors and audiences with a system of symbols by which to make
sense of perceived disorder and through which they may look forward to a millennial period in
which the problems they face today are resolved. Close study of evangelical premillennial
discourse produced during the coronavirus pandemic indicates that the evangelical premillennial
frame may pose significant rhetorical and ideological challenges to the values and modes of
evidence frequently forwarded by secular climate reformers.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Lukewarm Millennialism in a Warming World: Evaluating the Influence of
Premillennial Apocalyptic Frames of Acceptance on Evangelical
Attitudes Toward Climate Reform Discourse

Introduction
When compared to other religious groups and the U.S. population more generally,
evangelical Christians tend to display a greater degree of climate change skepticism. According
to a 2015 report by the Yale Program on Climate Change Communication (YPCCC), while a
majority (fifty-one percent) of evangelicals believe that climate change is occurring (Leiserowitz
et al., “Climate Change in the American Christian Mind: March 2015” 10), only forty-one
percent believe that it is the result of human activity (11). Interestingly, only thirty-eight percent
of evangelicals report being “worried” about climate change at all, with sixty-two percent
reporting that they are “not very” or “not at all” worried about climate change (13). These
numbers stand in stark contrast with the rates of concern reported by the general population of
the U.S. during the same time period, with fifty-two percent of respondents stating that “they are
at least ‘somewhat worried’ about global warming” (Leiserowitz et al., “Climate Change in the
American Mind: March 2015” 9). Rates of climate skepticism are even greater among white
evangelicals. In another 2015 study, the Pew Research Center found that only twenty-eight
percent of the white evangelicals surveyed believe the earth is warming due to human activity
compared to fifty percent of the general population (Funk and Alper 33). Thirty-seven percent
state that there is no meaningful evidence that climate change is occurring at all (33). And while
the number of white evangelicals who believe in anthropogenic climate change increased to 44%
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by October 2020 (Climate Nexus et al), they continued to lag behind other religious groups and
the general population of the U.S. Likewise, while rates of climate concern increased among
white evangelicals between 2015 and 2020, fewer reported being worried about climate change,
with twenty-four percent of white evangelicals reporting in 2020 that they are “[v]ery worried”
about climate change compared to thirty-nine percent of the general population (Climate Nexus,
et. al). Such statistics point to the often-stark differences between evangelical Christians’
attitudes toward climate change and those of other U.S. citizens.
Several social and political scientists have suggested that evangelicals’ relative lack of
climate concern reflects, at least in part, the influence of premillennial apocalyptic belief. In their
1993 study, “Theological Perspectives and Environmentalism among Religious Activists,” James
L. Guth and colleagues find a correlation between increased theological conservativism and
decreased prioritization of environmental issues (379) among “American religious activists”
belonging to a range of Christian organizations that include Bread for the World, Evangelicals
for Social Action, and Concerned Women for America (374). According to the authors, “the
biblical literalism, End times thinking, and social pessimism of fundamentalism all contribute
substantially to environmental conservativism” (379). In a later study, “Faith and the
Environment: Religious Beliefs and Attitudes on Environmental Policy,” James L. Guth and
colleagues expand their data beyond religious activists to also include the general population
(371). Significantly, the authors find that end-times belief “is negatively associated with
environmentalism across the board” (371), thereby indicating that adherence to premillennial
thinking is correlated with decreased environmental concern not only among pastors and activists
but citizens more generally (370-71). Adding to this body of research on the correlation between
increased end-times belief and diminished environmental concern, David C. Barker and David
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H. Bearce’s 2012 study, “End-Times Theology, the Shadow of the Future, and Public Resistance
to Addressing Global Climate Change,” finds that end-time beliefs, especially those related to
the Second Coming of Jesus, correlate with an increased resistance to government attempts to
combat climate change, specifically (272). Interestingly, Barker and Bearce find that end-time
beliefs negatively influence subjects’ attitudes toward climate reform even after accounting for
the influence of “Party ID, ideology, and media distrust” (273), suggesting that eschatological
beliefs have a unique bearing on climate change attitudes that cannot be easily explained away as
the product of other social factors. Lastly, in their 2017 study, “What’s ‘Evangelical’ Got to Do
with It? Disentangling the Impact of Evangelical Protestantism on Environmental Outcomes,” E.
Keith Smith and colleagues report that “both biblical literalists and evangelical Protestants were
found to be less likely to have future concerns about climate change and exhausting the earth’s
natural resources than their counterparts” (313). Because “[t]hese effects were not observed for
more current environmental outcomes, e.g. water and car pollution,” Smith and colleagues
suggest that “[t]his pattern may reflect eschatological views prominent among evangelical
Protestants” (313). Like Guth and colleagues, Smith and colleagues suggest that adherence to
Christian end-times beliefs may influence certain citizens’ attitudes toward environmental
reform, and, like Barker and Bearce, Smith and colleagues correlate such apocalyptic thinking
with decreased concern toward climate reform, specifically.
These studies provide insight into possible reasons for why evangelicals tend to
demonstrate less worry about the threat of climate change than the general population by
suggesting that the internalization of eschatological beliefs is a recipe for diminished climate
concern. This conclusion is far from universal, however. In The Gospel of Climate Skepticism:
Why Evangelical Christians Oppose Action on Climate Change, Robin Globus Veldman
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suggests that while the preceding studies offer evidence that “end-time beliefs are associated
with reduced environmental concern, even after controlling for other possible influences,” they
fail to adequately “illustrate what the association between end-time beliefs and environmental
apathy looks like” (42). According to Veldman, while end-times beliefs are an undeniable
component of evangelicals’ theological framework and may influence their attitudes toward
environmental issues to some extent, scholars such as Barker and Bearce may overestimate the
causal link between the internalization of eschatological beliefs and a decreased concern for
environmental issues like climate change (218). Even though Barker and Bearce’s evidence
suggests a correlation between belief in end-times events like the Second Coming and decreased
belief in the need for governmental intervention, Veldman’s own studies of the evangelical
community suggest that “[o]nly a small number of them [evangelical respondents] would have
interpreted this to mean that preserving the earth for future generations was futile” (218).
Furthermore, Veldman observes that respondents’ resistance to government-led climate reform
may have more to do with evangelicals’ historical “sense of embattlement with secular culture”
(91) than end-times belief (219). Veldman suggests that evangelicals’ tendency to resist climate
reform efforts is more a reflection of the Christian Right’s campaign to foster antienvironmentalist attitudes within the evangelical community than a necessary expression of
theological belief, even those beliefs that relate to the end-times (220-21). Whereas Barker and
Bearce and others may point to end-times belief as the source of diminished climate change
concern, Veldman demonstrates that there are always non-theological, social factors at work in
the production of such attitudes.
Indeed, one need not look far to find examples of evangelicals whose behavior challenges
what Veldman terms the “end-time apathy hypothesis,” or the assumption “that end-time beliefs”
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are the driver of “environmental apathy” (7). For instance, the organization Young Evangelicals
for Climate Action (YECA), encourages evangelicals to engage in climate reform action as an
expression of core Christian principles, such as “loving God fully and loving our neighbors as
ourselves” (“Take Action”). Beyond simply adopting more climate conscious attitudes and
behaviors on an individual level, YECA calls upon evangelicals to manifest Christian love in the
world by striving to care for the environment and those negatively impacted by climate change.
As a Senior Advisor to YECA (“Dr. Katharine Hayhoe”), as well as a climate scientist and selfidentified evangelical Christian, Katharine Hayhoe provides an especially powerful counter to
the end-time apathy hypothesis Veldman describes. As Megan Von Bergen and Bethany Mannon
explain in “Talking Climate Faith: Katharine Hayhoe and Christian Rhetoric(s) of Climate
Change,” Hayhoe engages evangelicals on the issues of climate change and climate reform from
within the matrix of evangelical Christian attitudes and beliefs. Hayhoe “speaks and writes not
(only) as a climate scientist,” Von Bergen and Mannon observe, “but as a Christian who draws
on the horizons she shared with fellow believers to bridge the gulfs between faith and climate
action.”
This bridging of evangelicalism and climate science is showcased in A Climate for
Change: Global Warming Facts for Faith-Based Decisions, in which Hayhoe and Andrew
Farley outline the evidence for climate change and make an argument for climate reform that is
grounded in Christian belief. Throughout Climate for Change, Hayhoe and Farley frequently
appeal to the four beliefs that, Bethany Mannon suggests in “Xvangelical: The Rhetorical Work
of Personal Narratives in Contemporary Religious Discourse,” constitute evangelical religious
identity: “(1) individual conversion, (2) the Bible’s authority and inerrancy, (3) the imperative to
spread faith to nonbelievers, and (4) ongoing relationships with God made possible through the
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substitutionary death of Christ (being ‘born again’)” (144). In one representative passage,
Hayhoe and Farley reassure readers that God does not require them to engage in climate action
as a prerequisite for salvation. “There are,” Hayhoe and Farley explain, “many gray areas with
regard to how Christians ‘should’ respond to things that the Bible does not directly address.
Climate change falls into that category” (139). In keeping with Mannon’s description of
evangelical identity, Hayhoe and Farley state that “God the Father measures everything we do by
one criterion only: was it done in dependency on His Son?” (138). By thus presenting
evangelical readers with an understanding of climate change and climate reform that is situated
within their core belief system, Hayhoe “creates possibility, envisioning alternative, hopeful
models of faith expansive enough to include climate change—models that may, eventually, take
root” (Von Bergen and Mannon). In other words, Hayhoe’s fusion of evangelical and climate
discourse gives this climate reform-resistant community of believers the opportunity to embrace
the attitudes and actions of the climate reform movement without compromising their cultural
values and beliefs as evangelical Christians.
Creating such faith-based discursive spaces for evangelicals to evaluate their
environmental attitudes and behaviors is important, especially given the often politicized and
politically divisive nature of climate change discourse within the United States. Like Veldman,
Hayhoe points to political ideology as a key determiner of evangelicals’ attitudes toward climate
change and climate reform. In the Grist article “For Some Evangelical Christians, Climate
Action Is a God-given Mandate,” Hayhoe observes that, “[f]or a large segment of evangelicals,
‘their statement of faith is written primarily by their politics, and only secondarily by their faith. .
. . If the two come in conflict, they will go with their politics over what they claim to believe’”
(Geselbracht). That many evangelicals’ attitudes toward environmental issues like climate
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change are being influenced by political ideology is further suggested by Guth and colleagues’
1993 study, which finds that theological conservatives who report being resistant to
environmental reform also tend to be politically conservative (Veldman 218). According to Guth
and colleagues,
The patterns are clear and striking. Environmentalism is part and parcel of a liberal
religious/political worldview. The Christian Left . . . scores highest on all measures.
Christian Right activists, on the other hand, do not see the environment as a pressing
problem, rank it low in national priorities, and evince much less willingness to adopt
environmental policies that might cause inflation or cost workers their job. (380)
Indeed, when we consider that 81% of “white born-again or evangelical Christians” voted for
Republican President Trump in the 2016 election (Martínez and Smith), thereby leading to the
U.S. withdrawal from the Paris Agreement (Pompeo) until it rejoined on February 19, 2021
under Democratic President Biden (Blinken), it is hard to disagree with Hayhoe and Veldman’s
assertions that climate change and climate reform have become political for many evangelicals.
With white evangelicals constituting 26% of the overall 2016 electorate (Martínez and
Smith), that means that Trump-favoring, white evangelicals made up approximately 21% of
voting citizens. Representing just over one-fifth of 2016 voters, this community played a
significant role in undoing years of climate reform by voting into office a President who would
rapidly pull the U.S. out of the Paris Agreement. In addition to exerting a direct influence on
U.S. involvement in the Paris Agreement through their support of Trump, evangelical Christians
also paved the way for former Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell and the Senate’s
rejection of the Green New Deal (“Roll Call Vote”), with 75% of white born-again/evangelical
Christians voting Republican in the 2018 Midterm Election (CNN). By continuing to support
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Republican candidates who are unable or unwilling to enact the rapid, large scale, and
cooperative climate reform efforts called for by the United Nations, U.S. Democrats, the
scientific consensus, and climate reformers such as Greta Thunberg, evangelical Christians pose
a significant challenge to national and global climate reform efforts.
However, while Veldman and Hayhoe offer compelling evidence that evangelicals’
attitudes toward climate reform are motivated by political factors, it is important to not reduce
such attitudes to politics alone. Indeed, it is precisely such reductive understandings of
evangelical motives and identity that Veldman is so critical of. According to Veldman,
acknowledging the often-political nature of evangelicals’ climate resistance challenges the endtime apathy hypothesis—the belief that such resistance stems from the “otherworldly
indifference” inspired by “end-time beliefs” (218). Yet, by drawing so strong an opposition
between the so-called “otherworldly indifference” of Christian apocalyptic belief and the “thisworldly engagement” of political motives, Veldman likely underestimates the power of
apocalyptic frames to influence citizens’ attitudes toward pressing societal problems like climate
change (218). Considered rhetorically, evangelicals’ beliefs about the end of the world may be
interpreted as an instance of what Kenneth Burke terms “‘[f]rames of acceptance,’” or narrative
structures that people create to explain the world around them and make that world sensible
despite its seeming contradictions (Attitudes 20). According to Burke, the circulation of such
narrative frames constitutes a form of rhetorical action by providing audiences with a symbolic
framework through which to interpret the world and perceived problems: “[e]ach frame enrolls
for ‘action’ in accordance with its particular way of drawing the lines. Out of such frames we
derive our vocabularies for the charting of human motives. And implicit in our theory of motives
is a program of action, since we form ourselves and judge others (collaborating with them or
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against them) in accordance with our attitudes” (Attitudes 92). Stated differently, “Words are not
puppets. They have more than mere ‘delegated power.’ They also command – and [in a
statement that may just as easily be directed at Veldman’s own study] a theory that seeks to
consider them after the analogy of puppets alone must leave important questions unanswered”
(332). More than a mere guise for political motives, the presence of apocalyptic symbols within
evangelical discourse does rhetorical work by encouraging audiences to adopt particular attitudes
toward pressing societal issues like climate change.
Even as evangelical attitudes toward climate change are influenced by political factors,
the language through which they articulate their thoughts about societal issues more generally
suggests that eschatological narratives are intimately linked with how many evangelicals make
sense of perceived problems in the world. And while it is difficult, if not impossible, to draw a
causal link between end-times beliefs and evangelical attitudes toward pressing issues like
climate change, this chapter will survey recent evangelical discourse on the end-times in order to
demonstrate that such apocalyptic narratives may present certain challenges to the secular
climate reform efforts explored in Chapter Three. Specifically, this chapter will examine the
premillennial apocalyptic discourse circulated by such evangelical rhetors as Jimmy Evans,
David Jeremiah, Ron Rhodes, and Todd Hampson, which encourages audiences to distrust
intergovernmental organizations like the United Nations as steppingstones toward the formation
of a one-world government and therefore complicit in the Antichrist’s imminent rise to power.
As the primary global mediator of both climate change science and reform, such attempts to
undermine the UN’s authority threaten much of the climate reform occurring in the U.S. today.
In addition to sowing distrust toward the UN, the aforementioned premillennial rhetors also
encourage audiences to question all progress narratives that position human beings as capable of
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resolving the world’s problems without divine aid, an appeal that conflicts with climate reform’s
frequent emphasis on humanity’s capacity to mitigate climate change through scientific expertise
and social reform. Far from being limited to the discourse of such premillennial rhetors, analysis
of audience responses on social media forums like YouTube demonstrate that these premillennial
narratives constitute rhetorical frames through which audiences actively make sense of the world
around them and may pose a challenge to secular climate reform efforts.
While evangelical premillennial discourse often challenges the values and goals of
secular climate reform within the U.S., that does not necessarily mean that all evangelicals
operating within the premillennial frame possess no environmental concern whatsoever. Whereas
Veldman’s research finds that only a small number of evangelical subjects (so-called “hot
millennialists”) demonstrate a direct correlation between end-times beliefs and “this-worldly
apathy”—with the majority of subjects (“cool millennialist[s]”) rejecting climate reform efforts
for primarily political reasons that merely take the form of end-times narratives (102)—a
rhetorical reading of recent evangelical apocalyptic discourse suggests that end-times narratives
may encourage another type of environmental response beyond mere indifference. Rather than
fostering a complete disregard of climate reform efforts, the use of premillennial narratives may
encourage evangelical audiences to adopt a watered-down support of climate reform that is not
compatible with the calls to immediate and widespread action explored in Chapter Three, though
it is likely compatible with the narrative of climate reform moderation advocated by Katharine
Hayhoe. Rather than dividing evangelicals into hot and cool millennialists, analysis of recent
apocalyptic evangelical discourse suggests that many evangelicals may more accurately be
described as lukewarm millennialists in that end-times beliefs may serve, not to render pressing
societal problems like climate change moot, but to temper the urgency of evangelicals’
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commitment to the levels of action called for by many secular climate reformers. By considering
this potential for lukewarm environmentalism, we may also question the ultimate efficacy of
Hayhoe’s own attempts to persuade evangelicals to commit to climate reform through limited
shifts in environmental attitudes and behaviors. In the face of a rapidly warming earth, it is not
only climate apathy that we must fear but narratives of climate moderation that delay urgent, lifesaving reforms.

The United Nations and Evangelical Fears of a One-World Order
One potential challenge to U.S.-directed climate reformers’ efforts is the suspicion that
evangelicals often display toward U.S. cooperation with intergovernmental organizations like the
United Nations. Not only does the UN oversee the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC), whose regular reports of the findings and implications of climate scientists from around
the world form the scientific foundation of the Green New Deal (United States 2) and whose goal
of global net zero carbon emissions by 2050 (Masson-Delmotte et al. 12) is reflected in the
climate change mitigation measures of Biden-Harris’ American Jobs Plan (White House, “Fact
Sheet”). It also oversees the Paris Agreement through which nations publicly declare their
climate mitigation goals and seek to hold each other accountable in the fight against climate
change. As the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) observes in its 2020
“Emissions Gap Report,” not only must the U.S. and other carbon-intensive nations abide by
their commitments under the Paris Agreement, they “must collectively increase their NDC
ambitions threefold to get on track to a 2°C goal and more than fivefold to get on track to the
1.5°C goal” of global warming that would avoid the worst effects of climate change (xxi). To
accomplish this, however, the U.S. must, as the largest greenhouse gas (GHG) emitter per capita
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and the second largest in total emissions after China (xvi), win the widespread support of its
citizens. “The participation of civil society is,” according to the UNEP, “necessary to bring about
wider changes in the social, cultural, political and economic systems in which people live” (xxv).
Yet, as a segment of the population whose eschatological discourse frequently positions
intergovernmental organizations like the UN as steppingstones to a one-world government to be
controlled by the Antichrist and representative of a weakened United States in the end days,
many evangelicals may distrust the United States’ participation in such urgent, global reform
efforts.
One of the most recent and pointed end-times critiques of the United Nations comes
from XO Marriage founder and pastor Jimmy Evans (XO Marriage). In August 2020, during the
COVID-19 pandemic, Evans delivered a four-part sermon on his 2020 book Tipping Point: The
End Is Here to the congregation of Gateway Church. As a nondenominational (Outreach 100,
“Gateway Church”), “Bible-based, evangelistic, Spirit-empowered” megachurch that reports a
weekly attendance of more than 100,000 people (Gateway Church) and whose sermons circulate
through social media, Evans’ sermons have reached many evangelical Christians and have the
potential to reach even more over time. This reach is significant for discussions of climate reform
as Evans’ end-times discourse promotes a deep skepticism toward intergovernmental
organizations like the UN.
For Evans, much of this skepticism relates to the question of Israel’s capital. In the
second installment of the TippingPoint sermon series, Evans argues that the United Nations will
effectively kickstart Armageddon by “refusing to” recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital
(“Gateway Church Live | What Time is It?” 00:44:26-00:44:33). This refusal is, according to
Evans, due to the intense hatred that the UN feels toward Israel. According to Evans, “[t]he
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United Nations absolutely, totally despises the nation of Israel” (00:45:06-00:45:11) to the extent
that “[y]ou could call the United Nations the ‘Hate Israel’ club” (00:45:37-00:45:40). In a
statement that parallels his argument in Tipping Point that the UN’s opposition to Israel “fulfills
an end time prophecy” (30), Evans instructs audiences that they are living through the start of
Armageddon “right this minute as the United Nations absolutely hates Israel and is doing
everything they can to try to force them into this two-state solution and give up Jerusalem”
(“Gateway Church Live | What Time is It?” 00:48:00-00:48:14). By positioning the UN as
antagonistic to Israel, Evans taps into evangelical audiences’ end-times beliefs, fifty-two percent
of whom report that they support the nation state of Israel because it “is important for fulfilling
biblical prophecy” (LifeWay Research 17). By linking the UN to the Antichrist’s work in the
world, Evans equips evangelicals with ample reason to distrust the UN as a human force for
addressing pressing problems like climate change not just on the international stage, but in the
U.S. though collaborative programs like the Paris Agreement.
Evans is far from alone among apocalyptic evangelical rhetors in his criticism of the UN
and its role in facilitating the end-times. In The Book of Signs: 31 Undeniable Prophecies of the
Apocalypse, David Jeremiah indicates that intergovernmental organizations will play a
significant role in facilitating the apocalypse. However, whereas Evans focuses his criticism on
the UN, Jeremiah also criticizes the European Union. Like Evans, Jeremiah informs his
audiences that they are living through the beginning of the end. “Today,” Jeremiah writes, “the
concentration of power in the European Union signals the beginning of this new world order. . . .
We must not miss this point: the European Union is a prelude to the coming of the Antichrist”
(27). Armed with this prophetic knowledge, Jeremiah encourages his audience “to be vigilant” as
they witness the end-times approach (28). While most critical of the European Union as a
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steppingstone for the Antichrist’s rise to power, Jeremiah also questions the effectiveness of the
United Nations as a symbol for human cooperation across national difference. Taking soviet
sculptor Evgeniy Vuchetich’s sculpture “Let Us Beat Swords into Ploughshares” as an example
(United Nations Gifts), Jeremiah argues that “this sculpture,” located in the United Nations
Garden in New York City, “depicts Isaiah 2:4 and suggests that one of the missions of the United
Nations is converting implements of war into implements of peace and productivity” (372). Yet,
despite its good intentions, “the United Nations has,” according to Jeremiah, “utterly failed in the
attempt. That mission cannot happen by human effort, for the passage in Isaiah talks about the
millennial reign of Christ. He alone can bring peace to the planet” (372). Whereas Evans cites
the UN as a facilitator of Armageddon, Jeremiah offers a no less scathing critique by positioning
the UN’s mission as an ultimately futile endeavor to produce world peace through human means
when such peace can only be achieved through divine intervention through the establishment of a
perfect government on earth to be ruled over by a returned Jesus Christ. In both cases, Evans and
Jeremiah encourage Christian audiences to question the ultimate authority of the UN as a human
force for positive global change, a critique that may predispose evangelicals to distrust UNinformed climate change efforts by challenging the UN’s efficacy altogether.
In The Non-Prophet’s Guide to the End Times, Todd Hampson echoes Evans and
Jeremiah’s warnings about the UN’s role in the end-days. Pointing to conflict in the Middle East
as a sign of the world’s increasing political distress (152-58), Hampson instructs readers that
“[b]ehind the scenes of the economic and geopolitical instability is a growing philosophical and
political push toward a one-world government, currency, and religion” (158). Citing the UN’s
“2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development,” Hampson claims that while the “title makes it
sound like a project involving the care and growth of humanity, . . . this agency, in fact, is one of
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the boldest subversive attempts ever made toward setting up a one-world governing authority”
(159). Significantly, climate action is a key component of the UN’s “2030 Agenda.” “The global
nature of climate change calls,” the document reads, “for the widest possible international
cooperation aimed at accelerating the reduction of global greenhouse gas emissions and
addressing adaptation to the adverse impacts of climate change” (United Nations Department of
Economic and Social Affairs). Yet it is precisely such appeals for the world to unite in its
response to problems like climate change that Hampson (like Evans and Jeremiah) finds so
suspicious. According to Hampson, “There’s no doubt that the UN’s push for some type of oneworld governing body intersects with what Bible prophecy says will take place in the future.
Neither the UN nor the EU are founded on eternal biblical principles. Both are based on
humanism and naturalism—apart from any consideration of a creator, a Savior, or a final judge”
(159). Not only is the UN complicit, according to Hampson, in ushering in a one-world
government and thereby expediting the apocalypse, but its very existence is an affront to God in
that the UN assumes that human beings can unite across the world and fix their problems through
human effort alone. Like Jeremiah in The Book of Signs, Hampson does not believe the UN as a
secular institution can fix a world that can only be saved through divine means.
This brief survey of the recently published apocalyptic evangelical discourse of Evans,
Jeremiah, and Hampson illustrates how the United Nations and intergovernmental bodies in
general are frequently positioned by evangelical apocalyptic rhetors as complicit in the creation
of a one-world government. By encouraging evangelical audiences to internalize the
premillennial genre of apocalyptic Christian discourse, apocalyptic rhetors equip those audiences
with a particular frame through which to make sense of events in the world, whether that event is
climate change or the perceived push for a one-world order. By inviting evangelical audiences to
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participate in this viewpoint, premillennial evangelical rhetors help to circulate an apocalyptic
frame of acceptance in which the UN is positioned as a force of evil in the world, an attitude that
may make UN-connected climate reform efforts within the U.S. less appealing to evangelical
Christians.
That the frame of acceptance circulated by premillennial rhetors like Evans, Jeremiah,
and Hampson has had an impact on their audiences is suggested by a review of the large amount
of discussion that has taken place in response to the publication of their premillennial discourse
on social media forums such as YouTube. By surveying these responses, we can see that
premillennial rhetors’ negative attitudes toward the UN parallel those of many audience
members. This is especially evident in audience responses to Jeremiah’s March 2020 YouTube
publication of a sermon titled “Is the Coronavirus in Bible Prophecy?” in which he assesses the
COVID-19 pandemic from the perspective of end-times theology. At one point in the sermon,
Jeremiah revisits his claim in The Book of Signs that “Satan and the Antichrist would like
nothing better than to have a worldwide plague under way at the beginning of the Tribulation to
further their argument for a one-world government led by a seemingly benevolent, peace-loving
dictator” (242). After quoting this passage, Jeremiah expresses disbelief at how much these
words, originally published in 2019, appear to preempt the pandemic, stating “I’m not a prophet
or the son of the prophet, but that’s a pretty good description of what’s happening” (“Is the
Coronavirus” 00:16:14-00:16:19). While Jeremiah falls short of declaring that the COVID-19
pandemic is a sign of the approaching end-times, by narratively linking the pandemic with
biblical prophecy regarding the Antichrist’s rise to global dominance, Jeremiah uses the strategy
of typology (Brummett 105) to superimpose ancient scripture onto modern day events. By
encouraging audiences to read COVID-19 through the lens of premillennial apocalyptic
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narrative, Jeremiah allows them to feel a sense of empowerment over seemingly chaotic events
by reading such events as components of an overarching divine plan.
One of the effects of interpreting the pandemic through the lens of premillennial
apocalyptic rhetoric is that it encourages audiences to be distrustful of one-world government
and, by extension, intergovernmental organizations like the United Nations that are pivotal in the
fight against climate change. This distrust is vividly illustrated by the response of YouTube user
Chris Here who responds to “Is the Coronavirus” as follows:
There are 50 bible verses about God using EVERYTHING for good. Google up ‘God
using evil for good in bible’ One day, the AntiChrist will rule the whole world under a
one world order or new world order. The Antichrist will rule for 7 years. But guess what?
Do you know who will rule the entire earth for a 1,000 years after that? The whole world
will have a King for a 1,000 years. That’s King Jesus, amen!
In this passage, we can identify two principle apocalyptic appeals at work that are characteristic
of premillennialism. First, Chris Here rearticulates Jeremiah’s assertion, one that is characteristic
of premillennial Christian eschatology, that the establishment of a one-world order is
synonymous with the Antichrist’s rise to power. However, the second, and arguably more
compelling apocalyptic appeal that Chris Here presents is the argument that even the
establishment of a one-world order and the Antichrist’s rule is only the prerequisite for Christ’s
return to earth and millennial rule. In Living in the Shadow of the Second Coming, Timothy P.
Weber explains that, according to the premillennial frame, no matter how chaotic the world
becomes or how desperately humans may try to assert their will upon the cosmos, “[i]n the end,
they will all be cast feebly aside by the word of Christ” as he returns to earth to establish his
perfected kingdom, one that no human collaboration could ever hope to produce (102). Far from
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fostering “otherworldly” passivity toward the problems of this world (Veldman 218)—whether
the coronavirus pandemic or climate change—Chris Here’s statement illustrates how the
premillennial discourse circulated by popular rhetors like Jeremiah equips its audiences with
attitudes through which to make sense of those problems, attitudes that delineate what earthly
agents are to be supported and which are to be vilified. Indeed, it would seem that possibility
itself—the possibility of earthly reform and earthly improvement—is delimited by the cast of
characters set forth in the premillennial set piece that Jeremiah offers his audiences.
As a form of rhetorical action, or what Burke terms “symbolic action,” premillennial
discourse is far from passive and acts upon audiences by shaping their attitudes toward realworld events (“Terministic Screens” 44). In this sense, premillennialism constitutes a
“terministic screen” by equipping audiences with a “particular nomenclature” and encouraging
them to use that symbolic vocabulary to classify their experience (47). As Burke explains, once
an audience is equipped with such a symbol system, they “may proceed to track down the kinds
of observation implicit in the terminology” they “have chosen, whether” that “choice of terms
was deliberate or spontaneous” (47). Having internalized the premillennial genre/symbol
system/frame of acceptance, Chris Here proceeds to circulate premillennial discourse for others
to internalize, thereby facilitating the replication of the premillennial thinking characteristic of
many evangelical apocalyptic rhetors. And while Chris Here provides an especially overt
example of premillennial apocalyptic rhetoric being used as a frame of acceptance by audiences,
similarly negative references to an imminent one-world order from such YouTube users as
BloodMoon (“I see a ONE WORLD GOVERNMENT !”) and Winter Solstice (“Sure enough, I
think it was yesterday, former u.k. prime minister was calling for a temporary one world
government.”) further illustrate that fears of a one-world order grounded in premillennial
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apocalyptic Christian belief continue to circulate among evangelical audiences and provide a
symbolic system through which current affairs are made sensible. The kinds of resistance that
premillennialism fosters toward intergovernmental organizations such as the UN helps to further
circumscribe the range of attitudes and behaviors believers may adopt toward climate change and
climate reform.
Whether stated explicitly in the form of Thunberg’s calls to action and Democrats’
decision to rejoin the Paris Agreement or implicitly in the form of Biden’s reiterations of UNcollated climate science, climate reformers often encourage audiences to embrace
intergovernmental organizations like the UN as the world and the United States’ best chance to
mitigate climate change. While such appeals to the United Nations may be authoritative for
audiences who believe in climate reform as an inherently global effort, they are challenged by
the competing symbol system embodied in premillennial evangelicalism, which maintains an
active distrust of intergovernmental organizations as the basis for one-world government. Indeed,
it may be precisely such premillennial narratives of a one-world order that help to explain why
Hayhoe and Farley do not mention the United Nations at all in A Climate for Change, despite the
fact that they frequently reference the UN-organized IPCC as the scientific authority on climate
change (68-73). Originally published in 2009, A Climate for Change sought to engage
evangelicals in climate reform in the aftermath of Tim LaHaye and Jerry B. Jenkins’ bestselling
Left Behind series, in which the Antichrist, Nicolae Carpathia, rises to power by taking over the
United Nations, disarming the world, establishing a single global currency, and, eventually,
forging a one-world government or what Carpathia terms “a global village” (Left Behind 274).
Likewise, in the original 1999 publication of Are We Living in the End Times?, LaHaye and
Jenkins punctuate the narrative of Left Behind by asserting that they “are convinced that unless
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God intervenes, the one-worlders will not give up until they make the United Nations the ruling
force of the world by at least 2025—and maybe much sooner!” (170 [1999]). With such negative
representations of the UN circulating among evangelical audiences, it is not only unsurprising
that Hayhoe and Farley omit references to the UN in A Climate for Change, but rhetorically
savvy. However, this omission begs the question: “How are evangelicals to support the wideranging and rapid reforms demanded by climate change when the very name of the UN, a key
architect of this reform, is anathema to many evangelicals?”

Progress Narratives Not Grounded in Faith
As suggested by Jeremiah and Hampson’s critiques of the UN, as well as YouTube user
Chris Here’s correlation of one-world government with the Antichrist’s rise to power, one of the
reasons that intergovernmental organizations like the UN are so distrusted by premillennial
evangelical rhetors is that, according to the premillennial apocalyptic frame, no human or
community of humans can solve the world’s problems but only make them worse. As Daniel
Wojcik explains in The End of the World as We Know it,
Premillennialists assert that an inherently sinful world can be redeemed only through
catastrophe and supernatural intervention. Holding that the imminent return of Christ is
the only means of rectifying the world’s problems, premillennialists believe that a
thousand-year reign of peace on earth [the millennium] will be established after Christ
returns [the Second Coming]. (35)
This is not to suggest, however, that premillennial evangelicals do not believe in humanity’s
ability to better understand and affect the world through science and industry. Recent
premillennial Christian discourse is littered with examples of apocalyptic rhetors emphasizing

145
the validity and importance of scientific practice. For instance, Jeremiah reassures audiences that
“if there’s anybody gonna find the answer to these diseases [malaria and the coronavirus], our
medical people will do it, and there’s certainly great hope” (“Is the Coronavirus” 00:29:5800:30:05). Likewise, Evans registers amazement at humanity’s “phenomenal growth in
knowledge” in recent decades (Tipping Point 164) and repeatedly appeals to the authority of
astronomical knowledge, in particular (69-81). Hampson, too, acknowledges the power of
“[h]uman imagination” to innovate unprecedented “technological advancements” (194), thereby
making the “once-imagined technologies” of fictional shows like The Jetsons “a reality for us”
(193). LaHaye and Jenkins, too, suggest that “[t]hese are easily the most exciting days to be
alive,” in part, “because of the breathtaking advances in technology and science” (Are We Living
ix [2011]), and they even “quote secular scientists” to identify parallels between premillennial
prophecy and mainstream science in order to generate authority for their apocalyptic
pronouncements (24). In all these cases, premillennial evangelical apocalyptic rhetors
acknowledge the ability of secular scientists to discover knowledge about the world, knowledge
that can then be used to make changes in the world in order to benefit human beings.
Far from being anti-science or anti-progress, premillennial evangelical rhetors make
substantial use of scientific research and language in their prophetic writings. As discussed in
Chapter Three, apocalyptic rhetors often generate authority for their arguments by constructing a
chain of reasoning in which the rhetor’s apocalyptic prediction or argument is immediately or
gradually linked to the authority of a “grounding text” (scripture or a scientific study, for
instance) that will be accepted by their audience (Brummett 99). While the secular climate
reformers explored in Chapter Three largely ground their claims in the authority of secular texts
like the IPCC’s scientific data or intergovernmental texts like the Paris Agreement or even
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Democratic texts like the Green New Deal, premillennial evangelical authors “fetch the political
out of the sacred” by interpreting prophetic scripture in order to instruct audiences on what
attitudes and behaviors they should adopt in response to a world that, for many evangelicals,
feels like it is rapidly spinning out of control, a world that can only be corrected through divine
power (110). Given evangelicals’ emphasis on “sola scriptura,” or “the insistence on [the] wordfor-word inerrancy” of the Bible and its central importance in Christian life (Greeley and Hout
13), it is not surprising that premillennial rhetors would draw from scripture as the primary
source of evidence for their claims. Far from contradicting biblical authority, however, the use of
secular scientific texts in premillennial discourse serves the purpose of another core evangelical
value: leading the unsaved to Christ. In The Truth about Conservative Christians, Andrew
Greeley and Michael Hout explain that Conservative Christians—a category the authors use to
denote theologically conservative Christian denominations like the Southern Baptists and
Pentecostals, denominations that include many of the evangelicals discussed in this chapter (8)—
believe that “it is their duty to” spread the word of salvation through being “‘born again’” by
accepting Jesus as one’s personal savior (16). Toward that end, premillennial rhetors have
frequently incorporated secular authorities to persuade the unsaved. Even as far back as 1970,
Hal Lindsey sought to engage religious skeptics by admitting that “[t]here are other places men
search for answers: philosophy, meditation, changing environment, science. . . . all of these are
good if used properly” (Lindsey and Carlson 6). However, while premillennial rhetors may use
secular texts to reinforce their authority with lay audiences, they do so with an important caveat:
any authority possessed by a secular text will always be subordinate to the divine authority of
scriptural truth. This interplay between secular and scriptural authority within premillennial
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evangelical discourse belies the profound distrust many premillennialists feel toward secular
society, distrust that finds frequent expression in evangelical apocalyptic discourse.
Even as premillennial evangelical rhetors make use of authoritative secular texts, they
frequently warn audiences about the rise of secularism in the U.S., which is represented as a
concerted attempt to diminish the authority of Christianity and a sign of the approaching endtimes. In The Book of Signs, Jeremiah observes that “the godless spirit of the age” in which we
live hearkens back to the “Babylon” of old (55). One especially insidious feature of this
godlessness is the “rising tide of humanist secularism” within “America’s educational system”
(90). This secularism “has,” according to Jeremiah, “become America’s de facto religion” by
rejecting God’s authority (90). For Jeremiah, this modern-day rejection is only a continuation of
the original rebellion against God by Adam and Eve, an archetypal rejection that unleashed
chaos and decay into the world. Because “God’s personal purity supplies a moral baseline for the
universe and provides the guidelines by which we live healthy and holy lives,” any system of
thought or action that is not grounded in God is doomed to make things worse (91). “Anything
that comes before Jesus Christ in your affections or priorities—that is your idol” (92). Indeed, it
is, according to Jeremiah, such idolatry, such rejection of divine authority, that necessitated an
end to the world in the first place, for “[e]ver since humanity rejected God’s authority, there has
been an ever-present, lurking, persistent, dark force poised to invade the human heart given the
slightest opening—a force that is pushing the world toward a cataclysmic end of ruin and
destruction” (311). For Jeremiah, the world only needs to end because humanity corrupted it
through original sin. As such, every rejection of God through the embrace of a non-faith-based
knowledge system—like that which characterizes the secular climate reform discourse explored
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in Chapter Three—effectively recreates the Fall all over again, thereby making apocalypse even
more necessary.
When humans act without faith, they may appear to ease their burdens at first, but they
are, according to the premillennial view, ultimately doomed to make things worse. In Tipping
Point, Evans recites a passage from the Olivet discourse, in which Jesus warns his disciples that,
“[a]s were the days of Noah, so will be the coming of the Son of man” (New Oxford Annotated
Bible, Matt. 24.37). Evans instructs readers that in this passage, Jesus “was referring to some of
the events we know about in this corrupt and immoral world that treats sin as ‘business as
usual’” and will, as in the days of Noah and the Great Flood, further necessitate God’s ultimate
cleansing (destruction) of human society (Tipping Point 187). Evans goes on to wonder if Jesus
is also “referring to the demonic attraction humans have to altering their genetic line” (187)—a
practice that has biblical precedent in the “nephilim” (181), a race of giants produced through the
mating of fallen angels and human women (181-83)—“through methods such as cloning, genetic
modification, and transhumanism” (187). By recounting the stories of Noah and the nephilim and
linking them to Christ’s Olivet discourse, Evans draws a parallel between these texts and the
modern-day phenomenon of human genetic modification. Through these textual connections,
Evans transfers (Brummett 109) scriptural authority to the final link in his premillennial
argument:
Human seed is sacred. We are made in the image of God, and we have no right to try to
improve upon or manipulate what He has done. Yes, good people can access medical
technology to help or cure others. However, arrogant humans should not try to take the
place of God in an attempt to improve and immortalize themselves. There is only one
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God, and we are not Him. Human seed should be left untouched. (Evans, Tipping Point
187)
Even as Evans acknowledges the potential benefits of technology to address illness, he suggests
that such technology, pursued without restraint, can become an expression of human arrogance
and constitute a rejection of God altogether. In another nod to a secular grounding text, Evans
invokes the authority of “Dr. Malcolm from Jurassic Park. Our efforts to replace God in the
creation of humans is doomed to failure. There is but one way to ensure immortality, and it
comes from embracing God—not replacing Him” (175). By suggesting that such genetic
modification may fulfill one of Christ’s signs of the end-times, Evans instructs his audience that,
more than an expression of human arrogance, the unrestricted pursuit of technology may also
serve to fulfill one of the signs Christ offered for the Second Coming. Ultimately, it is not
through human ingenuity but divine grace that the problems of the world, including human
illness, will be cured.
Just as intergovernmental organizations like the UN cannot save mankind but only make
matters worse, any human effort to resolve the world’s problems is ultimately doomed to fail
because these problems are the result of original sin, “the curse” that humanity inflicted upon
itself through its archetypal decision to rebel against God (Jeremiah, “Book” 402), and cannot be
fixed by human beings but only through divine action. In premillennial Christian discourse, this
divine action takes the form of the end-times and the establishment of a millennial kingdom, the
only perfect government the earth will ever see, to be ruled by Christ following the Second
Coming. In The End Times in Chronological Order: A Complete Overview to Understanding
Bible Prophecy, Ron Rhodes describes the millennial kingdom that Jesus will create: “In short,
Christ’s government will yield an ideal climate for living on earth. Christ will succeed where all
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human governments have failed!” (201). Whereas “humanism, materialism, and hedonism are
three of the most prominent philosophies in our world today” (103), the millennial kingdom will
see society perfected, not through human progress, but through “the perfect government of
Christ,” a system in which “all outward rebellion will be stopped instantly” through divine power
(206). As with Jeremiah and Evans, Rhodes does not hold out hope for humanity to solve its own
problems, at least through purely human means. It is only through divine agency that the ills of
the world can be resolved. As a rhetorical frame through which evangelicals are encouraged to
make sense of perceived conflict in the world, premillennialism positions all worldly problems as
what Jesus describes in the Olivet discourse as “the beginning of the birth-pangs” (New Oxford
Annotated Bible, Matt. 24.8), or end-times “signs” that “are,” according to Evans, “intensifying,
like labor pains that are announcing the birth of a child” (217). Within this narrative, it is only
through the birth of this child—through the effective rebirth of Christ in the world through his
Second Coming—that the consequences of humanity’s original fall will ever be remedied.
In addition to not believing that human forces are equipped to resolve the world’s
underlying problems, progress narratives that are not grounded in faith may also alienate
evangelicals by playing into feelings of persecution by a secular world. Evans embodies this
sense of persecution when he attempts to comfort readers who “have been mocked for” their
Christian beliefs (Tipping Point 226). “Your family or friends may be laughing at you, even as
you read this book. They may think you are weird because you believe in Jesus and His return”
(226). In this passage, Evans “articulates the typically premillennial sense of oppression, of being
a minority” that characterizes the discourse of premillennial apocalyptic rhetors (Brummett 125).
Armed with this sense of having access to a singular truth, indeed, the one truth that really
matters, any system of thought or practice that is not grounded in the truth of salvation through
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Christ may be perceived as an attempt to undermine the spirit of God working in the world and,
therefore, a source of persecution. If we take Evans, Jeremiah, Hampson, and Rhodes’
premillennial apocalyptic discourse and classify it according to its “strategies,” as Burke
recommends we do in “Literature as Equipment for Living” (303), then we might conclude that it
equips audiences with a set of attitudes through which to ameliorate their perceived persecution
in the world by transmuting that persecution into a sign of divine providence (304). Equipped
with this attitude, the perceived increase of secularism in the world corresponds with an
increased sense of faith-based persecution, and it is this sense of accelerated persecution that, in
turn, leads some believers to joyfully anticipate Christ’s imminent return, with YouTube user
Thomas LaPeer stating in the live chat of Evans’ “Gateway Church Live | August 8–9” Tipping
Point sermon, “oh GOD i want to be where You are oh LORD JESUS,” Deborah Amy replying,
“Me too!! Please Lord Jesus, please come soon!”, and Gilberto Sanchez commenting “who ever
[sic] wants to stay for the tribulation, you may stay, but Iam [sic] leaving at the sound of the
trumpet at the rapture!!!” In a world that feels like it is getting progressively worse, a perception
that will likely be intensified by the mounting effects of climate change, premillennial
apocalyptic narratives offer hope in the face of hopelessness. Such desires to escape the world’s
suffering are in line with the message of the apocalyptic rhetors explored in this chapter. This is
poignantly illustrated by Evans, who states, “I have been accused of being an escapist, and I
openly admit that I am. . . . He [Jesus] is telling us to pray that we will [sic] rescued by Him in
the Rapture and escape all the judgments of the Tribulation. Yes, I’m an escapist, but I’m an
obedient escapist!” (Tipping Point 107). Evaluated according to such apocalyptic logics, the
eager anticipation of Christ’s return is not only reasonable but can even be considered a
measurement of one’s faith.
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Yet the link between secularism and persecution can be a vicious circle as it suggests that
even the perceived absence of true Christian principles in the world is a source of persecution
and, therefore, a sign of the end-times. This conspiratorial reading of secularism in the world is
further evidenced by Hampson’s discussion of climate change. According to Hampson, when the
Rapture occurs “the restraining influence of the church and the Holy Spirit” will be
instantaneously removed from the world, allowing “hellish forces” to “break loose on earth with
supernatural lying signs and wonders” (182). Following the Rapture, the Antichrist and his
agents “will need answers” to explain to those who remain why all true-believing Christians have
suddenly disappeared (182). The narrative that the forces of Satan invent to explain the Rapture
is what Hampson calls “the lie,” a systematic effort to conceal the divine reality of the Rapture
event, a lie that we are “being groomed for” right now (182). Among the possible narratives
through which the world is encouraged to internalize this “strong delusion,” Hampson identifies
climate change (182). Hampson instructs readers that
[i]n a lead-up to the deception—in whatever form it takes—culture is already beginning
to adhere to upside-down ideas. For example, in some political circles, climate change is
seen as a greater danger than Islamic terrorism. . . . These current delusions show how the
world is being conditioned to accept illogical ideas en masse prior to the tribulation
period. More and more, logic and common sense are being thrown out the window. (18283)
Even at the time of this writing, the world is, according to Hampson, being conditioned to accept
the demonic narratives that will serve to conceal the divine nature of the imminent Rapture of the
Church. And while Hampson references climate change as an example of what this deception
may look like, climate change is merely a stand-in for any ideological frame, any arrangement of
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attitudes and behaviors that privileges the knowledge of human beings and the concerns of this
world over the always pressing reality of Christ’s return and the ever-present need for salvation
through divine grace.
Like their distrust of the United Nations, Jeremiah, Evans, Rhodes, and Hampson’s
distrust of the secular world and its narratives of human progress are echoed by many of their
audience members. In response to the first installment of Evans’ Tipping Point sermon series at
Gateway Church, YouTube user Carl Coop encourages fellow audience members to “Please read
the word for yourselves, ask the questions to God, why did Jesus repeat ’let [sic] NO MAN
(emphasis mine) deceive you.. [sic] Check out the scriptures and go not to the left or right but
stay on the narrow road” (“Gateway Church Live | August 8–9”). Through this statement, Carl
Coop reiterates Evans’ narratives of distrust regarding the secular world and reinforces the
evangelical value of sola scriptura, the Bible as the sole source of real authority in the world.
Likewise, after thanking Evans for his message on “what will transpire in the not so distant [sic]
future,” Rosa Brooks recaps the story of Noah, observing that “[i]t’s possible that all doubters
may well have to go through the tribulation period. Why? Because they aren’t looking for Jesus
before hand [sic].” Rosa Brooks concludes her comment with an imploration to Evans’—and
now her own—audience: “Folks, lets [sic] get those oil lamps trimmed and ready!” Like Carl
Coop, Rosa Brooks casts doubt upon the secular world of “doubters” whose attention to worldly
affairs causes them to miss out on what is to be the most important event of their lives: the
imminent Rapture of the saved. In a tone that is reminiscent of Carl Coop’s response, YouTube
user Mike Purvis replies to Jeremiah’s sermon “Is the Coronavirus in Bible Prophecy?” by
suggesting that “[t]he spirit of the antichrist appears to be conquering and bringing all of its allies
together during this time—the beginning of sorrows. With the appearance of the corona virus
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[sic] we see that the rider on the first seal appears to have been given a crown. For the record,
corona also means ‘crown.’” In this statement, Mike Purvis not only interprets the COVID-19
pandemic as an explicit event within premillennial end-times chronology, but he encourages
audiences to interpret world events, perhaps even nations’ responses to the pandemic, as to some
degree orchestrated by the Antichrist. Far from being a passive audience for Evans and
Jeremiah’s premillennialist teachings, Rosa Brooks, Carl Coop, and Mike Purvis illustrate the
extent to which believing audiences may take such apocalyptic narratives and use them as
interpretive frameworks for making sense of the world, especially those aspects of the world that
are most disruptive and distressing. And while Rosa Brooks, Carl Coop, and Mike Purvis are
responding primarily to the threat of the coronavirus pandemic, the premillennial logics they help
to circulate equip audiences with a frame of acceptance that has the potential to undermine
secular responses to other pressing societal problems, including climate change. Whether it is the
coronavirus pandemic or climate change, the premillennial interpretations these audience
members arrive at do not hold out much hope for the ability of secular institutions—humanity in
general—to adequately address perceived problems in the world.
Through the Tipping Point and “Facing Uncertain Times with David Jeremiah” series of
sermons, Evans and Jeremiah, respectively, have sought to provide their audiences with
premillennial narratives for making sense of the chaotic events around them, especially during
the spring and summer 2020 stage of the coronavirus pandemic. Evans and Jeremiah offer
audiences both overtly apocalyptic narratives that evaluate the coronavirus pandemic in the
context of scripture on the end-times, as well as implicitly apocalyptic narratives that use
scriptural logics to instruct audiences on how to interpret the chaotic events unfolding around
them. Far from being mutually exclusive discourses, overt and implicit apocalyptic discourse
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functions for many evangelical audiences as one cohesive, logical system through which the
world is interpreted.
While much premillennial Christian rhetoric focuses on overtly apocalyptic events like
the Rapture, the Tribulation, the Second Coming, the Millennium, Armageddon, the Final
Judgment, and the recreation of a perfected earth and cosmos (Wojcik 35), Brummett explains
that for religious apocalyptic traditions like the premillennialism maintained by many
evangelicals, “apocalyptic . . . is a mode of thought and discourse that empowers its audience to
live in a time of disorientation and disorder by revealing to them a fundamental plan within the
cosmos” (9). For the climate reformers explored in Chapter Three, the perceived inability of
current systems to adequately respond to climate change prompted a discourse of secular
premillennialism, in which it is argued that current systems must be overthrown and replaced
with ones that will facilitate the production of a new, more climate conscious millennial order.
Likewise, for the premillennial evangelical rhetors considered in this chapter, as well as for many
of their audience members, perceived disruptions to the status quo (a divine order of things that
was corrupted through original sin and continues to be negated again and again through sinful
human action) are made sensible and responded to via a premillennial apocalyptic narrative, in
which the secular systems of this world are deemed inadequate to resolve pressing problems—
especially problems like the coronavirus and climate change that are global in nature—because
such problems are ultimately a symptom of the spiritual depravity of the world and are
inevitable. In either case, the world as it currently exists must be effectively destroyed in order to
make way for a new one, or at least a substantially improved one, in which the problems of this
world are either resolved completely (as in the case of premillennial Christian rhetoric) or at least
significantly improved (as in the case of premillennial climate reform rhetoric). And while
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Hampson is the only premillennial rhetor that overtly encourages audiences to distrust climate
reform as a steppingstone for the Antichrist’s rise to power, the more generalized and persistent
premillennial distrust of human institutions and humanity’s ability to resolve the world’s
problems encourages evangelical audiences to internalize a regime of attitudes and practices that
do not appear to be conducive to the secular climate reform efforts considered in Chapter Three.
At best, the lukewarm regard for human agency demonstrated by Jeremiah, Evans, Hampson,
and LaHaye and Jenkins may encourage audiences to adopt an equally lukewarm commitment to
the very human and often secular institutions and organizations that make up the most visible
efforts of the climate reform movement within the United States.

Lukewarm Millennialism
While it is likely that evangelicals’ premillennial belief that human institutions cannot
adequately resolve the world’s problems may influence their attitudes towards climate change
and climate change reform, this does not mean that these evangelical audiences do not care about
such issues at all. Veldman has demonstrated that such an end-time apathy hypothesis does not
account for the complexity of evangelical Christians’ perspectives on the environment and
climate change. Far from being apathetic to environmental concerns, Veldman’s subjects
demonstrated a “‘practical environmentalism,’” in which “they maintained that human treatment
of the natural world should be governed by common sense, in keeping with local mores,
apolitical, enacted at the individual level, locally scaled, and proudly anthropocentric” (48).
Veldman goes on to explain that what environmentalists like Al Gore (26), scholars like
Roderick Nash (27), and commentators like Bill Moyers (219-220) have interpreted as
“indifference” toward the environment among evangelicals may actually reflect “the poor fit
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between the kinds of approaches and concerns that environmentalists tend to emphasize” and
evangelicals’ “religious and cultural mores” (48). Such conflicting values include
environmentalists’ frequent emphasis on “activism,” a behavior that evangelicals may consider
“socially disruptive,” as well as environmentalists’ calls “for structural or global solutions,” a
perspective that can conflict with evangelicals’ “preference for individual or local-level
solutions” and for the practice of “leaving global problems to God” (48). Far from being the
singular expression of premillennial Christian theology, Veldman argues that evangelicals’
tendency to resist environmental reform efforts like those currently being directed at climate
change is the result of the Christian Right’s politicization of climate change via a long and highly
developed media campaign (220-21). In other words, evangelicals’ resistance to environmental
issues like climate change is not so much a reflection of their lack of concern for the
environment, but more a rejection of how such concerns are not made relevant for evangelical
audiences.
The problem of evangelical resistance to climate change is, for Veldman, not one of
apocalyptic belief, but proper messaging. Even “[t]oday, Christian radio continues to bind the
evangelical community while also helping to set white traditionalist evangelicals’ social and
political agenda” (221). And while “[e]vironmentalists have a compelling message, . . . the
movement has relied heavily on the secular mainstream media to cover its efforts and convey its
messages” (221). “A long-term strategy for environmental resurgence may need to include
finding new ways to activate this silent majority [of evangelicals]—who do not want to drink
polluted water, breathe polluted air, or put the health of their children at risk because of lax
environmental enforcement” (221). Veldman’s assessment reiterates that of Susanna Priest, who
observes in Communicating Climate Change: The Path Forward that to successfully mitigate
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global warming, “people must be motivated to donate their time, effort, money, skills, social
contacts, or other resources to the movement,” motivation that must be fostered through
communicative strategies that successfully engage audiences (152). Also like Veldman, Priest
suggests that in order to generate sufficient consensus and motivation to move forward with
climate reform in the U.S., environmentalists “should not assume” that religious groups, even
those associated with “the political right,” “are negative about climate but instead might look for
places to connect climate concerns as directly as possible with elements of their worldviews”
(58). “People must,” Priest observes, “trust the sources from which they learn about climate
change for this information to be effective” (56). In light of evangelicals’ tendency to display
decreased concern for climate change than the rest of the U.S. population, the outstanding
question appears to be, what would a successful model of climate reform messaging look like for
this particular audience, and who is best poised to deliver it?
A model of climate reform messaging that would be successful with evangelicals would
likely need to present the findings of climate scientists and the necessary steps toward climate
reform using language and appeals that resonate with (and do not alienate) evangelicals’
worldviews. As far as who is best poised to deliver this message, an obvious choice would be the
climate scientist and self-identified evangelical Christian, Katharine Hayhoe. As Hayhoe
describes in Saving Us: A Climate Scientist’s Case for Hope and Healing in a Divided World,
growing up in Colombia while her parents performed mission work (21) helped her to
understand from an early age how vulnerable populations in Colombia and across the globe are
impacted by the effects of climate change, an experience that inspired Hayhoe to specialize in
climate science (22). Equipped with the combined resources of climate science, personal
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experience, and evangelical Christian faith, Hayhoe is well positioned to foster more sustainable
climate attitudes and practices among her evangelical audiences.
As previously discussed, Von Bergen and Mannon point to Hayhoe as having the
rhetorical potential to bridge the gap between the appeals of climate reform and climate science
and the theological and cultural norms of evangelicals. According to Von Bergen and Mannon,
Hayhoe’s
work creates possibility, envisioning alternative, hopeful models of faith expansive
enough to include climate change—models that may, eventually, take root. Hayhoe’s
approach, inhabiting familiar landscapes of faith but widening their horizons, offers a
model for other contexts where rhetors might successfully connect with resistant publics
using invitational approaches that recognize the relevance of their standpoint and
expertise.
One way that Hayhoe tailors her climate change discourse for evangelicals is to offset the
perception that she is attempting to cultivate fear among her audiences regarding the pressing
and increasingly devastating impacts of climate change. Veldman observes that many of the
evangelicals she studied “tended to associate all environmentalists with extremism, going too far,
and radicalism” (121), all associations that participate in the broader histories of U.S.
environmentalists being “dismissed as morose naysayers, ‘doom prophets’ who have no faith in
the American Dream and no concrete plan for ‘doing it better’” (Killingsworth and Palmer,
EcoSpeak 261) and as falling prey to “‘environmentalist hysteria’” (Killingsworth and Palmer,
“The Discourse of ‘Environmentalist Hysteria’” 2). As an evangelical and climate reform rhetor
who seeks to engage evangelicals on climate change, Hayhoe is careful to frame her narratives in
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ways that do not activate this fear of environmentalist extremism. One way that Hayhoe avoids
this stereotype is by explicitly instructing audiences to not feel fear in the face of climate change.
In a message delivered to The Meeting House—a church in Ontario, Canada that
identifies itself as primarily Anabaptist, with evangelicalism as one of its primary influences (Be
in Christ Church of Canada)—Hayhoe reassures audiences that the proper response to climate
change is not fear at all, but action. Commenting on the persistence of fear-based climate change
narratives in the media, Hayhoe places herself in the role of her audience, a community of
believers attempting to make sense of a phenomenon that is often articulated in apocalyptic
terms:
Every time I look at the headlines, the headlines are full of fear. They are full of disaster.
‘We are underestimating the impacts.’ ‘Global sea levels are rising faster.’ ‘Devastating
wildfires are plaguing Australia as we speak.’ We look at these headlines, and they fill us
with fear. But here is where what we believe comes in. Because we have a litmus test,
written by the apostle Paul to Timothy, and that litmus test tells us this. It tells us very
simply that God has not given us a spirit of fear. So if we feel fear, if we respond out of
fear, that fear is not coming from God. (“Christians and Climate Change” 00:34:3100:35:15)
Through this scripture-based statement, Hayhoe encourages audiences to not feel fear regarding
climate change and suggests that such fear is not encouraged by God, but a result of not trusting
in God completely. Rather than respond with fear, Hayhoe encourages Christian audiences to
take action in response to climate change, whether that action is in the form of “big solutions”
(00:36:24-00:36:25) like supporting the efforts of organizations like “Climate Caretakers”
(00:37:36-00:37:37)—which encourages Christians to join together in the fight against climate
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change—“reducing our food waste” (00:36:43-00:36:44), and “improving agriculture”
(00:37:11-00:37:12), or in the form of individual actions like using more energy-efficient
lightbulbs and recycling (00:39:04-00:39:06), choosing to “eat lower down the food chain” by
decreasing meat consumption, especially beef (00:39:17-00:39:18), opting for solar energy
(00:39:54), or driving electric cars (00:39:58). Rather than fostering a sense of fear among her
audience and advocating ‘extremist’ reforms to mitigate the escalating effects of climate change,
Hayhoe presents her audience with manageable strategies for cultivating more climate-conscious
behaviors while also dipping their toes into the community-based climate reform actions
characteristic of the climate reform movement writ large.
By taking the findings of climate science and the actions of climate reform and
combining them with evangelical cultural logics, Hayhoe packages climate reform in ways that
have the potential to inspire greater evangelical commitment to the fight against climate change.
Yet, even as Hayhoe communicates the findings and implications of climate science from a
deeply evangelical perspective, audience perceptions of Hayhoe as an evangelical climate reform
rhetor are heavily gendered. As a woman taking on an authoritative role within the evangelical
community, Hayhoe resists the limitations that have circumscribed women’s participation in the
Church. As Mannon explains, “evangelical culture discourages or prohibits women’s preaching”
(148), including within such denominations as the Southern Baptist Convention (146). As
Mannon indicates, much of this resistance to women’s leadership within the church is due to the
influence of “[c]omplementarianism,” or the belief that men and women’s God-given virtues
better equip men for religious leadership and women for managing the home life (146). Like the
women evangelical writers Mannon discusses in “Xvangelical,” Hayhoe’s embodiment as a
woman in the male-dominated spaces of the evangelical Church—especially as a woman who
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communicates from a position of scientific and scriptural expertise—participates in “long
debates about gender and authority” within the evangelical community (150). As an evangelical
climate reform rhetor, Hayhoe communicates within “a religious culture that still limits
[women’s] opportunities to teach and speak” (150). Mannon’s findings are echoed by Von
Bergen and Mannon, who suggest that the two primary obstacles to Hayhoe’s efforts to engage
evangelicals on climate change are “her gender and the increasing influence of politics on faith”
(“Talking Climate Faith”). Von Bergen and Mannon go on to observe that “Hayhoe’s gender
marginalizes her—and other evangelical women who publicly exercise rhetorical agency—
within evangelical communities.” In addition to the many challenges that premillennial ideology
may pose to climate reformers as they strive to mobilize U.S. citizens to engage in meaningful
climate action, Von Bergen and Mannon’s research highlights how evangelicals’ reception of
such discourse is mediated by gender, as well. When we consider that so many of the climate
reformers discussed in this project are women, we come to better appreciate the complex and
uneven resistance that many members of the evangelical community present toward the climate
reform movement within the United States. No matter how nuanced a climate reform message
Thunberg or Hayhoe may create, many evangelicals will likely interpret that message through
the prism of gender as it has been defined within the evangelical tradition, thereby defusing the
persuasive power of Thunberg and Hayhoe’s environmental discourse.
Even after accounting for the negative influence of gender on evangelicals’ reception of
Hayhoe’s climate reform discourse, Hayhoe continues to stand out as one of the most promising
ambassadors of climate science for evangelicals precisely because she is able to ground climate
change communication within values and beliefs of evangelicals in ways that secular climate
reformers such as Thunberg would likely find difficult or would be reluctant to do at all.
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However, while Hayhoe may help to make climate change and climate action less threatening to
U.S. evangelicals, it is unclear if such narratives are sufficient to override the influence of
premillennial thinking on many evangelicals’ understanding of societal problems like climate
change. Specifically, by encouraging audiences to adopt what amounts to a moderate response to
climate change, Hayhoe rearticulates a line of thought that premillennial evangelical rhetors
often use to justify, not active reform, not “otherworldly indifference” (Veldman 218), but a
lukewarm orientation to the world in which human beings are tasked to improve conditions in a
moderate and limited fashion. Lying somewhere between the expansive (and secular) calls for
climate reform explored in Chapter Three and the complete disregard or even celebration of
climate change as a sign of the end-times articulated by Veldman’s hot millennialists (74),
Hayhoe’s climate change messaging, at least as it is directed at evangelical Christians, is one of
environmental moderation. Whether taking the form of the “gradual implementation” of more
stringent standards to reduce industry emissions on a national level (Hayhoe and Farley 155) or
“slowly and subtly altering our lifestyle” to reduce emissions on an individual and community
level (144), Hayhoe presents evangelical audiences with a climate reform model grounded in
“common sense, not radical activism” (154). While Hayhoe actively seeks to encourage climate
reform action among evangelical audiences, her tendency to couch such appeals in the language
of moderation is not likely to foster the expansive and rapid societal changes that the IPCC states
are needed to avoid the disastrous consequences of global warming in excess of 1.5°C. And
when we further consider that the amount of emissions that must be reduced annually in order to
achieve 2.0°C or 1.5°C of warming have respectively doubled and quintupled, as well as the
finding that “[f]ailure to significantly reduce global emissions by 2030 will make it impossible to
keep global warming below 1.5°C” (United Nations Environment Programme xxi), we must
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begin to question whether Hayhoe’s message of climate reform moderation is sufficient to bring
about the changes needed to avoid catastrophic climate change. Like Hayhoe, premillennial
apocalyptic discourse may also encourage audiences to adopt not environmental apathy, but a
lukewarm approach to environmental issues like climate change, an orientation that does not
foster the urgency of action embodied in either the secular climate reform discourse discussed in
Chapter Three or the IPCC reports in which that discourse is grounded.
One of the most significant challenges that premillennial evangelical discourse poses to
climate change reform is, ironically, embodied in oft-repeated variations of a phrase that, on its
surface, sounds like it should foster environmental stewardship. This is the phrase, “plan like
Jesus isn’t coming back for 100 years but live like He is coming back today!” (Evans, Tipping
Point 223). At first glance, this statement seems to encourage audiences to remain engaged in the
world even as they spiritually prepare themselves for the imminent return of Christ and the
instantaneous Rapture of the Church. Yet, while stated differently by different premillennial
rhetors, the underlying meaning remains much the same: this world is not your home, and its
concerns are secondary to that of salvation in Christ. That this premillennial orientation can
impact evangelicals’ attitudes toward environmental issues is suggested by Jeremiah’s
observation that “Christians are—or should be—in a proper sense, the world’s best ecologists.
We realize that God loves the world He has made, and from the beginning, back in Genesis 2:15,
we’re told that we are responsible for this planet, to ‘tend and keep it’” (404). While this
statement may seem to actively encourage evangelicals to care for the environment and, by
extension, combat problems like climate change, any such activist connotation is quickly
undercut by Jeremiah’s statement that “the beauties of our world—the hills, the plains, the
mountains, the oceans, the spangling vault of heaven—are like appetizers that whet our appetite
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for the main course, for God’s new creation” (404), a creation that will only come into being
when the world that currently exists and the universe it exists within crumble “like an old house
in flames” (394). While Jeremiah does not actively discourage evangelicals from caring for the
environment, any such concern is counterbalanced by the always pressing awareness that this
world is doomed to fall apart, indeed, must fall apart for a perfected world to replace it. Rather
than being an example of premillennial thinking inspiring environmental apathy, Jeremiah’s
statement illustrates how premillennialism encourages audiences to not so much reject
environmental reform as to award the environment decreased priority, with personal salvation
being the primary concern of evangelical Christian existence.
While Jeremiah’s message allows for environmental reforms, even if they are likely
limited, Hampson is much more adamant in his resistance to environmental concern. Through his
combined dismissal of climate reform as a narrative tool of the Antichrist (182-83) and insistence
that “unprecedented flooding, wildfires, extreme hot and cold weather” (170), all potential
consequences of climate change, are little more than God’s “billboards to get our attention—to
awaken us,” Hampson does not create space for the urgency of climate reform but emphasizes
the need to “repent” (171). While representing varying extremes, both Jeremiah and Hampson
present audiences with end-times narratives that devalue the urgency of environmental reform.
More importantly, however, they encourage audiences to not fear the environmental catastrophes
and imbalances the world is facing and will face and, instead, encourage those audiences to look
ahead to Christ’s imminent return. In this sense, narratives of premillennial reckoning are not
incompatible with Hayhoe’s narratives of climate reform moderation. In both cases,
premillennial rhetors and Hayhoe reassure audiences that there is no need to fear the
consequences of global disasters, whether that disaster is climate change or the coronavirus
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pandemic. In light of this capacity of premillennialism to neutralize the urgency of societal
reforms like those required to mitigate climate change, as well as Hayhoe’s own tendency to
downplay the urgency of the very climate reform actions she seeks to foster among evangelicals,
it is unclear if Hayhoe’s climate reform discourse is likely to encourage the rapid and expansive
reforms needed to limit global warming to 1.5°C. Of course, it goes without saying that Hayhoe
is one person. Neither the fate of the world, nor the environmental convictions of evangelicals
are on her shoulders, alone. However, by considering Hayhoe’s representation of climate change
and climate reform in the context of premillennial evangelical discourse, we come to appreciate
the potential for the premillennial apocalyptic frame to mitigate climate mitigation efforts, even
those produced by evangelical rhetors like Hayhoe who do much to bridge evangelical attitudes
and those of the climate reform movement. By evaluating the gulf between Hayhoe’s climate
reform messaging and the reforms that need to occur to avoid the very real and very pressing
apocalyptic scenario of runaway global warming, we come to appreciate the profound (and
distressing) complexity of the rhetorical situation that faces climate reform rhetors in the United
States, evangelical and secular.

Conclusion
Throughout this chapter, I have evaluated recent premillennial evangelical discourse to
explore how this apocalyptic frame may influence its audiences’ attitudes toward the climate
reform efforts considered in Chapter Three, as well as those of evangelical climate reform rhetor
Katharine Hayhoe. Regarding the former, the persistent distrust of intergovernmental
organizations like the United Nations poses a significant challenge to climate reform initiatives,
as many of those initiatives—and much of the science that underpins them—are responses to the
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UN’s global climate reform effort, an effort that may easily be interpreted within the
premillennial frame as an attempt to establish a one-world order to be ruled by the Antichrist.
Likely of greater concern, however, is premillennialist evangelicals’ distrust of secular
institutions and humanity in general and their ability to resolve problems in the world without
divine means. This combined distrust of organized human beings’ ability to achieve progress in
the world constitutes a meaningful ideological challenge to the secular climate reform efforts
discussed in Chapter Three, all of which position human intelligence, problem solving, and
collaboration as the premier metrics of success in the fight against climate change. And while
evangelical climate reform rhetors like Katharine Hayhoe may help to present climate change
science and climate reform appeals to evangelicals in ways that more productively resonate with
evangelical beliefs and values, Hayhoe’s narratives of climate reform moderation do not seem
likely to facilitate the rapid and systems-wide reforms that the climate reformers of Chapter
Three and the global scientific consensus project are needed to avoid the most devastating
consequences of climate change. Furthermore, it is not clear if Hayhoe’s model of climate reform
moderation is sufficient to overcome similar appeals within premillennial evangelical rhetoric,
which presents audiences with a similarly balanced response to environmental and societal
problems by instructing them to do what they can to make the world a comfortable place to live
while they await the imminent Rapture. While such appeals to environmental moderation may
encourage some evangelicals to embrace some aspects of climate reform, it is likely that any
such reform efforts will be lukewarm. In the face of a rapidly warming planet, lukewarm
approaches to climate change mitigation are little better than outright climate skepticism and
apathy.
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It would seem, then, that we have come to a rhetorical impasse. In the face of climate
change as an imminent threat, how are climate reform rhetors, secular or Christian, to motivate
evangelical citizens to lend their weight to the cause of climate reform? To be sure, Hayhoe
provides secular climate reform rhetors with a set of strategies by which they may make their
climate reform appeals more persuasive, or at least less alienating. However, the disconnect
between evangelical and secular climate reform efforts also seems to open another avenue of
consideration for rhetorical scholars by exposing the limits of discourse altogether. In the
following chapter, I evaluate this climate reform impasse as an illustration of how liberal
democratic discourse—through its privileging of human reason and critical-rational debate as the
basis of conflict resolution in the public sphere—may not be capable of generating consensus in
response to climate change. While the field of rhetoric has long held that deliberative discourse is
the foundation of conflict resolution, the ideological impasse between evangelical and secular
climate change rhetors exposes the limits of such discourse as a strategy for generating
consensus in the face of such an urgent and complex societal issue as climate change. However,
if we accept that deliberative discourse is likely not capable of producing the consensus needed
to enact life-saving climate reforms, then what model would be more successful and at what cost
to our democratic values?
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CHAPTER FIVE
Rhetorical Strategies for Engaging Resistant Audiences on Climate Change
Even as We Acknowledge the Limitations of Democratic Discourse

Introduction
Throughout this project, I have sought to demonstrate the complex influences of
premillennial apocalyptic rhetoric on United States citizens’ attitudes toward climate change and
other pressing societal problems. In Chapter Three, I evaluated the U.S.-directed secular climate
reform discourse of Greta Thunberg and other members of the Global Climate Strike, as well as
the text of the Green New Deal to understand how much of the climate reform discourse that
circulates within the U.S. today makes use of premillennial apocalyptic appeals. Through
premillennial apocalyptic rhetoric, climate reformers attempt to persuade audiences that climate
change is an urgent, existential threat to the U.S. and the world and that the only meaningful path
forward is to radically alter current systems and instantiate a new order in which all economic
and political decisions are informed by the need to not exceed the carbon budget. Far from being
limited to a mere set of regulations restricting carbon emissions, the new world climate reformers
ask U.S. citizens to embrace is one in which citizens’ attitudes toward the environment and
humanity’s relationship to it are radically altered.
In Chapter Four, I examined a competing set of premillennial apocalyptic narratives in
the form of evangelical Christianity. By analyzing the premillennial discourse of such influential
evangelical rhetors as David Jeremiah, Jimmy Evans, Ron Rhodes, and Todd Hampson, I
outlined the challenges that premillennial theology may pose to climate reformers’ own attempts
to persuade citizens using premillennial apocalyptic appeals. In particular, premillennial
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apocalyptic Christian rhetors’ tendency to position intergovernmental organizations like the
United Nations as steppingstones toward the establishment of a one world government and the
eventual rule of the Antichrist, as well as their general suspicion of any individual or
organization that seeks to resolve pressing societal problems through human action alone pose
significant challenges to secular climate reformers’ emphasis on organized global efforts at
climate reform that emphasize human agency and responsibility. Further complicating climate
reformers’ efforts is the extent to which such premillennial evangelical rhetors’ messages
resonate with wider audiences by circulating through social media forums like YouTube.
Through analysis of the conversations that YouTube users are having in response to Jeremiah
and Evans’ premillennialist sermons, we see that these rhetors’ apocalyptic visions resonate with
many evangelicals’ own rhetorical and ideological frames and thereby continue to encourage
evangelical audiences to interpret pressing societal problems like climate change through the lens
of premillennial Christian apocalyptic rhetoric.
While examining two different sets of discourse produced by two different communities
that often express radically different attitudes toward the world, Chapters Three and Four have
one thing in common: they demonstrate that premillennial apocalyptic rhetoric, far from being
limited to evangelical Christians, is a rhetorical framework through which many U.S. citizens
make sense of their feelings of disorientation, anger, and despair toward the world around them.
Of course, the source of these negative feelings and the target of premillennial calls for change
depend on the apocalyptic frame of acceptance that informs a particular audience’s attitudes. On
the one hand, for many secular climate reformers, feelings of anger and disappointment
regarding the current order’s inability or refusal to address the causes of anthropogenic climate
change are acknowledged and given voice through the symbolic annihilation of the status quo
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and its replacement with a new more carbon conscious nation and world. On the other, for those
evangelical Christians who suffer from anomic feelings of persecution by a secular world and
perceive massive social mobilizations like climate reform or even efforts to combat the
coronavirus pandemic as attempts to undermine God’s power in the world, biblical depictions of
a returned Christ and the restoration of divine order provide a framework through which such
negative feelings are made sensible and life is made more endurable. Whether grounded in
human-centered calls for rapid and expansive climate reform or the desire for the divine reform
of the Second Coming, this study has demonstrated that premillennial apocalyptic rhetoric is a
persistent frame through which many U.S. citizens make sense of perceived problems in the
nation and the world.
More importantly, however, the premillennial apocalyptic frame exerts some influence on
what attitudes citizens are likely to adopt to not only perceived problems but to the proposed
solutions to those problems. In short, analysis of premillennial apocalyptic appeals in U.S. public
discourse suggests that citizens’ capacity and willingness to engage in deliberative discourse on
pressing societal problems like climate change is likely influenced by the apocalyptic frame
through which that discourse is interpreted. Subsequently, scholars of not only environmental
rhetoric but public rhetoric more generally, as well as rhetors who would seek to engage resistant
audiences on pressing issues like climate change, would likely benefit from paying closer
attention to the apocalyptic frames that may be influencing their audiences. Even further, the
study of apocalyptic rhetoric also suggests that attempts to engage resistant audiences on such
pressing issues as climate change may be made more persuasive by being more mindful of how
one’s own attitudes are being influenced by a particular apocalyptic frame. Far from being a oneway-street, apocalyptic rhetoric asks us to pay closer attention to how apocalyptic ways of
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thinking may be influencing our own understanding of pressing societal problems, in addition to
those of our audiences.
However, while this increased attention to the influence of apocalyptic rhetoric on one’s
own and one’s audiences’ attitudes toward problems and proposed solutions may help rhetors to
foster some middle ground on pressing problems like climate change, the study of apocalyptic
rhetoric also helps to illustrate the difficulty of using discourse to create even the most limited
forms of consensus. Indeed, by evaluating the influence of apocalyptic rhetoric on climate
reform discourse, we may come to question whether democratic discourse is capable of
sufficiently resolving such urgent problems as climate change that will impact citizens across the
country and the world in complex and enduring ways. The study of premillennial apocalyptic
rhetoric and its potential influence on U.S. citizens’ attitudes toward climate change and climate
reform helps to illuminate the stark ideological divides that define the U.S. today. In the face of
such division, as well as the ever-present uncertainty of who will control U.S. climate policy
following the next election cycle, it is worth seriously considering whether democratic discourse
is capable of generating consensus on not just climate change but other pressing societal
problems like the coronavirus pandemic. What role is rhetoric to play among a people, many of
whom seem to have lost the capacity to change their minds?
Even in the face of such doubts, rhetoric and communication scholars and climate
reformers have presented us with a rich supply of rhetorical strategies by which climate resistant
audiences, evangelical and secular, may be engaged more productively. By extending the
insights of such rhetoric and communication scholars as Susanna Priest, Philip Eubanks, Leah
Ceccarelli, Sharon Crowley, Krista Ratcliffe, Bethany Mannon, and Megan Von Bergen and
drawing upon the climate reform discourse of Katharine Hayhoe and the organization Young
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Evangelicals for Climate Action (YECA) as working examples, I present four rhetorical
strategies by which climate reform rhetors may produce discourse that more productively
engages members of the evangelical community as well as other climate-resistant audiences.
However, even as I present these rhetorical strategies in the hope that they may help to foster
more productive discursive engagement with evangelicals and other resistant audiences on such
pressing issues as climate change, the ideological divisions that define the U.S. do not bode well
for such attempts at fostering middle ground. Not only the stark ideological divisions between
evangelicals and liberals2—like those between Republicans and Democrats more generally—but
the inability of Democrats at the time of this writing to reach consensus within their own party
on President Biden’s climate agenda (Brownstein) illustrate how difficult, perhaps even
impossible, it is to use discourse to generate a path forward on climate change that is both radical
enough to limit global warming to 1.5°C and broadly appealing enough to garner and sustain
sufficiently widespread support among U.S. citizens and lawmakers. While paying attention to
the influence of apocalyptic rhetoric may help climate reform rhetors to produce discourse that is
more engaging and persuasive to resistant audiences, the violent nature of such ideological
divisions begs us to question the notion of democratic consensus itself.
In light of this potential for continued rhetorical impasse on climate change within the
U.S., I briefly consider the limitations of the democratic model of public discourse to resolve the
ideological divisions that characterize U.S. citizens’ attitudes toward pressing problems like
climate change. As public rhetoric scholars such as Candice Rai and Ralph Cintron suggest, the

As Sharon Crowley does in Toward a Civil Discourse, I use the term “liberal” not necessarily to refer to any
particular political affiliation, but to those rhetors and audiences who make sense of the world through the
conventions of liberal democracy, namely its historical emphasis on human “reason as a primary mode of argument”
(16), its “values of freedom and equality” (17), and the potential for one’s mind to be changed through democratic
deliberation (196).
2
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difficulty, perhaps inability, of the U.S. to arrive at a consensus on climate change reflects, not
the failure of democracy, but contradictions inherent to the democratic model itself, especially as
it is articulated within capitalistic societies. In light of the very real possibility that the U.S. may
not be able to achieve a consensus that results in sustained, meaningful climate policy, I
conclude this chapter by briefly highlighting examples of climate actions that have occurred in
local and transnational contexts. Even as U.S. climate policy continues to stall, such examples
help to illustrate the varied tactics and strategies that citizens innovate in communities within the
United States and across the globe to help combat environmental problems like climate change.

Rhetorical Strategies and Considerations for Engaging Climate Reform Resistant
Audiences
As discussed in Chapter Three, one of the key obstacles to generating consensus on
climate reform within the United States is that citizens are interpreting climate change and
climate reform appeals through often opposing ideological frames, with the premillennial
apocalyptic frame being one of the most pronounced. This is most evident in gaps between
evangelical and secular climate reform discourse, but it can also be said of climate reform
discourse more generally, in which citizens often assign different meanings and values toward
the same climate reform symbol or appeal. This dissonance is especially evident in the inability
of scientific texts alone to mobilize audiences’ attitudes and behaviors in favor of rapid climate
reform. As Barry Brummett explains in Contemporary Apocalyptic Rhetoric, appeals to a
“grounding text,” whether it is a written text, symbol, or even a “natural law,” help apocalyptic
rhetors to ground their arguments in evidence that a particular audience may find authoritative
and, therefore, persuasive (99). For evangelical apocalyptists the most compelling grounding text
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is arguably the Bible, but for many of the secular climate reformers considered in Chapter Three,
it is the findings of the scientific consensus on anthropogenic climate change that is most
authoritative. In either case, citizens’ attitudes toward climate change as an ever-growing crisis
are mediated by what texts (and rhetors) they trust to communicate that threat. By attending to
the influence of grounding texts on audiences’ attitudes toward climate change, we may better
understand the values that motivate such audiences. Such understanding is crucial if rhetors
would seek to engage audiences on climate change in ways that resonate with audiences’ values
and beliefs.
Scholars of climate change rhetoric and communication have said much about the limited
ability of scientific and fact-based grounding texts to meaningfully alter audiences’ attitudes and
behaviors on climate change and climate reform. In Communicating Climate Change, Susanna
Priest observes that when it comes to engaging non-expert or resistant audiences on climate
change, simply disseminating scientific information is often not sufficient to alter audiences’
opinions on climate change (transform a climate skeptic into a believer, for instance) (5). This
notion that more scientific facts will persuade audiences to take climate change more seriously is
often called “the ‘deficit model’—the belief that public opinion (and public relations) problems
can be solved with improved dissemination of scientific information alone” (7). In The Troubled
Rhetoric and Communication of Climate Change, Philip Eubanks likewise observes that rhetors
operating from within the deficit model “assume that facts are, in and of themselves, powerful,
and that presented with the relevant facts, most of us, with even a modicum of rational
consideration, will reach reasonable answers to certain sorts of questions” (24). Priest and
Eubanks demonstrate that, as a model of public discourse, the deficit model is not an effective
way for citizens to reach common ground on pressing issues like climate because it positions
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“argument as war” by reducing a complex issue into “a matter of claims and counterclaims, pro
and con, convinced or not convinced, true or false” (Eubanks 6).
When facing a pressing problem like climate change, the deficit model is likely doomed
to failure as understanding and responding to climate change involves a great deal more than
simply proving or disproving its existence. “Scientific controversies in the public sphere
involve,” Priest explains, “political and economic interests, social values, and issues of trust.
Although scientific facts get used as ammunition in such cases, social controversies about
science rarely revolve around scientific facts exclusively” (103). Indeed, even if scientific
information is sufficient motivation for an audience to believe in climate change, it is “not
enough to motivate action” on climate change in the form of sustained and widespread climate
reform (5). Climate science “must,” Eubanks further suggests, “pass through the crucible of
public argumentation” in order for it to be made sensible to audiences and eventually influence
citizens’ attitudes and behaviors in ways that support climate reform actions (xi). Echoing the
findings of Priest and Eubanks, in “Manufactured Scientific Controversy” Leah Ceccarelli calls
upon scientific communicators “to recognize that the matters being decided in” such issues as
“carbon emission regulations . . . do not only involve matters of fact; they also involve matters of
value and policy, and therefore must be decided by citizens in the public sphere” (201).
However, as Eubanks points out, in the debate surrounding climate reform, “no weapon in this
argumentative war has been powerful enough to secure a certain victory for the consensus view”
(Eubanks 117). Fortunately, rhetoric and communication scholars have explored—and
evangelical climate reform rhetors have demonstrated—a variety of rhetorical strategies beyond
the deficit model through which climate reform resistant audiences may be more productively
engaged, including historically resistant communities such as evangelical Christians.
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Climate Reform Narratives that Empower
In Chapter Three, we reviewed rhetoric and communication scholarship on
environmental apocalyptic discourse and its potential efficacy for motivating citizens to more
proactively combat environmental problems like climate change. While these scholars
acknowledge the potential for apocalyptic environmental appeals to bring environmental
problems to the public’s attention (Killingsworth and Palmer, “Millennial” 22; Foust and
Murphy 152; Killingsworth and Palmer, “Discourse” 3; Doyle 291; Priest 141), many of them
also observe that such warnings of imminent environmental catastrophe are ultimately not
sufficient to inspire a long-term shift in audiences that manifests in meaningful and sustained
environmental reform (Killingsworth and Palmer, EcoSpeak 261, 263; Foust and Murphy 158,
164; Priest 142; Doyle 291). And while I have demonstrated that apocalyptic rhetoric is much
more than the mere attempt to incite fear in one’s audience, these scholars are correct in
observing that such fear-based appeals are likely not sufficient to mobilize audiences in favor of
sustained environmental reform, climate or otherwise. As Priest observes,
information likely to arouse negative emotions, such as fear, should be accompanied by
information on efficacy—how one can take steps against the threat. . . . Without steps to
be taken, fear can simply encourage people to ‘shut down’ or reinforce their denial. . . .
For climate, efficacy information seems as though it should be vital—not only to lessen
the potential impact of the kind of fearful response that might trigger denial, but also as a
means to encourage people to take the next step: positive action. (109)
In this passage, Priest explains that simply warning people about looming disasters like climate
change and how it will likely harm them is not enough to transform such audiences into active
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participants in meaningful climate action. Such harm-based communication is not sufficient to
motivate audiences to engage in the complex, arduous work of actively sponsoring policy action
on governmental levels or collective action in the public sphere to combat climate change.
Especially when engaging audiences on such apocalyptic issues as climate change, issues that
feel like they are outside audiences’ control, persuasion is more likely to occur when the climate
rhetor can return some of that control to the audience by charting a concrete path toward solving
the problem.
As discussed in Chapter Four, climate scientist and evangelical Christian Katharine
Hayhoe provides a compelling case study on what such empowering narratives might look like
for engaging resistant audiences on climate change and evangelical Christians, in particular. As
Megan Von Bergen and Bethany Mannon observe in “Talking Climate Faith: Katharine Hayhoe
and Christian Rhetoric(s) of Climate Change,” Hayhoe presents theologically conservative
audiences with “evangelical commonplaces about the importance of love and active, engaged
faith.” What helps to make Hayhoe’s message compelling to many evangelicals is that she links
this concept of engaged faith with “an evangelical ethic of care rooted in love,” a value that fuses
Christian love with action and “gives rise to practical acts of service.” By joining faith with
concrete climate reform steps that evangelicals can take, Hayhoe helps to empower audiences to
take charge of climate change, despite its complexity.
For an example of such empowering language, we may turn to A Climate for Change, in
which Hayhoe and Andrew Farley outline a series of practical tasks by which evangelical
Christians may help to mitigate climate change, tasks that are designed to move beyond climate
alarmism and empower evangelicals to take practical steps toward increased climate
consciousness and action. Hayhoe and Farley empower evangelical audiences by reassuring them
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that climate reform does not have to be an “all-or-nothing approach” and that “small actions do
matter” (141). By emphasizing practical and manageable climate mitigation efforts like
“walking, biking, or taking the public transit system” (142), using less electricity (144),
switching out incandescent for fluorescent light bulbs (145), using reusable bags when shopping
(146), and driving slower and keeping one’s car well-maintained to limit gas consumption (147),
Hayhoe and Farley take the scientific and ideological complexity of climate change and
condense it into a handful of concrete actions that evangelicals may enact in order to limit overall
carbon emissions within the United States. By presenting evangelical audiences with such smallscale, manageable strategies for combatting climate change, Hayhoe circumvents the “argument
as war” model of climate change discourse described by Eubanks (6) by creating a middle
ground that helps audiences “to stop feeling guilty about what we should be doing and instead
think about what we can do” (Hayhoe and Farley 144). To be sure, as I suggest in Chapter Four,
it is not likely that such personalized mitigation efforts will be sufficient on their own to limit
climate change to 1.5°C. However, even with such a qualification, Hayhoe’s emphasis on
practical climate action presents climate reform rhetors with a compelling example of how one
might empower climate reform resistant audiences to make climate reform a part of their daily
attitudes and behaviors by emphasizing climate action that is feasible to audiences rather than
action that overwhelms and alienates. As Priest observes, while “individual commitment” to the
cause of climate reform cannot “be completely successful without the adoption of collective
solutions,” “[c]ollective solutions are not possible without individual commitment” (58). Hayhoe
offers a model of how such commitment may be fostered in resistant audiences through
narratives of personal empowerment.
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Climate Reform Narratives that Resonate with Audiences’ Worldviews
In light of the divergent perspectives that many U.S. citizens have regarding climate
change and climate reform, as well as the role of politics and ideology in fueling such
oppositions, one way to encourage audiences to adopt more climate conscious attitudes and
actions is to help them view climate reform as a natural expression of deeply cherished values
and worldviews. Rather than automatically treating members of climate reform resistant groups
as inherently opposed to climate reform, Priest encourages climate reform rhetors to “look for
places to connect climate concerns as directly as possible with elements of their worldviews—a
good idea no matter what public is being addressed” (58). In order to engage audiences on their
own ideological and symbolic turf, however, it is vital that climate reform rhetors are mindful of
the “cultural logics” of their various audiences (Ratcliffe 33). In Rhetorical Listening:
Identification, Gender, Whiteness, Krista Ratcliffe observes that a given argument or “claim,” is
made sensible only within the “cultural logic,” or “belief system or shared way of reasoning” of
a given individual or community (33). Through Ratcliffe’s practice of “rhetorical listening,”
which is discussed in more depth in Chapter Two of this project, “listeners” are able “to
acknowledge both claims and cultural logics” and thereby begin to understand how a particular
claim might be interpreted by a particular audience according to its cultural logic or ideological
frame (33). Significantly for pressing societal debates like that surrounding climate reform in the
United States, “[b]y focusing on claims and cultural logics, listeners may still disagree with each
other’s claims, but they may better appreciate that the other person is not simply wrong but
rather functioning from within a different logic” (33). By attending to the cultural logics of the
evangelical Christians discussed in this project, as well as other climate change deniers and
climate reform resistors whose cultural logics regarding pressing societal problems like climate
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change are not informed by the scientific consensus, it is evident that climate reform rhetors must
not rely on scientific evidence as automatically persuasive but must appeal to the grounding texts
or values that are foundational to a given audiences’ attitudes.
As Ceccarelli observes, rhetors who would seek to engage audiences on heated topics like
climate change must acknowledge “that the empowered audience in these debates is a public that
does not always trust science” and it is, therefore, important for “students of rhetoric and
science” to move beyond mere questions of science and fact and engage “the questions of value
and policy that are the driving force behind the public debate” (217). In the context of climate
change communication, rhetors who would seek to engage resistant audiences on questions of
climate action will find more success if they can identify the values and beliefs that motivate an
audience and try to forge connections between those values and those of the climate reform
movement more generally. Eubanks further reminds us that “people’s views do not become more
flexible as their ability to understand the science increases. What matters is the worldview of the
person making the judgment” (58). And even though Eubanks goes on to suggest that “the
audiences most convinced by an argument are, if not the already persuaded, the already
persuadable,” the decision to craft climate reform appeals that are mindful of audiences’
worldviews may help climate rhetors “find a way to appeal to a broad set of values” and thereby
make their discourse more persuasive to a wider public (124).
Charting this middle ground will not be easy, however. Eubanks observes that “nearly all
of the ways climate change is framed—by skeptics and by those who accept the scientific
consensus—tend to perpetuate the current impasse because the frames cater strongly to the
values of those who reside at one end or the other of the ideological spectrum” (126). It is
because of the significant influence of worldview on how audiences are likely to interpret
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climate change and climate reform appeals that Eubanks calls upon climate rhetors to attend to
how they frame their discourse: “Paying attention to how framing excludes and attracts is
essential to better argumentation. Paying attention to framing is essential to our becoming aware
of the values that we genuinely hold” (129). It is only by helping “individuals come to terms with
how a warming planet touches their own lives and how it relates to their own practical and
ethical thinking” that meaningful and sustained climate action is likely to occur (133). Yet how
can such engagement occur given the intensely ideologically nature of the climate change
debate? As Crowley has observed, “the more densely beliefs are articulated with one another in a
given belief system or across belief systems, the more impervious they are to rhetorical
intervention” (78). Yet, as the preceding statements from Priest, Ceccarelli, and Eubanks
suggest, even the densest and most climate resistant belief systems have the potential to be
engaged if climate rhetors can only link audiences’ motives to their climate reform appeals in
ways that do not overly alienate audiences. And while such forward-looking statements are
aspirational, to the say the least, Priest, Ceccarelli, and Eubanks’ research helps to open up a
wider range of possibilities for thinking about not just climate change discourse but how actionoriented rhetors may engage resistance audiences on a variety of pressing societal issues.
One way of engaging evangelical Christians on climate change, for instance, is to present
climate reform as a manifestation of the value of Christian love. In her analysis of persuasive
techniques by which rhetors may more productively engage evangelicals on civil disputes,
Crowley suggests that one “route is to demonstrate the contingency of given values or sets of
values by locating them in space and time, thus destabilizing the system of belief in which these
same values are taken to be noncontingent” (201). Said differently, even densely articulated
value systems like that which characterizes evangelicalism can allow for transformation if the
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audience’s values can be rearticulated in ways that permit some shared ground with outside
perspectives while remaining consistent enough for evangelical audiences. As Crowley observes
in reference to evangelicals’ historic resistance to homosexuality, “the very deployment of a
different vocabulary” may help to spur this “work of recontextualization” (201), a line of
thinking that may also be useful to climate rhetors who would seek to mobilize evangelical
attitudes and practice.
The value of Christian love offers an especially powerful appeal by which climate rhetors
may attempt to recontextualize climate reform as an expression of evangelical practice. As
Crowley explains, “love is a central value in Christianity” and therefore provides rhetors with a
language through which to articulate their positions in ways that have the potential to resonate
with evangelical belief (201). Throughout her myriad attempts to engage evangelicals on climate
change, Hayhoe exemplifies the rhetorical power that Christian love may have for even the most
resistant evangelical audiences. In Saving Us: A Climate Scientist’s Case for Hope and Healing
in a Divided World, Hayhoe recounts a lecture delivered to a conservative Christian university
whose members had already demonstrated distrust of Hayhoe’s climate reform message in
emailed communications leading up to the event, with one faculty member going so far as to
assert that Hayhoe’s talk “‘is the work of Satan, the father of lies” and that “presenting solutions
to climate change is morally equivalent to abortion’” (139). In the face of such densely
articulated ideological resistance, it is unclear how Hayhoe’s message of climate reform would
have any potential to inspire audiences to adopt more climate conscious attitudes and behaviors.
However, Hayhoe offers a compelling rhetorical strategy for circumventing such
ideological resistance by appealing to a shared evangelical value: Christian love. Hayhoe
describes her talk as follows:
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As Christians, I concluded my talk, our response to any challenge should be characterized
by love. Jesus says, “By this everyone will know that you are my disciples,” and the
apostle Paul amplifies this, instructing his readers that “the only thing that counts is faith
expressing itself through love.” Love is the key to acting on climate change: caring for
the poor and the needy, those most affected by the impacts of a changing climate, as well
as creation itself. It’s not only our responsibility, it’s who Christians believe God made us
to be. (142)
Following her talk, Hayhoe is greeted by a university official (142) who had previously
attempted to halt publicity for the talk (139) and who proceeds to tell Hayhoe that she “had given
him a new perspective on this topic” and that “[h]e understood how his existing values connected
with addressing climate change and he’d changed his mind” (142). Through this anecdote,
Hayhoe provides a compelling depiction of how climate change appeals may be communicated
in ways that resonate with the values that motivate a particular audience, even those who are “not
just theologically, but politically and culturally” conservative (139). As Von Bergen and Mannon
observe, Hayhoe skillfully articulates “evangelical commonplaces about the importance of love
and active, engaged faith,” thereby positioning climate action as a natural expression of Christian
faith and godliness working in the world, an appeal that is more likely to resonate with
evangelical audiences than mere appeals to science separated from faith.
While Hayhoe’s description of her talk in Saving Us illustrates the potential rhetorical
power of grounding climate reform appeals in the value of Christian love, her statements also
point to another aspect of evangelical worldview that is meaningful to evangelical audiences: the
grounding text of scripture. As Bethany Mannon observes in “Xvangelical: The Rhetorical Work
of Personal Narratives in Contemporary Religious Discourse,” scholars of theology have
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observed “that evangelical beliefs vary widely but an emphasis on scriptural authority—which
some believers take to mean factual inerrancy—remains a pervasive discourse and one
compelling to many Christians” (147). In addition to appealing to the Christian value of love,
Hayhoe also appeals to scripture and thereby “urges her audiences to see how their sacred texts
foster an interest in the well-being of Earth and its inhabitants” (Von Bergen and Mannon). By
incorporating biblical quotations from Jesus and Paul, Hayhoe offers conservative Christian
audiences a more climate conscious path that also accords with scriptural authority by
positioning climate reform as an expression of Christian love by caring for those negatively
impacted by the consequences of climate change (Hayhoe 142). “As a Christian climate activist
. . . Hayhoe draws on commonplaces about evangelical concern for addressing poverty,
(re)centering service and the humanity of the global poor” (Von Bergen and Mannon). By
“[f]raming her climate advocacy within familiar Christian discourses,” such as Christian love
and concern for the global poor as articulated through scriptural authority, “Hayhoe shows how
the natural features of her evangelical landscape nourish meaningful climate action.” As a
climate reform rhetor, Hayhoe packages climate action in ways that are more likely to resonate
with evangelical audiences than the appeals to scientific, Democratic, and intergovernmental
grounding texts that characterize the secular climate reform discourse explored in Chapter Three.
Yet Hayhoe also opens up possibilities for how climate reform discourse may make itself more
engaging to a wider variety of audiences—not just evangelical Christians—by attending to
audiences’ worldviews and values.
Such appeals to the traditional evangelical values of Christian love and scriptural
authority are not unique to Hayhoe, of course, but are a recurring feature of climate reform
discourse that seeks to engage evangelical Christians. The organization Young Evangelicals for
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Climate Change (YECA), for instance, frequently draws parallels between the goals of climate
reform and evangelical worldviews. Listing Hayhoe as one of its senior advisors (YECA, “Dr.
Katharine Hayhoe”), YECA offers a similarly useful rhetorical model for how climate rhetors
may invent climate reform appeals that are more likely to resonate with evangelicals’
worldviews. In its “Faithful Action Pledge,” the signing of which is a prerequisite for joining the
organization, YECA articulates climate change in terms of the negative impact it will have on
“our neighbors . . . here in the United States and around the world” (“Take Action”). By
employing the plural possessive pronoun “our,” YECA emphasizes its goal of encouraging
fellow evangelicals to put their love of neighbor and the global poor into practice by helping to
mitigate the effects of climate change. Only in fusing such love with action will Christians “live
out what Jesus said was most important: loving God fully and loving our neighbors as
ourselves.” Also like Hayhoe, YECA grounds the value of love expressed through action in the
authority of scripture by identifying several passages in the Bible that present evangelicals with
not only a “call to love” their neighbor but an invitation to “take care of the good world that God
loves.” According to YECA, the scriptural authority testifying to “God’s love for the created
world is not confined to only a couple of well-worn versus. It courses through the very center of
the Gospel story from creation to new creation” (“Bible Study”).
Like Hayhoe, YECA presents evangelical audiences with climate reform appeals that are
grounded in evangelical Christian values and worldview and makes use of grounding texts that
would be authoritative for many evangelicals. Whether it is former YECA National Organizer
and Spokesperson Kyle Meyaard-Schaap’s public criticism of President Trump’s decision to
withdrawal the U.S. from the Paris Agreement (Goebel, “Paris”)—a move that directly
contradicts the tendency of many evangelical Protestants to support Trump’s policies (Martínez
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and Smith)—or current National Organizer and Spokesperson Tori Goebel’s testimony before
the EPA Oil and Gas Hearing (Goebel, “EPA”), or the YECA’s current letter writing campaign
to Congress regarding the need to pass the Biden Administration’s Build Back Better Act
(“Federal Advocacy”), YECA illustrates the importance of presenting climate reform discourse
in ways that have the potential to resonate with audiences’ values and beliefs. Whether offering
direct critiques of inadequate climate policies, providing public testimony on the oil and gas
industry’s unsustainable environmental practices, or encouraging evangelicals to actively call
upon lawmakers to implement much needed climate reforms (in ways that challenge U.S.
political divisions), the Young Evangelicals for Climate Action call upon evangelicals of all ages
to embrace climate action as a natural expression of Christian faith and love.

Climate Reform Narratives that Foster Trust
Rhetoric and communication scholars have suggested that one of the most important
influences on climate reform resistant audiences’ willingness to engage climate reform narratives
is the level of trust that audience has for the climate rhetor. As Priest suggests, when it comes to
climate change and climate reform, “[e]motional factors, trust in the source from which the
message comes, and identity with particular groups (for example, religious or political groups)
with their own ideas about climate are all influential” (46). Priest further states that “[i]t is not
just the message but the messenger, then, that matters. . . . Ultimately, the public’s trust in
specific messengers and other actors is centrally important for effective climate change
communication” (56). As illustrated by the rhetorical and ideological differences between the
secular climate reformers explored in Chapter Three and the premillennialist evangelicals
considered in Chapter Four, this trust can be difficult to foster when secular climate reformers
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appeal to grounding texts that are not authoritative for many evangelical audiences—just as
evangelical cultural logics grounded in scripture and theological belief would likely not be an
authoritative basis for action by secular climate reformers.
Far from being limited to evangelical Christians, the difficulty of cultivating trust when
engaging climate change resistant audiences is a dominant feature of climate change discourse in
the United States. As discussed earlier, Eubanks has demonstrated that much climate change
discourse reinforces disagreements regarding the path forward because climate rhetors “cater
strongly to the values of those who reside at one end or the other of the ideological spectrum”
rather than fostering climate change discourse that resonates with the cultural logics of divergent
audiences (126). Further complicating such climate change discourse is the fact that, as Eubanks
observes, “when our beliefs are challenged, we don’t just fail to be convinced; we reason
defensively” (57). Stated differently by Crowley, “The pathways typically taken in some
ideologics are so tightly connected with one another, so routinely and regularly traveled, that
they become a sort of automatic ‘first response’ to encounters with new or countering beliefs and
belief systems” (78). And especially when it comes to such hotly debated issues as climate
change, the outcome of which promises to have significant impacts on the lives of U.S. citizens
and the globe, cultivating trust between rhetor and audience may help to soften such
defensiveness and open up possibilities for more climate conscious attitudes and behaviors. Of
course, given the densely articulated ideological systems associated with competing perspectives
on the climate change debate, cultivating this trust will not be a simple task.
Rhetoric and communication scholars have suggested that trust is much easier to cultivate
when the rhetor and audience have a shared basis of identification, especially when it comes to
engaging Christians on climate change. “It logically follows,” Priest observes,
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that religious leaders can be among the highly trusted sources for climate change
information, especially for those groups among whom science may be less trusted. Many
religious groups, including groups within American Christianity, embrace the concept of
human stewardship over the land—which in turn implies a responsibility for
environmental protection. Scientists and science communicators interested in increasing
awareness, concern and action about climate change could certainly do more to enlist the
help of trusted religious leaders to reinforce this message. (Priest 4)
As Crowley has likewise observed, “[b]elievers in Christian apocalypticism” are more likely to
listen to community “insiders” who are able to articulate claims that align with evangelical
values and beliefs in ways that outsiders would find difficult (194). Especially for those
evangelical believers whose attitudes toward pressing societal problems like climate change are
mediated by the premillennial apocalyptic frame, trust between climate rhetor and audience is
easier to foster when that rhetor is an evangelical themselves. As Crowley further suggests,
The [apocalyptic Christian] belief system is itself isolationist because of its depiction of
believers as an elect who are spiritually superior to nonbelievers. It is also nearly
impervious to alternative articulations, given its legitimation by a divine authority, the
dissemination of whose word is carefully policed by professional proselytizers. Their
interpretations of that word can never be gainsaid by outsiders, who are agents of evil.
They can, however, be questioned by insiders who for some reason experience the
subaltern or double consciousness, when, for example, their experience does not square
with what they are being taught. (194)
Hayhoe and YECA’s linking of intimately Christian values such as love of one’s neighbor with
climate action represent two instances of evangelical insiders appealing to their insider
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knowledge to persuade climate reform resistant audiences in ways that accord with community
beliefs. As climate reform rhetors who occupy insider positions, Hayhoe and YECA likely
inspire greater trust than those speaking from outside the evangelical identity, such as the secular
climate reformers considered in Chapter Three. As members of the evangelical communities they
are trying to engage, Hayhoe and YECA are able to more successfully circumvent a challenge
that plagues rhetors who would engage resistant audiences on scientific topics such as climate
change: the assumption that only scientific perspectives matter.
As Ceccarelli further suggests, attempts to shut down debate on climate change by simply
stating that the debate has already been resolved by scientists can rhetorically backfire by feeding
into climate resistant audiences’ belief that
supporters of the dominant paradigm [the scientific consensus] would prefer to silence
dissent. Also, by suggesting that the opinion of a mere citizen is irrelevant on a matter
that citizens ultimately must decide, and by claiming that only scientists should be heard
. . . about an issue that has tremendous public policy implications, the response seems
elitist and antidemocratic. (208)
By engaging evangelicals on their own terms and as insiders, Hayhoe and YECA illustrate the
importance of respecting audiences’ worldviews even as climate rhetors seek to expand those
ideological systems to be more invested in the cause of climate reform. As Von Bergen and
Mannon observe, “Hayhoe relates to potentially resistant evangelical publics: she speaks and
writes not (only) as a climate scientist but as a Christian who draws on the horizons she shares
with fellow believers to bridge the gulfs between faith and climate action.” As a climate scientist
who is also an evangelical Christian, Hayhoe “treats [climate] skeptics as asking good-faith
questions without treating denial as a legitimate intellectual stance or devaluing expertise.” In
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doing so, Hayhoe presents evangelical audiences with ideological bridges that may enable them
to incorporate some climate reform values into the framework of their Christian belief.
In light of the relationship between trust and insider status, it seems that climate rhetors
are more likely to persuade climate resistant communities to engage climate change and climate
reform discourse if those rhetors can establish identification with the community. While it is
unclear how outsider rhetors are to establish trust in such a way, being more mindful of the
importance of such trust and the worldviews of one’s audiences would likely help climate rhetors
to avoid alienating climate resistant audiences unnecessarily. In “Rethinking the Public Sphere:
A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy,” Nancy Fraser employs public
sphere theory to address the difficulty of engaging audiences from an outsider position without
eliding important cultural differences between them and the rhetor. Fraser suggests that
“however difficult it may be, communication across lines of cultural difference is not in principle
impossible, although it will certainly become impossible if one imagines that it requires
bracketing of differences. Granted, such communication requires multicultural literacy, but that,
I believe, can be acquired through practice” (127). Stated differently and applied to the climate
change debate, even though it may be tempting for climate reform rhetors to try to ignore the
differences of their audiences (their resistance to scientific claims, for instance) when it comes to
engaging them on pressing societal issues like climate change, meaningful communication
between opposing points of view may only occur when such differences—such cultural logics—
are acknowledged.
To rhetorically engage with an audience, one must first acknowledge who that audience
is and what they believe, what narratives and symbols motivate them. The importance of
engaging audiences while being mindful of the cultural logics that motivate their understanding
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of one’s claims and arguments is aptly illustrated by Eubanks’ well-meaning but somewhat
worrisome suggestion that, in light of the looming catastrophic impacts of climate change and
the need for immediate, systemic climate reform, “[w]hen it comes to the [sic] climate change’s
main point of disagreement, it is more ethically fraught to argue in an uncertain way than to use
all of our powers of persuasion” (120). What is potentially worrisome about Eubanks’ argument
is that he goes on to suggest that “[w]e are all well justified in imputing moral shame to those
who doggedly take the other side (a category that does not include fair-minded skeptics). It has
been done before. The world is better off because people argued against slavery, against Jim
Crow, against apartheid, against genocide” (120-121). To be sure, when we consider that it is
“[t]he emissions of the richest 1 per cent of the global population [that] account for more than
twice the combined share of the poorest 50 per cent” (United Nations Environment Programme
xxv), as well as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) projections that
“disadvantaged and vulnerable populations,” “indigenous peoples,” and the “Least Developed
Countries” are “at disproportionately higher risk of adverse consequences” if global warming
surpasses 1.5°C (Masson-Delmotte et al. 9), then the parallels Eubanks draws between climate
reform resistance and the practices of slavery and genocide appear apt. However, as a rhetorical
strategy for engaging resistant audiences on climate change, such attempts at public shaming
may have questionable effect, especially when we consider the importance of trust in opening
possibilities of persuasion and ideological transformation in one’s audience.
As with excessive reliance on climate science, excessive reliance on moral shaming
seems more likely to reinforce audiences’ distrust and resistance of climate reform rather than
encourage audiences to internalize the values of such reform and manifest those values in
sustained and meaningful climate action. As Sally Weintrobe’s research on moral injury
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indicates, U.S. citizens and lawmakers’ reluctance to enact sweeping and immediate climate
reforms reflects the complex structures of climate change rationalization and denial that continue
to obscure the harmful impacts of U.S. capitalism and consumption on the environment, systems
of denial that exist in large part due to the efforts of the oil and gas industry to promote what
Weintrobe terms a neoliberal “culture of uncare” (356). Such systems of denial can only be
resisted, Weintrobe suggests, by “talking about the state of the climate and seeing the harm
already done” (357). For such talk to occur, however, especially among those who carry the
wounds of moral injury regarding their role in creating climate change, wounds that one might
carry unconsciously and fiercely resist acknowledging, one needs the strength of a larger
community, the strength found in belonging to “a culture of care” that can “support people at
these times” of moral distress (359). The form such a culture of care may take will, of course,
vary according to the affiliations of a particular individual. Hayhoe and the YECA may be seen
as promoting such a culture of care for evangelical Christians, for instance, by creating
communal spaces for processing the trauma of climate change complicity while offering
concrete, faith-based lines of action out of climate despair and toward a better, more sustainable
nation and world. Yet considering such questions of trust and moral injury as they relate to
engaging climate resistant audiences is also of use to climate reform rhetors, more generally.
While it may be difficult for outsider rhetors to foster trust when engaging ideologically dense
climate reform resistant communities, striving to cultivate such trust and acknowledging the
often-invisible effects of moral injury and the complex systems of climate denial that many
audiences have internalized may encourage rhetors to at least avoid rhetorical strategies such as
public shaming that are more likely to exacerbate audiences’ resistance to climate action than
overcome it.
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Climate Reform Narratives Grounded in Personal Experience
What all the aforementioned rhetorical strategies have in common is that they highlight
the importance of locating a point of identification between audience and rhetor in order to foster
some form of common ground when it comes to heated civil disputes that are delineated along
intensely ideological lines. It may be hard to foster, but without such identification, it is unclear
how U.S. citizens and leaders will be able to enact long term climate reform policy that helps the
U.S. to meet its emission reduction targets under the Paris Agreement, a task that will require
climate reform policies that are implemented and sustained regardless of what political party is in
power. All the climate change policy and science in the world will not help if it is simply tossed
out or ignored following the next election cycle. And while the situation may very well be, as
discussed in the following section, that the creation of a consensus on climate reform is likely
unachievable within the U.S. at this time and that the pursuit of such consensus may reflect a
profound misunderstanding of democracy as a mechanism for resolving civil disputes, there is
still value in considering rhetorical strategies that may help such consensus to be created, even if
it is always limited.
One way of fostering such common ground on climate change may be creating climate
reform appeals that are grounded in the personal experiences of both rhetor and audience. As
Priest observes, “Climate change does not have a ‘one size fits all’ solution but needs to be
approached from many different directions at once, through communication designed for
multiple audiences and purposes, as well as through the development of new energy-related
technologies and other sustainable alternatives” (46). All of the scientific and technological
might of U.S. innovation will likely not be sufficient to curb global warming unless such
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resources are joined with policies that have the widespread and enduring support of U.S. citizens
and other leading carbon producers. Taking the large-scale and difficult-to-comprehend threats
of climate change and scaling them down to the level of the personal may help to foster greater
public support of such policies. Reflecting on the difficulty of communicating climate change in
ways that help audiences to feel its immediacy and the need for action, Eubanks observes “that
threat to human habitation is more to the point than threat to the planet. It seems to me that
wanting to heal the planet is not as pertinent to most of us as needing to save our home” as well
as “protecting our cities and towns and farmland” (128). By making climate change personal,
both in terms of its impact on one’s audience and how one chooses to engage that audience,
climate rhetors may help resistant audiences to view climate change and climate reform as the
pressing issues they are.
As Priest further suggests, while widely distributed public discourse on climate change
can help to “keep the issue on the media and therefore the public agenda” and “shapes the
climate of public opinion and nurtures the expansion of people’s background knowledge,” it is
the ‘actual in-person, face-to-face communication with other individual people, even in casual
settings” that “may be even more important, since Internet messages are easily ignored. Every
time someone brings up the weather in a conversation, for example, it can be thought of as a
teachable moment” (166). The impact of climate change on rates of Lyme disease in the U.S.
offers climate reform rhetors a powerfully distressing teachable moment for engaging everyday
audiences in the ways Priest describes, especially in states like New York where Lyme disease
rates have increased. As Shao Lin and colleagues demonstrate in their study on “The Effects of
Multiyear and Seasonal Weather Factors on Incidence of Lyme Disease and its Vector in New
York State,” incidents of Lyme disease have not only increased within the state of New York in
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response to warmer winter temperatures, but the disease continues to move north (1187). Such
localized examples of climate change impacts offer opportunities for the teachable moments
Priest describes by allowing climate reform rhetors to connect climate change with the daily
experiences and concerns of the people one encounters in one’s own community. As rhetoric and
communication scholars have demonstrated, one of the most promising ways of engaging
audiences in such personal ways is through personal narratives that allow rhetors to connect with
audiences on the level of shared experience.
In her research on the limitations of liberal democratic appeals as a rhetorical and
ideological mechanism for engaging fundamentalist audiences such as those that characterize the
premillennialist evangelical Christians discussed in Chapter Four, Crowley observes that
“liberals gain little by trying to convert apocalyptists to liberal beliefs or policies by means of
reason. Rather a would-be rhetor should focus her persuasive efforts on the arousal of passion
and desire” (195). One powerful strategy for engaging audiences, not on the level of facts or
science, but emotional investment is through storytelling. According to Crowley, “Story is,
perhaps, the most efficient means of garnering attention” (198) and is a core feature of
“witnessing,” or “the term used by Christian fundamentalists to designate conversion attempts.
The telling of exemplary stories is a common tactic during such attempts” (198). Such
storytelling is not limited to evangelical Christians, of course, but may be used by climate rhetors
to present audiences with a narrative vision of a carbon conscious U.S. that they are invited to
enter. However, the practice of Christian witnessing points to a rhetorical strategy that may be
especially compelling for evangelical audiences who have been historically resistant to climate
change and climate reform discourse.

197
The importance of witnessing as a rhetorical strategy within evangelicalism is indicated
by the central role it plays in evangelical identity. As Mannon observes, “individual conversion”
and “the imperative to spread faith to nonbelievers” are two core features of evangelicalism
(144), a combination that “invites writers to educate or persuade their readers by recounting
God’s work in their lives” (148). And while Mannon focuses on the ways in which such “acts of
testimony and witnessing” have historically provided and continue to provide evangelical
women with the rhetorical apparatus for engaging members of a culture that “discourages or
prohibits women’s preaching,” her research also points to the power of “personal narrative” to
engage and persuade evangelicals more generally (148). In Saving Us, Hayhoe both
demonstrates and explains the power of personal narrative as she recounts her initial reasons for
becoming a climate scientist. Though born in Canada (17), Hayhoe describes her family’s move
to Colombia as a nine-year-old, where her parents performed education and church service (21).
Growing up in Colombia, Hayhoe observed how difficult it was for Colombian citizens to
recover from natural disasters, as well as the daily challenges of “poverty, inequality, lack of
clean water and health care; corruption and danger from the mafia, the guerrillas, the
paramilitaries. . . . When rains came, entire neighborhoods were swept away. When drought hit,
people starved” (22). After returning to Canada for college, Hayhoe’s experiences in Colombia
would coalesce under the umbrella of climate science as she “learned how the vulnerabilities
[she] saw in Colombia are reflected around the world and are being amplified by climate
change” (22). By situating the birth of her climate awareness in her family’s mission work in
Colombia, Hayhoe takes the abstract nature of climate change as a complex, global phenomenon
and grounds it in the fabric of her own life and the lives of those poised to be most impacted by
climate change. Yet Hayhoe does not stop here.
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What makes Hayhoe’s climate change narrative potentially so compelling to evangelicals
is that she positions the emergence of her interest in climate change and concern over its impacts
as interconnected with her growing spiritual awareness and sense of Christian duty. “As a
Christian,” Hayhoe continues, “I believe we’re called to love others as we’ve been loved by God.
And that means caring for those who are suffering—their physical needs and their well-being—
which today are being exacerbated by climate impacts. How could I not want to do something
about that? That’s why I became a climate scientist” (22-23). Like Crowley and Mannon, Von
Bergen and Mannon observe that “locating knowledge in personal experience is a familiar way
for believers to articulate religious convictions and to encourage others toward understanding
and action.” This practice of witnessing and storytelling is one that deeply informs Hayhoe’s
climate change communication to fellow evangelicals, as well as the wider public. And while
Hayhoe’s message may be especially compelling to evangelicals due to her appeals to Christian
love as the moral logic for climate action, Hayhoe’s more general strategy of contextualizing
climate change in personal experience and its impact on the lives of real people is likely to make
her calls for climate reform more relatable and more persuasive to audiences in general. Such
appeals that help to personalize climate change for a wider variety of audiences are desperately
needed. Fraser’s observation that “[o]nly participants themselves can decide what is and what is
not of common concern to them” captures well the importance of using all one’s rhetorical tools
to help audiences feel the immediate reality of climate change (129). “What will count as a
matter of common concern will be decided precisely through discursive contestation” (129), and
we are rapidly running out of time for climate reform discourse to generate the consensus needed
for U.S. citizens and lawmakers to mount and maintain the policies needed to limit global
warming to 1.5°C.
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As previously indicated, in addition to the storytelling and witnessing strategies described
above, another way to help audiences experience climate change as an immediate problem is to
present them with the effects of climate change as they manifest in local contexts. In “A Reason
to Believe: Examining the Factors that Determine Individual Views on Global Warming,” social
scientists Christopher P. Borick and Barry G. Rabe surveyed U.S. citizens to learn how political
alignment as well as other personal characteristics may be influencing citizens’ attitudes toward
the evidence supporting the existence of climate change (780). According to their results,
residents of Mississippi were significantly more likely than the national average to report
that the strength of hurricanes hitting the United States had a strong effect on their belief
in global warming. This finding may be linked to the recent history of large hurricanes
hitting the Gulf Coast. Similarly, in states such as California and Mississippi, which have
been hit by severe droughts in recent years, residents are much more likely than the
national average to cite this factor as a strong reason for their belief in a warming planet.
(786-88)
As summarized by Priest, “[t]his research . . . reinforces the idea that connecting climate to direct
experience of observable real-world impact is a vital communication strategy,” even when it
comes to engaging Republican citizens whose “reliance on personal experiences and
observations is consistent with general skepticism about both the media and government” (53).
Borick and Rabe’s study highlights the role that first-hand experience of climate change impacts
can play in encouraging those audiences who have been climate change and climate reform
resistant to acknowledge the pressing importance of climate change as a national and global
problem, a problem that demands a rapid and comprehensive solution.
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Eubanks offers an especially compelling example of how climate change may be made
personal for audiences by grounding climate change discourse in the kinds of localized
experiences that audiences may relate to. Eubanks presents readers with the powerfully
disturbing image of the “[t]ick-infested moose,” a symbol that may be used to drive home the
worsening impacts of climate change on U.S. citizens’ everyday lives (135). In his own act of
storytelling, Eubanks relates how close to his home “moose populations are declining rapidly”
with many scientists speculating that climate change is the culprit (135). Eubanks goes on to
explain that,
[o]verall, the United States is about two degrees Fahrenheit warmer than it was 40 years
ago. In the northern U.S., recent decades have seen shorter winters and longer, hotter
summers. Moose are particularly sensitive to temperature changes, so they act as the
canary in the coal mine, so to speak. (135)
While dwindling moose populations are distressing enough, Eubanks goes on to discuss a
particularly horrifying consequence of climate change: the dramatic increase in tick populations.
Expanding upon Darryl Fears’ Washington Post report, “With Warmer Winters, Ticks
Devastating N.H. Moose Population,” Eubanks explains that,
[i]n the White Mountain area of New Hampshire, the number of moose has dropped from
7,500 to 4,500 and many moose have become infested with deer ticks, which multiply in
warmer weather. A single moose can have as many as 150,000 ticks, and some are so
bothered by them that they rub themselves hairless. Tick-infested moose sometimes die
from anemia as ticks feed off their blood, and at other times the moose die as a result of
hypothermia because they lack the warming protection of their fur (Fears). (Eubanks
135)
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As climate reform rhetors seek a language that will help climate change and climate reform
resistant audiences to feel the importance of climate action, identifying climate change’s impacts
on audiences’ local environments and daily lives may help to convey the immediacy of climate
change as a problem that is not only global and national in scope, but local. Localizing climate
change dramatizes its capacity to disrupt citizens’ ways of life in the most visceral and disturbing
ways. For those audiences in “parts of the northern U.S. and Canada” (135) the image of a tickinfected moose may carry extra rhetorical power. For the Mississippi residents surveyed in
Borick and Rabe’s study, the motivating symbol may be increasingly devastating hurricanes. For
the evangelical Christians engaged by Katharine Hayhoe and YECA, the symbol that is needed
may be Christian love as embodied in caring for those most devastated by the effects of climate
change. Regardless of the symbol, these climate change rhetors and scholars highlight the
persuasive potential of grounding climate change in experiences and knowledges that are
meaningful to both rhetors and audiences.
In this section, I have drawn upon the findings of rhetoric and communication scholars,
as well as the examples of climate reform rhetors Katharine Hayhoe and YECA, to outline
several rhetorical strategies by which climate change and climate reform narratives may be made
more engaging and persuasive for resistant audiences. And while many of these strategies are
tailored for evangelical Christians, specifically, the rhetorical strategies of creating climate
reform narratives that empower, resonate with audiences’ worldviews, foster trust, and that are
grounded in the personal experience of rhetor and audience offer climate reform rhetors a suite
of practices through which climate reform discourse may be made more engaging for a wider
variety of audiences. Such a list is not exhaustive, by any means, and as previously discussed not
all strategies will be available to all rhetors for all audiences. However, such strategies highlight
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possible directions forward on climate change discourse in the United States and, most
importantly, point to the importance of attending to audiences’ experiences and worldviews
when attempting to engage them on questions of climate reform.
Yet, even as I assert the importance of inventing a variety of climate change appeals that
engage multiple U.S. audiences, I think it unlikely that either these or any other climate
communication strategies will be sufficient to generate the middle ground that is needed for the
U.S. to enact and maintain the policy reforms required to limit global warming to 1.5°C. This
pessimism is not so much a response to any weakness in the strategies, themselves, or the work
of the rhetoric and communication scholars and the climate reform rhetors who inspired them. It
is informed by my belief that much of the discourse regarding the achievement of consensus on
climate change in the United States is grounded in a faulty understanding of democratic
discourse that likely overestimates the capacity of the democratic system to encourage citizens to
arrive at societal consensus on such pressing problems as climate change through the sharing of
public discourse.

Consensus is Always Also Dissensus: The Difficulty of Enacting Sustained Climate Reform
in the United States
Thus far, this chapter has reviewed rhetorical strategies by which climate reform rhetors
may more productively engage and persuade resistant audiences on questions of climate change
and climate action. On the one hand, these strategies point to the potential for bringing U.S.
citizens into sufficient consensus to chart a path toward successful climate change mitigation. On
the other, the difficulty of engaging such audiences also begs us to question the notion of
consensus altogether. While the study of apocalyptic rhetoric helps us to appreciate the influence
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of premillennial apocalyptic thinking on the secular climate reform discourse explored in
Chapter Three, as well as climate resistant audiences such as the evangelical Christians
considered in Chapter Four and Republican citizens and leaders more generally, and while the
strategies explored in the preceding section offer climate rhetors (secular and religious)
opportunities for engaging climate resistant audiences, including evangelicals, more
productively, this knowledge and these strategies are likely not sufficient to bridge the rhetorical
and ideological divisions discussed in this project. To the contrary, by studying the influence of
premillennial apocalyptic logics on climate change discourse within the United States, we come
to question the potential of democratic discourse to foster consensus on not just climate change,
but other pressing societal problems. And while awareness and utilization of the rhetorical
strategies explored in this chapter may help to make climate rhetors more persuasive to resistant
audiences, the inability of climate reformers to generate consensus on climate action among U.S.
citizens and lawmakers is likely not due to a rhetorical failure among climate rhetors but reflects
a much more profound and deep-seated contradiction within democracy itself.
In “The Discourse of ‘Environmentalist Hysteria,’” M. Jimmie Killingsworth and
Jacqueline S. Palmer suggest that environmental apocalyptic rhetors, like their antienvironmentalist counterparts, engage apocalyptic rhetoric as the symbolic destruction of the
opposition. Citing Freud and Lacan, apocalyptic rhetoric embodies, according to Killingsworth
and Palmer, “the desire for the relief of tension that assumes the form of a death wish” (15).
While environmental apocalyptic rhetoric may be born out of a desire to heal the environment
and prevent further harm, it ironically prevents such reform by refusing to engage opposing
stakeholders. According to this line of thought, rather than grapple with the rhetorical and
ideological complexity of anti-environmentalist discourse, premillennial environmental
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apocalyptic rhetors construct narratives in which nature and society continue to deteriorate to the
point that anti-environmentalists are forced to confront their own ignorance and failure to act.
The central problem with this use of apocalyptic appeals in environmental discourse is,
Killingsworth and Palmer observe, that such appeals work to shut down discourse rather than
open it up: “Just as Freud’s famous neurotics built elaborate defense mechanisms and projected
end-of-the-world scenarios out of their need to escape the pain of the present, so the risk
apologists and millennial ecologists seem to imagine a world beyond conflict, a world without
politics” (15). Ultimately, Killingsworth and Palmer position such apocalyptic rhetoric as an
obstacle to democratic deliberation: “Though such rhetoric meets well the need to build and
support communities of advocacy, it fails to meet the continuing need for dialogue, deliberation,
and consensus-building—the need to keep the other in the foreground and to adjust one’s
position accordingly” (15). While apocalyptic rhetoric may be a powerful means of producing
and cohering communities, communities that are organized around apocalyptic discourse are
unable to meaningfully or productively participate in public discourse writ large. They are unable
to foster the consensus needed to make progress on the very environmental and societal problems
that are causing them so much distress.
Killingsworth and Palmer are far from alone in positioning apocalyptic rhetoric as
antithetical to democratic discourse. Crowley is similarly critical of the role of apocalyptic
rhetoric in civil discourse, especially as embodied in evangelical Christian3 responses to pressing

As discussed in Chapter Two, Crowley uses the term “fundamentalist” to describe those Christians who interpret
current events through the lens of biblical premillennial apocalypticism (103). While there is, as Andrew Greeley
and Michael Hout observe, little consensus over what the term “‘evangelical’” means and how it relates to the
associated term “‘fundamentalist’” (2), I have chosen to use the term “evangelical” to describe the umbrella of
theologically and often politically conservative Protestant Christians that fundamentalist Christians are a part of. As
demonstrated in Chapter Four, many premillennial Christian apocalyptic rhetors operate as members of evangelical
denominations even as they express attitudes characteristic of fundamentalist Christians as described by Crowley,
namely “the doctrine of biblical inerrancy” (103). Also, as sociologist Nancy T. Ammerman observes, “What makes
a fundamentalist a fundamentalist is not merely a set of conservative beliefs, but the perceived necessity to organize
3
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societal issues. Characterized as a divide between fundamentalist inflexibility and liberal
democratic openness, Crowley asserts that Christian apocalyptists like the adherents of
premillennialism discussed in Chapter Four are unwilling to submit themselves to the process of
democratic deliberation and thereby reach consensus. Drawing from the work of social theorist
Chantal Mouffe, Crowley envisions a democratic process in which citizen participants are not
just focused on defending their worldview but willing to compromise that view to accommodate
the thoughts of others. In The Democratic Paradox, Mouffe suggests that “[a] well-functioning
democracy calls for a vibrant clash of democratic political positions. If this is missing there is
danger that this democratic confrontation will be replaced by a confrontation among other forms
of collective identification, as is the case with identity politics” (104). In this statement, Mouffe
attempts to move beyond “deliberative-democracy” as the belief “that power could be dissolved
through a rational debate” (104) and open up spaces of democratic practice as “‘agonistic
pluralism,’” a democratic model in which consensus and closure are always resisted in an effort
“to keep democratic contestation alive” (105). When one considers such calls for unrestricted
democratic discourse against the backdrop of the starkly politicized landscape of U.S. climate
reform policy today, one may understandably question whether unending democratic
contestation is what we really need right now.
The potential for the democratic model to stymie climate reform efforts has been
illustrated throughout this project. Whether it is secular climate reformers’ calls for citizens to
embrace the attitudes and practices of the Global Climate Strike or Democrats’ calls to embrace
those of the Green New Deal, such appeals are always grounded in worldviews that are not

in defense of those beliefs” (73). As Chapter Four demonstrates, evangelical rhetors and audiences who are
operating within a premillennial mindset will often reinforce their attitudes by circulating discourse online, thereby
offering a defense of their beliefs in the face of a world they perceive to be falling apart.
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shared by large numbers of U.S. citizens, and this lack of consensus has frequently led to major
setbacks to U.S. climate policy, including Democrats’ failure to implement the Green New Deal
into law and the temporary withdrawal of the U.S. from the Paris Agreement under the Trump
administration. Even as of this writing, support for the Biden Administration’s “Build Back
Better Framework”—a plan that promises to be “[t]he largest effort to combat climate change in
American history” while costing taxpayers who earn less “than $400,000 per year” only “a
penny more in taxes” (White House, “President Biden”)—is not only delineated across partisan
lines, but it is likely that Senate Democrats will have difficulty garnering sufficient support
within their own party to pass this important piece of climate reform legislation due to the
resistance of Democratic Senators Kyrsten Sinema and Joe Manchin (Brownstein). Further
complicating climate reform efforts within the U.S., even if Democrats muster the consensus
needed within their own party to pass Build Back Better, the combination of gerrymandered
congressional districts and dwindling national support for President Biden and Democrats may
lead to Republican congressional majorities in 2022 (Epstein and Corasaniti), which may in turn
lead to efforts among Republicans to repeal the Build Back Better plan. Much like former
President Trump’s decision to withdraw the U.S. from the Paris Agreement, a 2022 Republican
victory may undo yet more U.S. progress on climate reform, a cycle that stands to be repeated
again and again even as greenhouse gas emissions mount and crucial carbon reduction targets are
missed. In the face of a threat as urgent as climate change and the inability of U.S. citizens and
lawmakers to arrive at a cohesive and sustained course of climate action, one may come to
question whether democratic deliberation is capable of fostering much needed consensus on this
pressing issue. This is a question that has also been raised by scholars of climate change rhetoric
and communication.
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Even as it offers a variety of rhetorical strategies for engaging resistant audiences on
climate change and climate reform, rhetoric and communication scholarship on climate change
has expressed a certain amount of trepidation regarding the potential for climate change to be
successfully mitigated through democratic deliberation. Much of this trepidation is a response to
the urgent nature of climate change as a problem that increases in magnitude the longer we delay
the implementation of much needed policy reforms. Priest characterizes climate change “as a
communication emergency” and suggests that “[w]e do not have the luxury of time on our side.
Whether or not this means that, ethically, it is acceptable for persuasive communication to
replace more democratic approaches remains an open and quite philosophical question” (17). By
juxtaposing “persuasive” and “democratic” modes of climate change communication (17), Priest
highlights the ways in which climate change as a physical phenomenon calls into question
traditional notions of deliberative democracy because we simply do not have time to engage in
such debate while carbon emissions continue to mount. Yet this process of questioning the
efficacy of democracy as a mechanism for resolving the climate crisis does not equate to a
rejection of democracy altogether. “In our democracy,” Priest continues, “we value both freedom
of belief and freedom of speech. Suppressing dissent would violate those core values, so we
often have to move ahead incrementally and without universal consensus. Yet for climate, time is
increasingly getting short” (117). Likewise, Eubanks acknowledges that,
[c]ertainly, voices of caution serve a valuable purpose. But if, as many climate scientists
tell us, we are approaching a tipping point after which it will be impossible to revise the
warming of the Earth, this kind of reticence could do great—the greatest—harm. If we
hope to halt global warming and to mitigate the effects that we are too late to stop, we
need broad public agreement. (19)
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Even as Eubanks observes that moderate approaches to climate reform are potentially harmful
due to the rapidly accelerating nature of climate change, he concludes his thought by reiterating
the need for societal consensus as the foundation of meaningful climate action. Yet the question
remains: what damage will climate change wreak on the world while high impact carbon emitters
like the U.S. continue to debate an issue about which there may never be “broad public
agreement” (19)? Considered in light of the preceding passages, the work of Priest and Eubanks
illustrates a central paradox of climate reform as a democratic enterprise: even as the accelerating
impacts of climate change compel us to generate sufficient consensus to halt carbon emissions,
the democratic process of arriving at such consensus risks pushing us past the tipping point after
which the worst effects of climate change can no longer be prevented. The urgent nature of this
problem leads Priest to question the notion of consensus altogether: “ . . . climate change is
progressing, and we must do our best to catch up with it. We simply cannot wait for every
‘denier’ to be converted. A functional democratic system should allow for progressive action
despite incomplete societal consensus” (Priest 132).
Priest’s ambiguous relationship to democratic discourse as it relates to the debate
surrounding climate change and climate reform points to a contradiction that is intrinsic to
democratic theory and practice. As articulated by Mouffe, liberal democracy as it is practiced
today contains an inherent contradiction between “the logic of democracy and the logic of
liberalism,” a contradiction that manifests in a conflict between liberal notions of “individual
rights” and self-determination and the system of “democratic self-government” (93). As Mouffe
elsewhere explains, “the liberal emphasis on the respect of ‘human rights’” is bound to exist in
“tension” with the democratic system as “there is no guarantee that a decision made through
democratic procedures will not jeopardize some existing rights” (4). Rather than attempting to
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escape the paradoxical nature of democratic practice, Mouffe embraces it. In “Power, Publics,
and the Rhetorical Uses of Democracy,” Candice Rai suggests that Mouffe’s concept of
“agonistic pluralism” (Mouffe 105) is “a politics that secures contestation as a permanent and
foundational condition of democracy” (Rai 41). Yet, while Mouffe’s vision of agonistic
pluralism may help us to resist the “exclusion” of perspectives that inevitably arrives with any
achieved “consensus” (Mouffe 105), such visions of relentless democratic contestation may not
reflect the constraints that any such democratic system must grapple with when confronted with
as urgent and devastating a threat as climate change. While “[c]ompelling in theory,” Rai
observes that Mouffe’s vision “presents serious limitations in the material world where concrete,
timely, and compromised decisions must finally be made. . . . eventually, public policy must act,
and often act in ways that some part of the constituency may deem ‘undemocratic’” (Rai 41).
While the notion of a radical democracy in which all perspectives may be publicized may seem
desirable, the need to make, implement, and sustain concrete decisions to ensure the well-being
of the populace may require the suspension of such open discourse. As Ralph Cintron observes
in “Democracy and Its Limitations,” “as the nature of constriction shifts increasingly to material
resources, liberty as a founding politics will more than likely be forced to adjust” (106). Stated
differently, as nature continues to press the United States’ hand, it may become increasingly
necessary to dispense with liberal democratic notions of consensus and self-determination in
order to enact policies that protect society as a whole.
Given democracy’s paradoxical relationship between individual rights and democratic
governance, the potential for the democratic state to enact policies to halt climate change that do
not necessarily reflect a consensus is not so much a negation of democracy but an expression of
its indeterminacy. As explained by Cintron, “If democracy is, indeed, a mixed system, then it
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cannot be distorted or corrupted because, in effect, whatever the critic is complaining about is
integral to the system itself” (112). Furthermore, any attempt to idealize democracy or
democratic practice, such as Mouffe’s vision of agonistic pluralism, appeals to a transcendent
notion of democracy that is not grounded in democracy as an indeterminant process. As Rai
explains, “The commitment to solving the problems of democracy by practicing ‘better’
democracy requires one to hold on to a transcendent conception of democracy that does not
exist” (45). Such transcendent visions of democracy pose an especially great challenge to efforts
at climate reform. According to Cintron, “idealized versions of democracy, those that implicitly
or explicitly depend on democracy as automatic virtue, do so by ignoring material limitation”
(103). Indeed, calls for generating broad consensus on climate change overlook the possibility
that the necessary climate actions may only be achieved through enacting policies that a majority
of citizens do not support.
Though not discussing climate change per se, Cintron’s words have nonetheless proven
prophetic: “Today’s problem is that nature itself has become the restricting agent. If we are
technologically unable to solve the impending exhaustion of nature, if we cannot distribute
nature to new billions who also have a right to their share of property and commodities,
democracy as open-ended rights and freedoms will need serious adjustment” (99). Applied to the
climate change debate, Cintron’s statement highlights how the notion of democracy as a system
in which all individual citizens must be engaged and persuaded in order to generate a consensus
as consent to climate reform policies may be out-of-step with the reality that such policies must
be implemented immediately if we are to protect the U.S. and much of the world from the worst
impacts of climate change.
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Conclusion
As we stare over the precipice of rapidly approaching tipping points, we are experiencing
“the exhaustion of democracy strapped to an exhaustion of nature” (Cintron 114). In the absence
of democratic consensus on climate change, it may be that climate reform efforts will need to
move beyond democratic attempts at persuasion in order to enact the policy changes needed to
mitigate climate change. As Rai observes, “The preoccupation in public sphere theories with
how to produce more effective persuasion is undermined by the limit written into the
impossibility of rational deliberation to produce consensus, a shared sense of justice, or material
force” (46). Taken further, Rai’s statement may be applied to those rhetorical strategies explored
earlier in this chapter. Even as the rhetorical strategies of creating climate reform narratives that
empower, resonate with audiences’ worldviews, foster trust, and that are grounded in the
personal experience of rhetor and audience may help climate rhetors to make climate reform
discourse more persuasive for audiences, it is uncertain that such strategies will be sufficient to
generate consensus on climate change, at least in time to prevent its worst impacts. Indeed, the
very notion that more deft discourse will be able to fix climate change seems to “cast rhetoric in
the role of superhero” by supposing that enhanced rhetorical practice will be sufficient to
transform the consciousness of a populace whose members possess deeply divided perspectives
on the common good and whose system of democratic governance continues to flip between
radically opposed ideological and political worldviews making sustained climate reform
exceedingly difficult if not improbable (Rai 46).
The combination of climate change’s determinacy as a physical reality and the
indeterminacy of democracy within the United States does not bode well for efforts to halt
greenhouse gas emissions or for the populace as a whole. Despite ongoing efforts among
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Democrats and climate reformers to enact sustained policy changes that will mitigate climate
change, such efforts are always at risk of being undermined by ideological divisions and the
ever-changing nature of the political landscape within the U.S. And while the study of the
influence of apocalyptic rhetorical frames on citizens’ attitudes and behaviors regarding pressing
societal issues like climate change may help climate rhetors develop more nuanced
understandings of their audiences’ worldviews and even engage those audiences using an
expanded suite of rhetorical strategies, it is unknown whether such efforts will be sufficient to
generate and sustain consensus on climate change given the uncertain political and ideological
landscape of the U.S. today. Yet, even as we acknowledge the difficulty of achieving sustained,
impactful climate reform on a national scale through democratically achieved policy reforms, it
would be useful at this point to consider what alternatives may exist to such large-scale efforts.
To illuminate some of these approaches, I conclude this chapter by exploring some of the myriad
climate mitigation efforts that are always occurring in local and global contexts even as U.S.
climate policy flounders.
The United States’ inability to arrive at a consensus on climate reform is profoundly
troubling. In addition to the reality that the U.S. continues to contribute to the always
intensifying effects of climate change, the inability of U.S. citizens and lawmakers to achieve the
goals of the Paris Agreement illustrates how the U.S. has shirked its responsibilities to minimize
the climate harm its emissions inflict throughout the world. As Eileen E. Schell and colleagues
observe in their “Introduction” to a special issue of Enculturation focusing on the Rhetorics and
Literacies of Climate Change, “developed nations” such as the U.S. have “the responsibility of
acting to prevent further planetary destruction and taking proactive steps toward public policies
and everyday rhetorics, literacies, and practices that are positive and sustainable for the planet,
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human, and non-human life.” And when we consider that the most negative impacts of climate
change are reserved for the most vulnerable communities throughout the U.S. and the world, we
must acknowledge that the U.S. failure to halt carbon emissions is not merely a failure of policy
and deliberative democratic discourse, but a moral failure as well. Yet, even as ideological and
political divisions in the U.S. delay uniform, national environmental action against climate
change, we may still find hope and models for meaningful climate communication and action in
the many forms of climate activism that are being implemented every day in the U.S. and the
world.
While much of the discussion of climate reform discourse in this project has concentrated
on such large-scale, highly publicized efforts as the Global Climate Strike, prominent climate
reform figures such as Greta Thunberg and Katharine Hayhoe, intergovernmental texts such as
the Paris Agreement and the IPCC’s climate reports, as well as such U.S.-specific policy efforts
as the Green New Deal and the Biden Administration’s Build Back Better Plan, I would be
remiss if I did not highlight the wide variety of climate activism occurring in the U.S. and the
world. In “Local Expertise, Global Effects: Amplifying Activist Arguments for Climate Change
Action,” Julie Collins Bates points to the activist work occurring “in the predominately Latinx
Chicago-area neighborhood of Little Village” as a compelling example of how citizens may
respond to the effects of climate change in local contexts. From conducting a successful twelveyear campaign to close “two coal-fired power plants [that] were responsible for the high rates of
asthma in their community” to providing public tours “of contaminated sites in Little Village,”
the members of the “Little Village Environmental Justice Organization (LVEJO)” exemplify the
power of local communities to organize in response to environmental threats. As Bates observes,
“LVEJA activists integrate climate change advocacy efforts into other local concerns they seek
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to address because these local issues, ranging from food insecurity to industrial pollution, are
intertwined with global climate change.” Even as we face what seems like a failure of large-scale
climate reform discourse in the U.S. to create the change needed to avoid the worst impacts of
climate change, we may look to the climate activism of communities like the Little Village for
examples of how citizens continue to navigate the effects of climate change and models for what
climate reform may look like in the localized contexts of our daily lives and communities.
For another example of how local communities may model meaningful climate action
even in the face of policy stagnation, we may look to the environmental and climate activism of
Puerto Rico. In “Colonial Causes and Consequences: Climate Change and Climate Chaos in
Puerto Rico,” Karrieann Soto Vega describes the efforts of activist groups such as Casa Pueblo,
who have been active since the 1980s and have successfully halted “open pit mining” in Puerto
Rico. By drawing attention to organized environmental efforts like Casa Pueblo, Soto Vega helps
to “rhetorically historicize and bring further light into the environmental (in)justice and activism
that has existed in Puerto Rico long before Hurricane Maria and the contemporary debate over
climate change.” Far from waiting for policy makers to enact much needed climate reforms, the
ongoing environmental activist work of Puerto Rico models how meaningful climate reform may
occur in the absence of government support through grassroots efforts. In “Resilience, Recovery,
and Refusal: The (Un)Tellable Narratives of Post-María Puerto Rico,” Christina Boyles likewise
describes “the Archivo de Respuestas Emergencias de Puerto Rico (AREPR),” a collaborative
project between Boyles and “a group of Puerto Rican scholars and community organizations” to
create “an open-access digital repository documenting the lived experiences of Puerto Ricans in
the wake of Hurricane María, the 2020 earthquakes, and COVID-19.” As a repository for Puerto
Ricans’ knowledge and experience of environmental adaptation, the AREPR offers “a set of best
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practices for disaster-stricken communities, especially those experiencing low bandwidth,
limited digital infrastructure, and climate vulnerability.” In addition to providing audiences with
helpful strategies for resisting the effects of climate change in local contexts, the AREPR creates
opportunities for “acknowledging, promoting, and appreciating the unique knowledge developed
in Puerto Rico during and after these disasters.” As Boyles further states, “this project seeks to
intervene in climate colonialism by advocating for climate justice.” Like Soto Vega, Boyles’
research and the AREPR project help to resist the erasure of local knowledge and experiences
that can occur in the wider debates on climate change and climate reform.
While the examples discussed so far showcase the power of individuals and communities
to enact environmental and climate action in local contexts, they also illustrate the inherently
transnational nature of climate change as a global phenomenon that has uneven localized
impacts. In “Managing Environmental Risks in the Age of Climate Change: Rhetorical Agency
and Ecological Literacies of Transnational Women During the April 2015 Nepal Earthquake,”
Sweta Baniya describes how studying Nepali women’s responses to the 2015 Nepal Earthquake
helps to “illuminate the kinds of future responses that will be needed in the wake of climate
change disasters and events.” Significantly, Baniya’s “transnational women participants worked
to study the immediate impacts of the earthquake, to raise funds, and to conduct relief and rescue
activities without any governmental support but by interacting and negotiating it within their
localities and beyond.” From “conducting fundraising, which helped hundreds of thousands of
people in Nepal receive disaster relief, to helping to “create a radio program designed to involve
the community while curating knowledge and meeting the information needs of the people
regarding environmental awareness,” the women Baniya describes provided a wide range of
disaster assistance to the Nepali people, often in ways that utilized web technology and social
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media to span national borders. In the case of the radio program, in particular, Baniya observes
that “[s]uch programs in the future could be beneficial in sharing knowledge about climate
change literacies in post-disaster contexts in which community is involved in creating knowledge
about understanding and managing risks put forth by climate change.” As this statement
suggests, and as the stories Baniya has collected illustrate, Nepali women’s response to the 2015
earthquake showcases the power of communities to respond to the impacts of climate change in
ways that address environmental harm in both local and global contexts.
The research that Eileen E. Schell, Charlotte Hogg, and Kim Donehower, as well as Julie
Collins Bates, Karrieann Soto Vega, Christina Boyles, and Sweta Baniya have presented in the
Rhetorics and Literacies of Climate Change illustrates the rich array of possibilities that exist for
climate change and climate reform discourse that engages audiences in a variety of contexts. By
studying climate reform discourse as it unfolds in such local and transnational contexts, we are
reminded that the work of climate action does not simply stop because Republicans and
Democrats cannot agree on a path forward, or because many evangelical Christians continue to
vote for Republican candidates that actively resist meaningful climate reform policies, or
because of any of the many points of ideological opposition that this project has addressed that
serve to stymie climate action on a national scale. Even in the face of stalled national policy,
individuals and communities in the U.S. and across the world continue to respond to the problem
of climate change in complex and impactful ways. And while one of the primary goals of this
project has been to explore the influence of apocalyptic rhetoric on climate reform discourse as it
unfolds within the broader public contexts of the Global Climate Strike, including Greta
Thunberg’s climate reform communication, and U.S. climate policy, it is important to
acknowledge the environmental perspectives and possibilities for action and engagement that lie
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beyond this approach, possibilities that will only become more and more and important as the
effects of climate change continue to worsen and the need to act grows.
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CHAPTER SIX
Conclusion: Where Do We Go from Here? Reflecting on the Implications of Apocalyptic
Rhetoric for the Study and Production of Climate Reform Discourse

In A Rhetoric of Motives, Kenneth Burke suggests that all symbols and narratives are
mythic (207). Their meaning is derived, not from the utterance itself, but from a network of
symbols and narratives that transcends both utterance, speaker, and audience. The job of the
rhetorical scholar is to investigate such utterances, to denaturalize them in order to unveil the
motives behind their use and the attitudes they authorize in the world. Applied to the discourse
surrounding climate reform within the United States, Burke’s rhetorical theory leads us to
consider that the problem of dealing with climate change is, at least in part, a problem of
transcendence. This problem has a dual nature.
On the one hand, many rhetors and audiences believe they have access to an
understanding of climate change that transcends the rhetorical situation itself. Whether it is the
secular climate reformers discussed in Chapter Three or the evangelical Christians explored in
Chapter Four, both the proponents and deniers of climate reform tend to position their own views
of climate change and action as true and, therefore, inherently persuasive. In this model of
transcendence, climate change is treated as a problem that has already been solved. We just have
to get our act together and implement the solution. The problem with this view of climate change
discourse is, as the rhetoric and communication scholars we have considered throughout this
project demonstrate, it does not adequately account for the influence of worldview on the
interpretation of even the most universally agreed-upon scientific facts regarding climate change
and what climate actions should be undertaken in response to those facts.
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As a case-in-point, I have devoted much space in this project to investigating the
influence of premillennial apocalyptic rhetoric on both secular climate reformers and evangelical
Christians’ attitudes toward climate change communication. By examining recent discourse that
secular climate reformers and evangelical rhetors have produced to help audiences make sense of
not just climate change but other pressing societal problems like the coronavirus pandemic, I
have demonstrated that one’s apocalyptic frame can have a remarkable influence on how one
understands and communicates both the problem of climate change and proposed solutions. For
both secular climate reformers and evangelical Christians, understanding of climate change is
mediated by values and narratives that are independent of climate change as a natural
phenomenon. Far from demanding a particular response, climate change—like so many of the
existential crises that currently confront the United States—operates much like a Rorschach test
for many rhetors and audiences. It reflects our values back to us, yielding nothing of itself but for
the destruction it wreaks.
The problem of climate change is a problem of transcendence in another way, as well.
Just as secular climate reformers and climate reform resistant audiences such as evangelical
Christians often believe that their understanding of climate change or other pressing societal
problems transcends the rhetorical situation in which such issues must always be decided, they
are often unwilling to transcend their own attitudes toward climate change in order to engage
with the worldviews of opposing stakeholders. In this sense, the problem of climate change and
climate action is simultaneously one of too much transcendence and not enough. In Toward a
Civil Discourse, Sharon Crowley observes that “[i]n the present argumentative climate the
burden of seeking change falls unfairly on liberals rather than on apocalyptists. This is so
because postmoderns, liberals, and other skeptics can more easily abandon portions of their
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belief systems than can apocalyptists” (196). In the context of climate change discourse,
however, Crowley’s suggestion that liberals be willing to submit themselves and their beliefs to
the scrutiny and transformative potential of deliberative democratic discourse can only go so far.
As my study of the secular climate reformers in Chapter Three indicates, refusal to
support the cause of climate reform is often cast as a moral failure among audiences, one that
privileges consumer-capitalist convenience over the welfare of those populations most
vulnerable to the effects of climate change. Indeed, because the United States’ degree of climate
action stands to have a profound impact, negative or positive, on the climate burden experienced
by those most disadvantaged within the U.S. and across the world, U.S. citizens and lawmakers’
inability to halt carbon emissions surely places the U.S. on uncertain ethical ground. As Olúfẹ́mi
O. Táíwò and Beba Cibralic observe in “The Case for Climate Reparations,” “Developed
economies are largely responsible for the climate crisis and have more resources to manage
climate impacts, while developing countries are often less responsible and poorly equipped to
survive the impacts. . . . ” As a primary contributor to climate change, the United States bears a
unique moral responsibility to mitigate its impacts on vulnerable populations, especially “the
21.5 million people fleeing their homes as a result of sudden onset weather hazards every year,”
as well as the even greater numbers of migrants who will be displaced as the effects of climate
change continue to accelerate.
While Táíwò and Cibralic acknowledge the value of policy efforts like the Green New
Deal to steer developed Western nations toward “important mitigation measures,” the authors
suggest that much more extensive reforms are required to avoid a state of intensifying “climate
apartheid.” In order to begin to address climate migration, as well as the historic inequities that
have served to produce climate change in the first place and which climate change will continue
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to exacerbate, Táíwò and Cibralic call upon developed nations such as the United States to pay
reparations for the damage and violence they have inflicted on the developing world. “A
reparatory approach seeks to understand which harms were committed and how through
structural change, those harms can be addressed. A historically informed response to climate
migration would force Western states to grapple with their role in creating the climate crisis and
rendering parts of the world uninhabitable.” In the face of climate change’s intensifying impacts
on the world, such calls for reparations will likely continue to grow even as many U.S. citizens
and lawmakers continue to grapple (or avoid grappling) with the moral implications of the
United States’ role in causing such profound, temporally and geographically expansive
environmental and societal harm. Yet, even as we acknowledge the ways in which the United
States is implicated in climate change, both in terms of global warming’s origination and the
unequal impacts it continues to have on the world, my study of competing apocalyptic discourses
in this project has shown that the moral logics that would seek to acknowledge and repair such
harm are far from universal and cannot always be relied upon to persuade those audiences whose
own ideological frames lead them to view climate change and other pressing problems from
within alternative ideological and ethical systems.
As a case-in-point, whereas the secular climate reformers considered in Chapter Three
view climate inaction as a moral failure and an expression of the greatest selfishness among U.S.
citizens, the evangelical Christians considered in Chapter Four might suggest that any
meaningful effort to fix the world must begin—not with policies and laws designed to transform
U.S. infrastructure in the pursuit of carbon neutrality—but by addressing the spiritual disease
rotting humanity’s core: the original sin that brought death and corruption into the world and
which is the sole root of all the problems facing us today, including climate change. Whether it is
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secular climate reform or premillennial evangelical apocalyptism, both frames use the language
of moral decay to cast the opposition as occupying an ethically untenable stance. And yet, to
return to Burke’s language of the mythic, the ethical or unethical nature of one’s climate
response is determined, not by one’s actions or even one’s words, but the narrative frameworks
in which those words and actions are made sensible. In what amounts to an impasse between
opposing apocalyptic frames, it is unclear how the attitudes of secular climate reformers and
those of evangelical Christians may be brought into sufficient alignment to generate consensus
on climate change and climate reform moving forward. In the face of such intractability, it is
difficult for scholars of rhetoric to know how to respond. The present study illustrates this
challenge.
Of course, one might reasonably question whether such consensus is necessary or even
desirable given the urgent nature of climate change and the moral responsibility that U.S. citizens
and lawmakers have to act. As discussed in Chapter Five, the ideological oppositions that
characterize climate reform discourse in the U.S. lead us to question whether democratic
deliberation is capable of generating consensus on this pressing issue at all. Yet I suggest that by
considering the influence of premillennial apocalyptic rhetoric on both secular climate reformers
and evangelicals’ understanding of climate change as a societal threat and climate reform as a
response to that threat, we may have a better understanding of the influence of apocalyptic
rhetoric on public discourse on pressing societal problems, more generally. Stated simply: no
matter how devastating a threat might be or how morally implicated a particular audience or
group of stakeholders is in the creation and/or reverberation of that threat for the nation and the
world, one’s understanding of that threat and one’s imagined capacity for action in response to it
will be, to some extent, influenced by one’s apocalyptic frame.
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Drawing upon the apocalyptic rhetorical theory of Barry Brummett, I have brought
attention to the power of apocalyptic thinking to influence citizens’ attitudes toward climate
change and climate reform discourse, and I have drawn readers’ attention to this particularly
profound obstacle to climate reform efforts that would seek large-scale support among U.S.
voters and lawmakers. More importantly, I have also illuminated how the meaning of climate
change for these stakeholders is mediated by the premillennial apocalyptic frame. Despite the
dire nature of the challenges that face the climate reform movement within the U.S., the study of
the influence of apocalyptic rhetoric on citizens’ attitudes toward climate change is not so much
concerned with the end of any particular discursive model but the need to think about climate
reform discourse in radically different ways.
One way of rethinking climate reform discourse is, as suggested in Chapter Five, to
acknowledge that liberal democratic models of conflict resolution are likely incapable of
overcoming the deep-seated ideological divisions that fuel much of the climate change debate
within the U.S. Far from being limited to climate change, my analysis of the influence of
apocalyptic rhetoric on citizens’ attitudes toward climate reform starkly illustrates how the
premillennial apocalyptic frame mediates citizens’ attitudes toward other pressing societal
problems such as the coronavirus pandemic. As an analytical and theoretical tool, apocalyptic
rhetoric promises to be increasingly useful to scholars of public rhetoric who would seek to
understand the narratives and logics that inform the increasingly violent ideological oppositions
and refusals of engagement that characterize public discourse in the United States today. As
demonstrated through my analysis of secular climate reform discourse in Chapter Three and
evangelical responses to pressing societal problems like climate change and the COVID-19
pandemic in Chapter Four, by considering the apocalyptic frames through which audiences
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interpret such problems, we may better understand the values, beliefs, and symbols that are likely
to motivate audiences either for or against a particular course of action.
Of course, paying attention to the apocalyptic frames that influence an audience’s
understanding of a particular issue in no way guarantees that one will be able to motivate an
audience to adopt a given course of action. As suggested in Chapter Five, even the most wellthought-out and rhetorically nuanced strategies may not be enough to engage resistant audiences
if one approaches those audiences as an outsider. Likewise, as demonstrated in Chapter Four,
even the persuasiveness of such evangelical climate reformers as Katharine Hayhoe, whose
climate reform discourse is grounded in evangelical cultural logics, is impacted by the structural
legacies of patriarchy that continue to mediate evangelical Christian spaces (Von Bergen and
Mannon). However, even with such qualifications in place, I suggest that attending to the
influence of apocalyptic thinking allows one to develop a more complex understanding of the
often violent oppositions that characterize public discourse in the U.S. today and may also equip
one with greater possibilities for thinking about and engaging such discourses, even if the
implementation of such strategies is always uneven, always imperfect, always subject to the
material and social constraints of one’s rhetorical situation.
As the world continues to warm, one would expect the urgent nature of the climate threat
to mobilize citizens en masse to support the immediate and large-scale local, national, and global
reforms needed to halt greenhouse gas emissions and prevent the worst effects of climate change.
Yet, despite the imminent threat of climate change, U.S. citizens and lawmakers are unable to
reach such consensus. Far from bringing U.S. citizens together in a united effort to avoid
disaster, the pressure exerted by climate change has only deepened the fissures between U.S.
citizens by reinforcing already existing ideological divisions. This is not to suggest that the U.S.
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is approaching a “boiling point,” however. To suggest that such a point exists is to interpret
current events from within a teleology in which public discourse will deteriorate until it reaches a
terminus at which some kind of “order” will be restored. Yet this can only be another instance of
mythical thinking. Indeed, to assert that public discourse can grow only so discordant until our
democracy somehow corrects itself is to assert yet another premillennial apocalyptic frame, to
offer yet another narrative of order supplanting disorder through the operation of some
transcendent principle that lies hidden behind the chaos of our times.
The reality—as I see it—is that there is no boiling point because there is no end point to
the divisions that dominate the public sphere at this moment. Whether it is the debate
surrounding climate reform or the coronavirus pandemic, there is no line of escape from the
oscillation between perspectives, the turbulent sea of discourse that leads only to more discourse
ad infinitum (or ad nauseum, as many of us likely feel right now). For democratic theorists such
as Chantal Mouffe, this constant movement of discourse without consensus—which can only
ever be coercion masquerading as widespread agreement—is the play of a more authentic
democracy (105). However, I would suggest that such consensus has the potential to be more
than coercion. Rather than being the coercive suppression of opposing perspectives, consensus
may also be achieved through the voluntary suspension of one’s tendency (and, from a liberal
democratic perspective, freedom) to unilaterally reject the perspectives and attitudes of those we
do not agree with, indeed, those whose worldviews and behaviors we may find utterly repulsive.
To be clear, I have scant faith that such an act of transcendence—and the overcoming of one’s
repulsion in our times is very much a transcendent action if not an outright miracle—can occur.
Turning hate into tolerance in times like these is like turning water into wine. However, if we
consider such discursive impasses as that which characterizes the climate change debate
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rhetorically, we may find a path—however overgrown and obscured—that leads beyond the din
of our own rush to judgment and which helps us to better understand the influence of apocalyptic
thinking on citizens’ understanding of pressing societal problems like climate change.
By raising the possibility that rhetoric scholars, as well as secular climate reformers, may
suspend the tendency to immediately dismiss those attitudes and behaviors that serve to prevent
climate change mitigation, I do not suggest that we ignore the structural problems that help to
perpetuate climate change, especially as it relates to climate reform resistant communities such
as the evangelical Christians discussed in this project. As Susan M. Shaw demonstrates in
“Oregon Is Burning While Most White Christians Deny Climate Science,” it would be an
oversimplification to suggest that white evangelical Protestants’ relative lack of concern toward
climate change and its impact on the most vulnerable communities within the U.S. and across the
globe is a function of religious belief alone, apocalyptic or otherwise. As Shaw observes, “The
inability of so many white Christians to hear the urgency of climate science suggests the depth to
which the white church is invested in white supremacy.” In a statement that resonates with
Táíwò and Cibralic’s calls for the United States and other developed Western nations to enact
extensive climate reparations, Shaw calls upon all white Christians to take responsibility for the
influence of racism on the Church’s response to climate change.
Poor people of color are both the most vulnerable to the effects of climate change and
the ones who contribute least to greenhouse gases. White Christians will have to change,
and the system of white supremacy itself will have to be dismantled, if we have any hope
of averting irreversible climate disaster. For now, the white church is mostly complicit
with the intersecting systems of racism and global capitalism that underlie climate
change.
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In this passage, Shaw powerfully asserts the role that racism plays in the white evangelical
community’s tendency to resist climate reform efforts, racism that is embodied in evangelicals’
continued support of former President Trump. As with its legacies of patriarchy and its tendency
to repress women’s ability to occupy positions of leadership and authority within the Church
(Mannon 150; Von Bergen and Mannon), the evangelical Christian community’s attitudes
toward pressing societal problems like climate change and its reception of climate reform rhetors
are not just mediated by the premillennial apocalyptic frame, but the structural legacies of race
and gender.
Throughout this project, I have examined a wide range of texts in order to demonstrate
the influence of apocalyptic rhetoric on the production and reception of climate change and
climate reform discourse in the United States. From Greta Thunberg and Global Climate Strike
rhetors Mia Werger and Anna Siegel, as well as the policy of the Green New Deal, to
premillennial evangelical rhetors such as David Jeremiah and Jimmy Evans whose audiences use
apocalyptic frames to make sense of the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as evangelical climate
reform rhetors such as Katharine Hayhoe and the Young Evangelicals for Climate Action who
articulate climate change discourse within evangelical cultural logics, I have sought to illustrate
how premillennial apocalyptic rhetoric shapes citizens’ attitudes toward such pressing societal
problems as climate change. To develop this inquiry into apocalyptic rhetoric and its impact on
the production and reception of environmental communication, I have drawn primarily from the
work of Barry Brummett, whose research on secular apocalyptic rhetoric, in particular, helps to
demonstrate that apocalyptic rhetoric is not limited to religious contexts but represents what
Brummett has termed a “bedrock” discourse in that it equips a wider variety of audiences in an
equally wide variety of contexts with “fundamental, bedrock ways of thinking and talking about
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the world” (52). Likewise, I have drawn from the work of rhetoric and communication scholars
Susanna Priest and Phillip Eubanks, as well as M. Jimmie Killingsworth, Jacqueline S. Palmer,
and others to articulate the importance of attending to the ideological frames that influence
audiences’ attitudes and behaviors toward climate change and climate reform, especially when
those attitudes are influenced by apocalyptic rhetorical frames like the premillennial frame
examined in this project. Undergirding this exploration has been the combined insights of Krista
Ratcliffe and Kenneth Burke who have demonstrated that any attempt to represent a community
or ideology through textual analysis necessarily provides a selective perspective on that
community by dislocating a given text from its lived reality as social discourse, as an utterance
produced by a particular person or community at a certain time in response to particular
circumstances (Ratcliffe 78; Burke, “Terministic Screens” 45).
Rather than attempting to offer a definitive, absolute, or in any way transcendent vision
of climate change and climate reform discourse within the U.S., much less the world, I have
sought to demonstrate how paying attention to the influence of apocalyptic rhetoric on climate
communication within the contexts of public discourse and policy formation within the United
States may help climate reform rhetors, rhetorical scholars, and other interested parties to make
some sense of the often violent and seemingly inexplicable ideological oppositions that have
stalled progress on much needed climate actions within the United States. More importantly, this
project suggests that by attending to the apocalyptic dimensions of pressing societal problems
like climate change, we may begin to craft discourse that is more likely to engage (or at least not
further alienate) resistant audiences. And while such engagement may, as discussed in Chapter
Five, never generate public consensus, it will help to open up possibilities for rhetors and
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audiences to arrive at a more mutual understanding of climate change and the importance of
rapid, comprehensive, and enduring climate action.
Given this project’s focus on the apocalyptic dimensions of climate change and climate
reform discourse as it unfolds within the broad scales of the public sphere and policy formation,
there are a variety of opportunities for future research to examine how apocalyptic thinking
mediates the production and reception of climate reform discourse in local and transnational
contexts. As I discuss in my conclusion to Chapter Five, the work that Eileen E. Schell, Charlotte
Hogg, and Kim Donehower, as well as Julie Collins Bates, Karrieann Soto Vega, Christina
Boyles, and Sweta Baniya have published in the Rhetorics and Literacies of Climate Change
issue of Enculturation showcases the power of individuals and communities to act locally and
transnationally in response to environmental and natural threats, many of which will continue to
be exacerbated by climate change. This research points to the potential for future scholars to
explore the influence of religious and secular apocalyptic rhetoric on rhetors and audiences’
understanding of climate change and climate reform within such local and transnational contexts.
In what ways do apocalyptic frames serve to structure individuals and communities’
understanding of climate harm as it impacts them in everyday contexts, and how do such
apocalyptic frames work to circumscribe rhetors and audiences’ possibilities for climate action?
These are just a couple of the questions that the study of apocalyptic rhetoric helps to raise.
However, even as future research might continue to examine the influence of apocalyptic
rhetoric on citizens’ understanding of pressing societal problems like climate change, albeit in a
wider variety of local and transnational contexts than are explored in this project, researchers
would also be wise to examine the influence of apocalyptic rhetoric on evangelical citizens’
continued support of conservative political leaders such as former President Donald Trump. As
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Kristin Kobes Du Mez indicates in Jesus and John Wayne: How White Evangelicals Corrupted a
Faith and Fractured a Nation, premillennial apocalyptic belief in the world’s impending
destruction has long been fused with the desire “to establish a Kingdom of God on earth” (94).
By studying the influence of apocalyptic rhetoric on evangelicals’ understanding of political and
policy discourse, scholars may help to illuminate the ways in which evangelicals’ support of
conservative leaders may reflect this combination of pessimism and optimism that is such a
defining feature of the premillennial apocalyptic frame as articulated within evangelical
Christian discourse. Even as premillennial evangelicals are pessimistic about the secular world’s
ability to adequately address the world’s problems, they remain optimistic about a future that is,
ultimately, in God’s hands. “To understand this tension between hope and despair,” Brummett
writes, “one must approach apocalyptic as rhetorical, to see that tension as directly linked to the
needs of an audience” (59). Indeed, it is evangelicals’ despair toward a fallen world that allows
for the joyful anticipation of release from this world and eternal union with Jesus Christ.
Furthermore, as demonstrated in Chapter Four, far from fostering otherworldly apathy toward the
affairs of this world, premillennialism encourages evangelical audiences to adopt particular
attitudes that influence their actions in the world, including what political leaders and policies
they support or oppose. By examining premillennial apocalyptic rhetoric as it influences
evangelicals’ attitudes toward specific policies beyond climate reform, as well as evangelicals’
support of conservative leaders, future researchers may help to expand rhetoric scholars and the
public’s understanding of the role that premillennialism plays, directly or indirectly, in
structuring the political public sphere and policy formation within the U.S.
As I conclude this dissertation, I am mindful of Susan M. Shaw’s observation that
evangelicals’ reluctance to engage the work of climate reform is, to some extent, a reflection of
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the white supremacist cultural logics that work to shape many evangelical Christians’
understanding of environmental harm. As with the tendency of evangelical spaces to be mediated
by the logics of patriarchy (Mannon 150; Von Bergen and Mannon), the influence of racism on
evangelicals’ understanding of climate change illustrates the complex histories that work to
shape evangelicals’ attitudes toward pressing societal problems. However, even as we
acknowledge the material legacies of oppression that influence evangelical audiences’
perceptions of such problems as climate change, as well as the moral implications of evangelical
resistance to climate reform efforts and continued support of conservative leaders who are often
hostile to environmental reform, if we consider such resistance rhetorically, we may begin to
acknowledge that the inability of U.S. citizens to reach consensus on climate change is not solely
the result of evangelicals’ moral failure or that of the United States as a nation. It is, to some
degree, an illustration of the limitations of democratic discourse, indeed, of language itself to
bring opposed stakeholders into sufficient ideological alignment to chart a shared path forward.
There is no transcendent principle being violated in U.S. citizens’ failure to agree upon a path
forward on climate change or any other pressing societal issue. There is only, as there has only
ever been, a failure of language to communicate and motivate, a failure that reflects the profound
differences in perspective among U.S. citizens and lawmakers regarding what is considered true
and who is to be trusted and granted authority to communicate and take action on that truth.
At the risk of reinscribing my own mythic thinking, I would conclude this project with a
small suggestion. Perhaps it is only by acknowledging the non-transcendent nature of democratic
discourse, indeed, of any discourse, that we may attune ourselves to the values and rhetorical
frames that motivate U.S. citizens not just on climate change but other pressing, “existential”
problems. By rejecting dialectic as the movement toward a pre-existing solution, we may
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encounter the conflicted discourse that dominates the U.S. public sphere as the rhetoricians we
are—even if what we learn from this encounter is that no disaster, however cataclysmic, will
ever be sufficient to engender allegiance to a particular course of action if one’s audience is not
sufficiently motivated to embrace that action. Such motives are not to be found in the cataclysm
itself but only in the rhetorical and ideological frames through which even the most devastating
events are given meaning. It is in the production of such motives that the work of rhetoric reveals
itself as the vital endeavor it always has been and will always remain.
The work of rhetoric offers us, as it always has, a path forward. Whether or not the
incremental work of engendering such motives in resistant audiences can be effected in time to
avoid the most devastating impacts of climate change—and whether or not climate reform
rhetors will have the desire or capacity to do such work—is another matter.
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